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Summary of Thesis.
This work examines periods and episodes which
illustrate the Labour Party's developing attitudes towards the monarchy.
Chapter One traces the historical background in the nineteenth century,
identifying those aspects of radicalism, republicanism and a changing
monarchy which had a subsequent bearing on Labour views. It finds that
the lack of a serious challenge to the monarchy resulted from its
increasing popular acceptance, the prevalence of anti-monarchic
sentiment over republicanism, and the indifference of social democracy to
strictly political reform. Chapter Two finds the monarchy increasingly
accepted by Labour during the Great War, and includes sections on
republicanism during the war, patriotism, anti-Germanism, royal visits, civil
liberties, and the Crown and royal philanthropy. Chapter Three
concentrates on the early 1930's, and examines Labour's concerns about
the powers of the Crown in the aftermath of 1931. The ideas of Laski and
Cripps receive particular attention, as does the paradox of the left's fear
of the use of the Crown's powers to frustrate them, whilst recognising the
necessity of its use to realise their Jacobin plans. The next two chapters
incorporate discourse analysis techniques. Chapter Four takes an
extended look at the 1935 Silver Jubilee and 1937 Coronation
celebrations, and analyses the range of Labour responses to the events,
at local as well as national level. The chapter includes a section of textual
analysis, contrasting Labour's Daily Herald with its popular rivals in their
coverage of the two celebrations. The contrastive analysis points up the
centrality of Labour's constitutionalism to its approach to the monarchy.
Chapter Five deals with the Abdication crisis, again analysing the spread
of Labour opinion, contrasting those ready to exploit the political
opportunity with the constitutionalists. Chapter Six looks at the Honours
System, and at the development of Labour's attitudes and conduct in the
matter. It finds Labour drawn into the system it inherited and examines the
justifications offered.
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1Introduction. 
This introduction will contextualise the content and explain the
approach to be found in the succeeding chapters. First, it will provide a
brief account of the recent and contemporary states of Labour opinion on
the monarchy; examining where we are now as a prelude to where we
have come from. Next, it will review some themes (and recent literature on
those themes), which have a particular bearing on the general topic.
These can be measured against the historical account which follows. The
three introductory thematic sections are intended to raise issues, pose
questions and indicate patterns which are developed at various points
later in the thesis. The themes are: Labour, the monarchy and social
class; Labour, the monarchy and the ideology of Englishness; Labour, the
monarchy and the British Constitution. These three sections are not
considered, and are not to be regarded, as discrete thematic categories.
They impinge upon each other in myriad ways, obviously and subtly. The
complexity of Labour attitudes to the monarchy derives, in part, from the
complexity of its attitudes in these three areas. A further section will
summarise the scope and orientation of the thesis. Finally, there is a
description and justification of the methodology (or methodologies)
employed in the body of the work.
21. Topicality and Relevance. 
When this thesis was started, in 1976, it lacked the obvious topicality
which it may now (1999) possess. In the middle to late 1970s, the
monarchy was hardly a burning issue in Labour politics, apart from the
specific matter of royal expenditure. An indication of the timidity with
which Labour approached the constitutional aspects of monarchy is to be
found in its "Machinery of Government Study Group", set up by the Home
Policy Committee of the National Executive Committee (N.E.C.). Despite
its stated intentions of examining the question of the monarchy, all that it
ever produced was an anodyne memorandum by Michael English, which
observed that,
"The monarchy is popular and without effective power and we
do not wish to change it in either of those respects, though we should like
an appropriate commission or committee to consider how it might be
democratised further, as has been done in the Scandinavian monarchies
and the Netherlands."'
The committee did not return to the subject. As for the Parliamentary
Labour Party (P.L.P.), the balance of attitudes towards the monarchy at
3this time is difficult to gauge, with the estimate of the republican Willie
Hamilton neither an entirely reliable nor a disinterested one.
"...my own estimate is that at least one MP in three would vote
for a republic given the chance. A majority of Labour MPs and Liberals
certainly regard the Monarchy with a mixture of tolerance, healthy
contempt, ridicule and apathy."2
This figure is almost certainly a gross exaggeration. In 1975, eighty-nine
Labour M.P.'s had voted to oppose the increase in the Queen's Civil List
payment, with a further fifty abstentions. Criticism from constituency
parties seemed similarly to focus on royal expenditure. Most resolutions
received by the Home Policy Committee in 1977 concerned either the cost
of the monarchy or the taxation of Civil List payments, with only one
demand, from Edinburgh, that the Labour Party campaign for the abolition
of the monarchy. The republicanism which found voice remained almost
beyond the pale, with Willie Hamilton exhibiting what Pimlott labels an
"obsessive republicanism" which encouraged "sober people to equate
republicanism with crankiness". 3
 The Queen's Silver Jubilee in 1977
may have had its "Stuff the Jubilee" protests, but the New Statesman had
to acknowledge that "there has been little of the furore and controversy
over the monarchy and Jubilee which accentuated the divisions between
the Labour Left and Labour's leaders in the 1930s." 4
 A study of British
4social attitudes in 1977 found that 77% of Labour voters believed that the
continuation of the monarchy was "important for Britain".5
By the time the thesis was disinterred for completion in the
mid-1990's, the atmosphere was transformed. It was not unthinkable for
front-bench figures in the P.L.P. to seek to draw the question of the
monarchy into political debate (Jack Straw did so in 1993), or even to
declare republican sympathies (Ron Davies in 1996). A poll of Labour
M.P.'s in 1994 revealed that 44% wanted a republic. 6 The scope of
criticism of the royal family and the monarchy had widened from the
narrow focus on expenditure in the mid-seventies. Straw had wanted the
party to initiate a debate on the constitutional role of the monarchy. The
Fabian Review carried articles in which republicanism was vigorously
advocated, as part of the process of 'democratisation' of British society, in
which hereditary institutions would have no place.' The Fabian Society
published a pamphlet calling for changes to: the Royal Prerogative; the
funding of the royal family; the honours system. Perhaps most radically, it
advocated a ten-yearly referendum on whether the monarchy should
continue!' The New Statesman regularly carried critical articles on the
royal family, and editorially it adopted a position of unequivocal
republicanism .9
Two things had helped to bring about this shift in attitude.
The royal family had been brought into disrepute by the behaviour of
several of it most prominent members. Many Labour M.P.'s interviewed
5by the Independent on Sunday referred to the revelations of
"misbehaviour". 10
 Secondly, constitutional reform had become a
fashionable topic, and the monarchy could not be altogether excluded
from it, although some bodies concerned with reform of the constitution
did not seem to regard the reform of the monarchy as either imperative or
politically viable ( Charter 88 has eschewed either republicanism or
detailed proposals for major reform of the monarchy). For the Labour
Party, constitutional reform became a major policy area, comprising an
element in the broader "modernisation" project. Democratisation of the
British Constitution, and in particular the abolition of the legislative role of
hereditary peers, led some to believe that the time had come to tackle the
other major pre-democratic part of the Constitution, the monarchy. A
future bill of rights would inevitably call into question the royal prerogative.
Amongst those convinced that the monarchy should be included in the
reform project was the New Statesman, which had changed from its old
advocacy of modernising the monarchy on Scandinavian lines, first
adopted by its long-time editor, Kingsley Martin, in the late 1930s." Now,
the journal believed,
"For their own survival, it might be enough for the Windsors to turn
themselves into a Scandinavian-style monarchy... But there comes a time
when this is not enough — when the issue becomes not the royal family's
dissoluteness or its cost to the taxpayer, but whether the the hereditary
6principle has any role at all to play in the government and politics of a
democracy." 12
The journal was under no illusions about the party leadership's
disinclination to engage with the issue, but felt that in the long run it would
have to. Despite the apparently propitious moment for beginning a debate
on reform (in the aftermath of Diana's death, even The Economist had
declared itself republican), the depth of Labour's reluctance and fear about
reform is clear in the comments of one backbench M.P., Denis MacShane.
"The modernising of Britain requires a modernisation of the
monarchy....Now we need a policy on royalty. It might begin with a debate
in the Commons, but who dares to call for one or let one take place?"13
MacShane omits to mention that, under the royal prerogative, it is
extremely difficult for any debate on any specific proposals concerning
the monarchy to be initiated without the sovereign's prior consent, and that
adjournment debates on the monarchy have been refused on the grounds
that the "subject does not fall under an area of ministerial responsibility".14
From the conduct and words of Tony Blair, both in the period
following Diana's death and during the celebrations of the Queen's golden
wedding, it would appear that he is no less a monarchist than MacDonald,
Attlee, Wilson or Callaghan. If the monarchy is to be 'modernised', rather
7than reformed (let alone abolished), then it is in good hands. For one
sharp observer of the current scene, Steve Richards, the medium-term
future appears thus:
"The closer ties now established between Downing Street and
the palace will greatly benefit the monarchy. For the modernisation of the
monarchy is the perfect project for the team that modernised the Labour
Party.. .Although the 'people's princess' is dead, we will soon have the
'people's monarchy".15
It may well be that the 1990's wave of interest in radical reform of
the monarchy has already passed. It may well be true, as Crick suggests,
that "institutional republicanism ebbs and flows". 16 The New Statesman,
despite its own republicanism, fears that "we (the nation) are resuming
our usual deferential, pro-monarchical habits". 17 If constitutional reform
under a Labour government leaves the monarchy essentially untouched,
this thesis may offer some explanation of a notable omission from the
project.
82) Labour, the monarchy and social class. 
The intent behind this section (and behind the following two
sections) is not to provide an exhaustive summary of every item of recent
opinion on the subject. It is rather to provide an overview of one aspect of
Labour's relationship with the monarchy, including reference to recent
scholarly work which offers illumination or insight, and through which the
relevant parts of the thesis may be viewed. This section considers the
paradoxes underlying, and possible explanations behind, Labour's attitude
and behaviour towards the monarchy in respect of questions of social
class.
Scholarly commentators on the monarchy are in little doubt about
its essential social character and location. Notwithstanding some
differences of nuance, there is agreement, amongst those who adhere to
the notion of an hierarchically organised, class based British society, that
the monarchy sits at the apex of the upper class.
"At the apex of the upper class, however we define it, was the
monarchy and the royal family. The royal family was, of course not typical
of the upper class.., but it was inextricably linked to it by marriage and
culture... n18
9The character and attitudes of the royal family reflect this social class.
"The Queen and her family are at the top of the social ladder; and
they must be expected to hold the views and prejudices associated with
very rich landed aristocrats and other members of the uppermost layers of
the upper classes."19
For Cannadine, monarchy during the inter-war years stood at "the apex of
traditional society", and was "crucial to the survival of hierarchy as a way
of seeing inter-war Britain". 20
 A potentially significant qualification to the
location of the royal family at the apex of the upper class has been made
by McKibbin, who believes that to some extent "the monarchy stood
outside the class system but it was inextricably part of the upper class".21
Commenting on the post- Second World War period, Muggeridge offered
a similar argument to that of Cannadine.
"The impulses out of which snobbishness is born descend from
the Queen, at the apex of the social pyramid, right down to the base.
Social distinctions, at the lowest as at the highest level are given a
validity."22
If the observations of this range of commentators are accurate,
several questions are raised. How and why was Labour, generally
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speaking, happy to co-exist with a royal family which represented a social
class, an hereditary principle, and an hierarchical conception of society
which seem, on the face of it, to be at such variance with its own class
composition, democratic values and egalitarian ideology? The royal family
not only symbolised social distinctions, but helped to reinforce them.
Historians have recognised this apparent paradox.
"....it would appear difficult to reconcile the acceptance of
monarchy with a vision of a Socialist Commonwealth based on equality,
democracy and representative institutions."23
Here is Pimlott on Labour's "traditional, expected set of attitudes"; its
"heritage".
"Labour is known to be against privilege, social hierarchy,
capitalism, personal wealth, inequality, unregulated markets, the powerful,
the Establishment, the upper classes, nationalistic fervour, military
might..." 24
Of these eleven anathemas, the monarchy could comfortably be identified
with seven, and a Marxist critique might establish the monarchy's links
with all of them. Pimlott adds that little in this list has changed in a
hundred years. How, then, has Labour come to accept and even to
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enthuse about monarchy? Simplifying, there would seem to be two
possible explanations: that Labour swallowed its objections (on the
grounds of social principles) to the monarchy because it recognised its
political/constitutional value; or that Labour (in general) accepted an
hierarchical, unequal society despite so much of its rhetoric. The former
position is articulated by Kenneth Morgan, albeit with reference to the late
1970s.
"Of course, the monarchy is defensible neither on democratic nor
on socialist grounds. Of course it is inextricably a part of the class system
of the country. Of course, there are no rational grounds for an hereditary
monarch... But the monarchy stands or falls not on the grounds of abstract
logic or political theory, but on whether it is justifiable in the light of the
specific historical needs of Britain today. In my view, it probably is."25
This attitude may underly the position of many in the Labour Party over
the years, who saw value in its constitutional role whilst wishing to detach
the monarchy from some of the anathemas listed above, by "simplifying"
or "modernising" the institution. The alternative position, that Labour (or,
at least, a sufficiently influential element within it) accepted the social
inequalities which were reflected in the British type of monarchy and royal
family, is argued by Cannadine. He cites Ramsay MacDonald as a
powerful voice in the Labour Party in defence of the hierarchical nature of
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British society. MacDonald is quoted as not wishing "to defy or even to
subvert the established order" or "to sweep away the elaborate gradations
of status and position so characteristic of the British social system".26
Cannadine attributes MacDonald's veneration for the monarchy to his
belief in the value of the social binding which derived from tradition and
convention. He also makes much of the Labour right's rhetorical emphasis
on co-operation and social harmony, to the exclusion of class politics.
This, of course, begs the question of whether Labour tolerated or
venerated the monarchy because of its lack of what Wertheimer called "a
class-struggle ideology", or whether its lack of a class-struggle ideology
may in part be due to the influence of the monarchy upon British life and
politics. 27
 The lack of a broad and enabling perspective of class on the
British left is identied by Nairn as a consequence of royalism.
"....Romantic-national Royalism had little to fear from a
Socialism based on 'class' — quite the contrary, it found a new and secure
foundation in that brand of parochial ideology. 'Class' in this sense has
been little more than the resentful but ultimately acceptive social
anthropology of Royalism." 28
Finally, one must not ignore the ways in which the monarchy
itself acted to soften its class image, or avoided the battlegrounds of
class conflict. It came increasingly to project an image of "ordinariness"
13
particularly during the reign of George V. Nairn remarks on "the public
relations of ordinariness". 29
 The second point is one elaborated by
McKibbin, who observes that the "theatrical element" of the British state,
which includes the monarchy, was successful in "divorcing itself from that
area of social relations — labour and capital — where there was least value
consensus".39
Turning the point round, if it is extremely problematic to explain
how the monarchy's class identity squared with Labour's tolerance of and
reverence for the monarchy, it seems more straightforward in the case of
Labour critics of the monarchy. It will be seen that "class consciousness"
was a consistent feature of the rhetoric of Labour anti-monarchism, from
Hardie, through the pages of Forward, right up to the more recent
example of Willie Hamilton. However, the fact that the anti-monarchism of
both individuals named here, heavily based upon class rhetoric, earned
for Hardie "a reputation for political instability and extremism" and for
Hamilton the charge that he had helped encourage people to "equate
republicanism with crankiness", suggests that objections to the monarchy
on the basis of its class identity failed to generate support, either within the
Party or amongst its supporters.
"The mass of devoted subjects knows perfectly well that the
Queen and her entourage belong to the topmost social crust, and have a
14
fair notion of 'how much it all costs'. Alas, such knowledge has no effect
whatever on royal popularity."31
The only qualification one might offer to this observation is that this
knowledge alone may not have an effect, but may do so when combined
with other contingent sources of discontent.
3) Labour, the monarchy and the ideoloqv of "Englishness".
At some points of the narrative of this thesis, national pride and
patriotism find powerful expression through Labour voices. Most striking,
for obvious reasons, was the period of the Great War, but the Silver
Jubilee of George V was also an occasion for celebrating what were
believed to be the blessings of being English/British. The relevant
chapters chronicle this phenomenon in some detail. At this stage, it is
intended to indicate in general terms the possible nature of this national
identity, as it relates both to the Labour Party and to the monarchy. What
kind of identity was being celebrated? To what extent was the institution of
the monarchy bound up with this identity?
Scholars who have examined this area have tended to
emphasise the influence upon Labour of hegemonic ideas of national
identity.
15
"Socialists, unless isolated, do take on the colour of their
surroundings. Nationalism does penetrate socialism to the extent that the
latter is located rather than flown in from the outside."32
Although Yeo employs the term 'nationalism' rather than national identity,
the point remains. Nairn does not restrict his comments to socialists or to
the Labour Party, but the breadth of his sweep cannot but implicate
elements, at least, of Labour and its supporters.
"...it is a fact that all classes have an inevitable stake in the nation
and overall national culture, however defined. In England-Britain that
definition has, since the defeat of chartism (and the virtual elimination of
republicanism), been overwhelmingly - and on the whole successfully —
archaic, traditionalist, politically deferential and royal."33
Nairn goes on to argue that British self-definition for the same period was
also liberal, and argues powerfully that what he calls "Whig-Labour"
interpretations of national identity "consistently inverted the truth by
pretending that tradition inevitably served progress". 34
 At this point, it may
be stated that evidence emerges throughout this thesis to support Nairn's
contention.
Categories must not, however, be carelessly conflated. Within
the ranks of Labour and its supporters were a range of positions: some
16
were unabashed monarchists; others were more 'semi-detached' in their
monarchism, indulging in the comfortable belief that the traditional enabled
the progressive; others found themselves obliged to accept the monarchy
on the grounds that its popularity was too broad and deep to challenge;
very few (and often a Scottish very few), consistently advocated
republicanism. This raises the question of whether the apparent
preponderance of Scots amongst the republicans indicates that
attachment to the monarchy was stronger within English Labour than
within Scottish, and whether it was the ideological power of monarchy
within Englishness that underlay this. This particular sub-topic is not
examined sufficiently in this work to offer a definitive conclusion, but the
indications point to affirmative answers to both questions.
One point to consider is whether Labour had a distinctive
version of patriotism. When, at moments of national crisis or national
festivity, it celebrated Englishness, was it a form which differed in tone or
content from conservative expressions? It is in this sphere that careful
attention to language is rewarding. If all expressions of patriotism make
claim to a special (and usually superior) status for the nation in question,
then the bases for that claim may vary considerably. The mid-1930s
provide a particularly fertile ground for examining this subject. Several
major events involving the monarchy occurred within less than three
years, and against a international backdrop of the growth of fascism and
nazism. Labour's attitudes to the former were heavily marked by
17
awareness of the latter. It is hoped that the analysis of this period proves a
corrective to Miles Taylor's too narrowly conceived portrayal of the British
left's reaction to the monarchy, at this period, which draws its evidence
almost exclusively from the Communist Party. Taylor asserts that,
"...both the British communist movement and the left in general
continued to equate patriotism with jingoism — indeed the jubilee and the
abdication crisis actually revived the notion of jingoism in a new form."35
This distortion requires the corrective of a more subtle and differentiated
interpretation of the 'left's' position on the monarchy and patriotism at that
juncture.
4) Labour, the monarchy and the British Constitution. 
Throughout the periods covered by this thesis, the role of the
Crown in politics received intermittent Labour attention. Most notably, it
came in for critical scrutiny in 1910, 1914, 1931 and 1936. To a lesser
degree, it was also under hostile gaze during the Great War. Such
periodic suspicion and concern should not disguise the fact that these
incidents were temporary exceptions to an underlying positive evaluation
of the Crown, and of the potentialities and workings of the unwritten
Constitution. It is difficult to disagree with Wright's generalisation.
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"The starting point is the history of satisfaction with British
constitutional arrangements on the part of British socialists, certainly of
most of them at most periods, coupled with an attitude towards radical
reconstruction which ranged from indifference to apathy."36
If Labour had such a thing as an "ideology of the Constitution", then that
would reflect not only the arrangements and practices they saw or read
about, but how they saw themselves and their interests within that context.
It would also reflect something of attitudes to political struggle which had
derived from Labour's radical roots in the nineteenth century.
The obvious exception to Wright's generalisation must be stated;
the House of Lords was a constant target of Labour attack, and throughout
the period under review in this work there were plans for its reform. Its
pre-democratic and hereditary character may have been shared with the
monarchy, but its continued legislative role and overt hostility to
progressive change were distinctive. So, acceptance of the following
conclusion implies excluding the case of the upper chamber.
"Historically, Labour has adopted a constitutionalist approach,
and adhered to the institutions, procedures and norms of the British
state."37
19
If this has, indeed, been true of Labour, then it would coincide with what
McKibbin claims to have been the attitude prevailing in the working class,
which had,
"....inherited ideologies which emphasized a common citizenship,
the fairness of the rules of the game and the class-neutrality of the major
institutions of the state."38
The monarchy lay at the heart of the Constitution, and if the opinions cited
above are accurate, then Labour's faith in the constitutionality of the
Crown and in the impartial exercise of its powers must have comprised
one aspect of that ideology. If it did so, then it was not without periodic
lapses into doubt and even hostility. These lapses were the result of the
impact of the actual working of the Constitution upon Labour's idealised
conception of it.
The nineteenth century had seen a series of concessions to
radical demands for more representative government, and these
successes generated optimism about the capacities of the Constitution to
accommodate and even to enable further change. The convictions and
strategy of those radicals bear a strong resemblance to Labour's own.
"Political radicals, taking the institutions of the state largely for
granted, persisted with a constitutionalist approach, a pragmatic strategy
20
and settled for incremental change in the fairly optimistic expectation that
their rights as 'freeborn Englishmen' would be recognised by Whig
governments and that concessions would eventually be made."39
Nairn perceptively quotes Herbert Butterfield on the Whig interpretation of
history, which Butterfield believed was itself "a product of history, part of
the inescapable inheritance of Englishmen". 40 The Labour Party was
composed of Englishmen who would seem to have appreciated this
inheritance. In more polemical tone, Nairn condemns "left-wing
genuflexions at the altar of Crowned Whiggery". 41 The Constitution which
had emerged from the nineteenth century appeared not simply to offer no
obstacle to Labour's political aims, but to provide the opportunity to
achieve them. 42 Throughout this work, Labour figures praise and celebrate
the way in which the workings of the Constitution had enabled the Labour
Party to enter Parliament and then government. Mild surprise and strong
delight are frequently expressed at the "fair play" which Labour received,
particularly from the Crown. There is an eagerness to find the latter;
evidence that Labour shared a more general predisposition.
"The British like to believe, and most do so genuinely, that the
monarchy is above politics, that the very essence of constitutional
queencraft or kingcraft is that the sovereign reigns but does not rule..."43
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Labour may also have liked to believe this, but there were,
periodically, events which shook the belief. These moments of crisis arose
from the "fluidity surrounding the bundle of custom, precedent and
procedure at the very heart of the Constitution"." The royal prerogative,
without defined legal status, afforded the possiblities both of the
monarch's political intervention and of ministerial deployment of the
prerogative's powers, thereby avoiding the customary parliamentary route
to legislation. Thus George V was able to convene a "Buckingham Palace
conference" over the pre-war Ulster crisis; the wartime government could
introduce Orders in Council, by-passing Parliament; the King was able to
call upon MacDonald to form a government without his party's
participation. These incidents, and others, led Labour not necessarily to
challenge or question the powers of the Crown under the unwritten
Constitution, but rather to criticise the specific actions of the King. It was
only in the aftermath of 1931, and then only in the writings of Laski, that
the dangers and potentialities inherent in the royal prerogative were
systematically examined." For the most part, Labour seemed to take on
trust that the machinery of the Constitution would be operated "fairly", and
seemed to share "an implicit belief in the existence of certain anchorages
of restraint [which] still informs, conditions and disciplines the apparently
uninhibited interplay of politics within a political constitution". 46 When
those anchorages of restraint appeared to have been slipped, Labour
22
reacted. However, the reaction did not extend to re-appraisal of the
vestigial powers of the Crown, let alone to any impulse to reform.
5) Scope and orientation. 
The thesis does not claim to cover the general topic exhaustively.
There was neither the time nor space for such treatment. The
chronological coverage ends with the coronation of George VI, and there
remains a vast amount of fruifful enquiry to be had into the periods of the
second world war, the post-war Attlee government and subsequently.
Secondly, the study does not include the first two periods of Labour
government. Whilst the thesis does not ignore or fight shy of "high
politics", to cover those periods would involve a detailed analysis of royal
involvement in such areas as ministerial appointments and the direction of
some aspects of government policy (foreign policy, particularly, comes to
mind). 47 Not only would this have been to enter the time- and space-
consuming field of government and Cabinet politics, but it would, to
provide an adequate coverage, have required access to sources denied to
the research student (especially the Royal Archives). For this latter reason
also, the thesis concerns what the Labour Party made of the monarchy,
and not what the monarchy made of the Labour Party.
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As hinted earlier, the study does not restrict its coverage to
high or low politics. The distinction is regarded as artificial, in the sense
that there was a constant interplay of forces at work, with mutually
determining processes and outcomes. It shares Lawrence's rejection of
the "artificial and debilitating gulf' between high and low politics."
"In studying popular politics, we are... studying the interaction
between the worlds of 'formal' and 'informal' politics, conscious that the
relationship between the two is never unmediated, and that our analysis
must therefore always be sensitive to the tensions and ambiguities in the
relationship between 'leaders' and 'led'?"
Thus the description and analysis shifts constantly between national and
local politics, and between national and local press sources.
Likewise, whilst using the label "Labour Party " in its title, the
thesis is not narrowly focused only on that organisation. Besides the
party's leadership, membership and affiliated press, there remains the
constant presence of its supporters, and of its opponents. The former
imposed an unquantifiable weight of influence upon party attitudes and
policy. The latter helped to define what Labour was for, by demonstrating
what it was not. Thus, at various points in the thesis, attention is given to
Labour's rivals on the left; and to its Conservative opponents; particularly
24
to the evidence relating to ideology, embedded in right-wing press
accounts of events in the 1930s.
Finally, there is a dimension noticeable by its absence; gender.
Whether or not there were (or are) important distinctions to be drawn
between male and female attitudes to monarchy, inside or outside the
Labour Party, is an important question. Raphael Samuel has no
compunction in identifying such a distinction in contemporary terms.
"It is now the domestic rather than the dynastic preoccupations of
the monarchy which fascinate the public (or at any rate the female half of
This is a bold claim, and no evidence is presented in its support. In this
thesis, no claims are made about gender variations, because no evidence
emerged to indicate such. Perhaps other, untapped, sources may have
added this dimension, but the uncomfortable truth is that in every aspect,
period and source referred to, the masculine voice is not merely dominant;
it is exclusively present. The social psychologist, Michael Billig, gathered
his own evidence of contemporary gendered interest in monarchy, and
presents a suggestive account of distinctive attitudes. 51 No evidence
emerged to illuminate this field for the period covered by the thesis
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6) Methodology. 
The thesis draws upon two forms of academic discourse. The
first comprises a fairly conventional historiographical account, in which
description and analysis of a series of historical events follow a
chronological sequence. Parts of the thesis are handled differently. The
sections dealing with the 1930s present detailed textual analyses of press
coverage of specific events dealt with in the accompanying chronological
account. The discourse of these sections comes from linguistics, albeit a
'practical', text-analytical type of linguistics. The text analysis is placed
adjacent to the conventional history, for fear that integration might have
led to unnecessary confusion and to a clash of discourse types. It is
hoped that these sections of text analysis possess an explanatory power
which deepens and refines the accompanying historical account.
As indicated, much attention is given to press coverage of the
historical events under examination, primarily as a source of contemporary
evidence. The weight of coverage is given to what may be termed the
"Labour press", and in particular to the Daily Herald. As the daily
newspaper institutionally embedded in the Labour movement, it is the one
likely to provide the most comprehensive and informative accounts of
Labour's attitudes and conduct vis-a vis the monarchy. However, this is far
from being the only reason to attend to the Labour press. The overt
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functions of reporting and commenting upon current affairs were not
pursued in an ideological vacuum. In reporting and commenting upon the
monarchy, for example, the newspaper's content reflected not simply
some external and material "reality", but two other crucial influences: a
view of the world in which the monarchy and Labour were represented in
particular ways, along with a representation of an historical context in
which both were located; secondly, an understanding or perception of
what the newspaper's readership believed, were interested in, and wanted
to read. Contemporary textual analysis correctly emphasises the
significance of investigating readers' response to text. At the period
covered by this thesis, no systematic studies were made of readership
profiles and attitudes. However, from 1938 onwards, Mass Observation
published findings about the readership of national newspapers. Much
may be inferred from this source about the earlier 1930's. In addition,
Political and Economic Planning produced their Report on the British
Press in 1938.
Thus the focus of the study shifts from a conventional historical
analysis of events to analysis of press representation of those events. The
approach shifts from historical narrative to one which draws conceptually
and methodologically from other disciplines. The objective of this section
is to expose, compare and analyse the ways in which a cross-section of
popular British newspapers represented three royal events. These events
were the Silver Jubilee of George V, the Coronation of George VI and the
27
Abdication of Edward VIII. Press coverage of them will be subjected to a
form of textual analysis which aims to uncover the ideological framework
which underpins and informs their accounts. The narratives which the
newspapers present serve ideological and political functions, as well as
embodying a partial representation of the ideology from which they are
constructed. Evidence about the respective ideological characters of the
newspapers is to be sought in the "discourse" of popular monarchy. Given
this shift of focus, towards a concern with ideology and its realisation
through discourse, some explanation is necessary of theoretical
assumptions, interpretative methodology and the criteria for selection of
textual evidence.
Theoretical assumptions. 
Concern with "discourse" is widespread and fashionable
throughout the social sciences. The term itself carries much ambiguity, as
definitions vary according to which discipline embraces it. However,
historiography has, in the last ten years, been riven by the implications of
a particular approach to discourse and history, labelled both by
proponents and sceptics as the "linguistic turn". Essentially, this approach
has taken up the post-structuralist interpretation of Saussurean linguistics,
in order to attack what it characterises as a fundamental misconception at
the heart of the materialist programme. The basis of this misconception is
held to be a naive and simplistic belief in "reality" and "experience" as
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existing outside, but being represented through, language. Patrick Joyce,
the foremost British proponent of the "linguistic turn" summarises the
conflict thus:
"For historians, there is the danger that 'the real' and 'history'
themselves become a new foundation upon which to base a defence of
truth against the perils of what is taken to be the chaos of relativism
evident in post-modernism. This outlook tends to rest on a view of
language in which there is still a direct correspondence between it and the
world. Whereas it is the burden of the view of language that underlies the
advent of 'post-modernism'... .that this is not so. Rather, what has been
called the 'semiotic challenge' questions our assumption that 'the
difference between the signified and the signifier is the categorical
difference between a phenomenal entity and its epiphenomenal
representationl."52
Admitting the failure of his Visions of the People 53 to adhere to this
approach because of its ultimate recourse to the foundation of
"experience", Joyce prefers the label "hermeneutic turn" rather than
"linguistic turn", in which "the only true foundation is that there is no true
foundation, only the making of meaning".54
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Objections to this particular direction of the linguistic turn are many, but
the central charge is that language and 'reality' are conflated; that there is
no reality beyond language and discourse.
"..if reality does not extend beyond representation in language and
discourse, then how can we logically and practically investigate... .the links
between the 'linguistic', the 'social', the 'political' and the 'economic'?"55
For the current work, the basic inadequacy of this version of the "linguistic
turn" is summarised in Eagleton's observation that:
"The category of discourse is inflated to the point where it
imperializes the whole world, eliding the distinction between thought and
reality. The effect of this is to undercut the critique of ideology - for if ideas
and material reality are given indissolubly together, there can be no
question of asking where social ideas actually hail from."56
As will be evident from the approach demonstrated in the rest of
this thesis, the existence of a material reality beyond discourse is not in
dispute here. However, that does not entail simple-minded belief in the
correspondence between language and that material reality, nor does it
deny the crucial significance of discourse and language in the construction
of social reality. The approach does not seek to attribute determinist
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power either to material factors or to rhetorical construction. Instead, it
comes close to Wahrman's notion of a "space of possibilities between
social reality and its representation".57
Methodological Approach. 
This study does agree with Joyce in the importance he attaches
to the field of hermeneutics. 58
 However, the form of hermeneutics from
which it draws its methodology has quite different assumptions and
procedures, which avoid the charges of idealism and subjectivism which
have been levelled at Joyce and others. This study draws upon "depth
hermeneutics", which has been most eloquently expounded by Paul
Ricoeur. 59 His approach to cultural analysis gives a central role to the
process of interpretation of the object, but only within a consideration of
the social-historical context. The process of interpretation is mediated by
what Ricoeur calls "objectifying techniques", which deepen and enrich the
interpretation and which attend to the complexity of the object domain.
There are essentially three procedures which are employed
simultaneously in the depth-hermeneutic methodology. The first is "social-
historical analysis", the study of the social-historical context within which
cultural phenomena occur. In the present study, much of this dimension is
approached through the historiographical account of contexts which form
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part of the chapters which also incorporate text analysis. The second
procedure is "discursive analysis". All symbolic constructions (of which the
texts dealt with in the sections of linguistic analysis constitute a generic
type), possess structural features, patterns and relations. These are
susceptible to formal analysis, which in the case of written texts will
involve the deployment of linguistic techniques. The third procedure
involved in depth hermeneutics is "interpretation". This builds upon the two
previous procedures and is:
"...a creative, imaginative activity which transcends the closure of
symbolic constructions treated as structured systems, and embroils the
interpreter in a necessarily risky, conflict-laden arena.. .Symbolic
constructions are already an interpretation, so that to take undertake an
analysis of them is to produce an interpretation of an interpretation, to re-
interpret a pre-interpreted domain."60
Ideology and Discourse. 
Before passing on to a consideration of the specific set of events
and texts to be dealt with, some general statements of definition and
orientation need to be offered. The term "ideology" has been applied to a
shifting and conflicting range of ideas, but as used in this work, the term
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has a particular value. 61 It is well-summarised by Thompson in the
following way:
"To study ideology., is to study the ways in which meaning (or
signification) serves to sustain relations of domination.. (It) has often been
assumed that ideology operates like a sort of social cement, binding the
members of a society together by providing them with collectively shared
assumptions and norms... .Yet however pervasive it may be, this
assumption is highly questionable.. Rather (we should) redirect this theory
away from the search for collectively shared values and towards the study
of complex ways in which meaning is mobilized for the maintenance of
relations of domination."62
This extract has been quoted at length because its critical conception of
ideology is central to this study. Not only is it concerned with power
relationships between social groups or classes, and the ways in which
those relationships are represented, and legitimated or subverted, but the
approach presupposes a complex and heterogeneous process of
achieving these ends. It performs the valuable task of predisposing the
text analyst towards seeking, and seeking to explain, divergences as
much as similarities, thereby reducing the tendency towards simplistic and
distorted accounts of ideological processes. A useful concept to invoke
here is that of the "social imaginary". The texts under consideration here
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played their part in producing an image of social groups and the
relationships between them; of the past and the present, and the
relationship between them. Ideology has an "integrative" function, of
closing gaps between social classes and between the past and the
present. It does so by way of justifying the system of authority as it is; and
by distorting the existing order of reality to conceal certain features of the
social world.
Texts and Contexts. 
The text analysis sections of this study examine the coverage given
by a group of British newspapers of the three royal ceremonies indicated
above. In the broadest terms, these ceremonies, and the reporting of
them, reflected the current social and political status of the monarchy, the
political condition of the country, the international context, and the
historical background to the events. The events provided the occasion for
reflecting upon these and other aspects of British society, and for
projecting an understanding of that society. Through its reports and
commentary, a newspaper constructs not only a representation of the
society in which it is embedded, but a social framework within which it
then locates its reader. This complex process involves an implicit situating
of the "ideal reader" within the interpreted and projected social framework.
Newspaper editors may claim that what they produce is what their
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readership demands or expects, but as Stuart Hall indicates, this is an
inadequate explanation of the relationship between press and readership:
"Newspapers must continually situate themselves within the
assumed knowledge and interests of their readership, consciously or
unconsciously adopt modes and strategies of address: they must 'take the
attitude of their significant other', in any particular case about any
particular person or event. Language, style and format are therefore
products of a process of symbolic interaction between the newspaper and
its audiences. ,63
The principal interest of the current study is to identify similarities and
differences within a group of popular British newspapers in their
interpretation and representation not just of the historical events
themselves, but of how their readership can and ought to be situated
towards those events.
The criteria for selecting the newspapers from which to draw texts
were straightforward. As the thesis attempts to explain Labour's unfolding
relations to the institution of monarchy, those newspapers with institutional
links to the Party, and whose readership was most likely to be drawn from
its members or sympathisers, are obvious candidates for study. Thus, the
Daily Herald, Reynolds Illustrated News and the Town Crier are three of
the newspapers examined. Additionally, this choice provides scope for
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analysing variations and conflicts of interpretation within the Labour
movement, as these three newspapers differed considerably in their
treatment of events. It will appear much less obvious why, in a work
dealing with the Labour Party, extensive analysis is made of the Daily
Express and the Daily Mail. The first reason for doing so relates to the
notion of context of situation, introduced above. These newspapers
provide alternative reactions, against which the response of Labour can be
assessed. Their role here is that of a foil, necessary to any exercise in
contrastive analysis. To analyse the responses of the Labour press to
events in isolation from the broader press and ideological contexts, is to
present an impoverished picture. The Daily Express and the Daily Mail
were "popular", as distinct from the "quality" or the merely "pictorial"
newspapers, and are thus broadly comparable in type with the Daily
Herald and Reynolds. The contrastive value of including these two right-
wing newspapers is not the sole reason for their presence in this work.
These two publications were read by large numbers of Labour voters and
sympathisers. Figures cited below suggest that 32% of Mail and Express
readers were supporters of the Labour Party, whilst 41% of this group
identified themselves with the Conservative Party. Notwithstanding
questions concerning the influence which newspapers might have upon
the world-views of their readership, the sheer fact that large numbers of
Labour supporters were textually immersed in these conservative
representations of events must be a factor in our understanding of where
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Labour stood vis-a-vis the monarchy. The way in which events were
represented would have helped to frame the terms in which those events
were understood by individuals and social groups from whom Labour drew
its support. Underlying the treatment of the monarchy and royalty are
wider and deeper concerns: beliefs and perceptions about the nation, its
past, present and future; attention to those social groups for whom the
newspaper purported to speak; and commercial considerations, as
prestige events such as a jubilee or a coronation had a significant effect
upon a newspaper's advertising revenue. The social profiles of the
respective readerships of the four national newspapers under analysis
were distinct in quite complex ways. The distinctions will be discussed
later. Some Labour critics charged the Daily Herald, in particular, of being
no different to the Conservative popular press in its treatment of the
events under analysis. It should be apparent from the following study that
this allegation ignores important distinctions which require more subtle
handling if one is to understand how Labour perceived and reacted to
popular monarchy in the 1930's.
1 Michael English, The Constitutional Structure, Machinery of Government Study Group
Labour Party Archives, RE 1633K
2 W. Hamilton, 1975, My Queen and .1, London, p13
3 B.Pimlott, 1997ed., The Queen, London, p424
4 New Statesman, Vol.93 No.2411, June 3, 1977, p733
5 Cited in T. Nairn, 1988, The Enchanted Glass, London, p20
6 Independent on Sunday, October 23, 1994
7 Fabian Review, Vol. 106, No.6, December 1994, and Vol.107, No.1, February 1995
8 P. Richards, 1996, Long to reign over us?, Fabian Pamphlet 576, London
9 New Statesman, Vol. 124, No.4261, November 24, 1995 & August 28, 1998
37
10 Independent on Sunday, October 23, 1994
11 For Martin's unchanging views, see K. Martin, 1962, The Crown and the Establishment,
London, pp167-176
12 New Statesman, Vol. 124, No.4261, November 24, 1995
13 Fabian Review, Vol. 108, No. 6, Winter 1996
14 M. Foley, 1999, The Politics of the British Constitution, Manchester, p109
15 New Statesman, September 12, 1997
16 New Statesman, Vol. 122, No. 4137, June 4, 1993
17 New Statesman, August 28, 1998
18 R. McKibbin, 1998, Classes and Culrues: England 1918-1951, Oxford, p3
19 R. Ivfiliband, 1982, Capitalist Democracy, Oxford, p126
20 D  Cannadine, 1998, Class in Britain, London, p141
21 McKibbin, op.cit., p15
22 Saturday Evening Post, October 19, 1957
23 JA Thompson, "Labour and the Modern British Monarchy", in South Atlantic Quarterly,
vol.lxx, 1971
24 B. Pimlott, 1994, Frustrate Their Knavish Tricks, London, p383
25 New Statesman, Vol. 93, No.2411, June 3, 1977
26 Quoted in Cannadine, op.cit., p140
27 E. Wertheimer, 1929, A Portrait of the Labour Party, London, p91
28 T. Nairn, The Enchanted Glass, p188
29 T. Nairn, "Britain's Royal Romance", in R Samuel (ed.), 1989, Patriotism: the making and
unmaking of British national identity, Vol. 3 London, p83
39 R. McKibbin, 1994 ed., The Ideologies of Class, Oxford, p32
31 T. Nairn, "Britain's royal romance", p76
32 S. Yeo, "Socialism, the State and some oppositional Englishness", in R. Coils & P. Dodd,
1986, Englishness, London, p312
33 T. Nairn, "Britain's royal romance", p77
34 ibid.
35 M. Taylor, "Patriotism, History and the Left in Twentieth-Century Britain", in
The Historical Journal, 33, 4 (1990), p980
36 A. Wright, "British Socialists and the British Constitution", in Parliamentary Affairs,
Vol.43, No.3, July 1990, pp323-4
37 B. Jones & M. Keating, 1985, Labour and the British State, Oxford, p183
38 McKibbin, The Ideologies of Class, p24
39 Jones & Keating, op.cit., p17
4° Quoted in Nairn, op.cit., p124
41 ibid., p345
42 Wright,
 op.cit., p324
43 P. Hennessy, 1995, The Hidden Wiring, London, p54
44 ibid., p33
45 For example in H.J. Laski, 1933, The Labour Party and the Constitution, London
46 Foley, op.cit., p37
47 Royal involvement in the first two periods of Labour government receives some attention in,
amongst other works, D. Marquand, 1977, Ramsay MacDonalg London, and
D. Carlton, 1970, MacDonald versus Henderson, London
48 J. Lawrence, 1998, Speaking for the People, Cambridge, p62
49 ibid., p61
56 New Statesman, Vol. 112, No.2886, July 18, 1986
M. Billig„ 1992, Talking of the Royal Family, London, ppl 72-201
52 P.Joyce, 1994, Democratic Subjects, Cambridge, p8
53 P. Joyce, 1991, Visions of the People, Cambridge
54 Joyce, Democratic Subjects, p13
55 Neville Kirk, "History, Language, Ideas and Post-modernism: a materialist view", in Social
History, Vol.19, No.2, May 1994, p221
38
56 T. Eagleton, 1991, Ideology, London, p219
57 D. Wahrman, 1995, Imagining the Middle Class, Cambridge, p8
58 See Joyce, Democratic Subjects
39 P. Ricoeur, 1981, Hermeneutics and the Human Sciences, Cambridge
60 Thompson, op.cit., p369
61 See R. Williams, 1983 ed., Keywords, London, pp153-157
62 J.B. Thompson, 1984, Studies in the Theory of Ideology, Cambridge, pp4-5
63 in A.C.H. Smith, 1975, Paper Voices, London, p22
39
Chapter One: Labour and Monarchy: analysing the background. 
Introduction. 
This chapter attempts to contextualise Labour attitudes towards the monarchy
by examining the nineteenth-century political environment from which they
emerged. It covers the period up to the Great War, follows a chronological
course, but in one or two instances introduces relevant material from a later
period. It contends that Labour attitudes reflected both the political traditions
which the Labour Party drew upon from the nineteenth century, and the
particular cultural and political changes affecting the monarchy and the nation
in the period 1870-1900. The analysis incorporates events, periods and ideas
which predate the formation of the Labour Party, or even of the socialist
organisations which preceded it and figured in its formation. However, a central
theme in this analysis will be that of continuity; if not necessarily of personnel,
then of attitudes and ideology.
Republicanism, radicalism and the working class. 
The alliance of forces which joined at the beginning of the twentieth
century to form the Labour Party, drew upon a broad and varied political and
ideological inheritance. However, the new party was overwhelmingly working-
class in its composition, and it was to the working class that it looked for
support, a fact which did much to influence its attitude to the monarchy. The
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Party reflected, and had to reflect upon, the dominant attitudes towards the
monarchy current amongst the working class.
Two relationships need to be considered separately. The first is between
popular opinion and the institution of monarchy, including the the role of the
Crown. The second is between republicanism and the working class. To start
with the former; historians have noted several shifts in public attitudes towards
the monarchy during the nineteenth century, whilst at the same time detecting
a long-term trend of increasing popularity. That popularity was not simply an
accident of history, but the result also of deliberate attempts to manipulate
public attiudes. Some of the phenomena associated with the popularizing of
the British monarchy in the late nineteenth century have been recognised as
originating as far back as the reign of George 111. 1
 A popular cult of monarchy
was fostered, with careful attention to pageantry and ceremonial, culminating
in the jubilee celebrations of 1809; power and splendour were demonstrated
through large and expensive constructions of royal residences; newspapers
publicised royal events as never before. Colley makes the point that the reign
of George III left significant and durable legacies.
"By the end of his reign, the monarchy was more genuinely and assertively
British than it had been before; it was indisputably more splendid; and it was
more securely at one with the politics of unreason and emotionalism. It was
now axiomatic that royal celebrations should ideally involve all political
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affiliations, all religious groupings and all parts of Great Britain.. .This had by no
means always been the case."2
More positive perceptions of the monarchy derived also from the Crown's
gradual withdrawal from political life during the nineteenth century. By the end
of the century it had exchanged its earlier political role for a ceremonial one
which was "emotionally pleasing and politically uncontentious"3.
One theme thrown up by the "Queen Caroline" episode which had
resonance in popular politics throughout the century is that of the royal
defender of the Constitution and of "fair play". Thus, even the republican
William Benbow could proclaim:
"And a QUEEN will now bring down the corrupt conspirators against the
Peace, Honour and Life of the Innocent."
A similar theme emerges from the popular agitation over the Tichborne
case, in the form of a demand for:
"....straight dealing in social behaviour. The term helps us to understand
how 'politics' was constructed by the working class - the feeling that a corrupt
world can be restored by purity amongst the rulers."5
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The agitation in support of the Claimant in the Tichborne affair produced
a weekly newspaper devoted exclusively to the case, nationally organised
defence funds, and the Magna Carta Association. The latter included amongst
its aims support of the House of Lords and "to restore the Crown to the
Queen". The principle behind such demands was radical constitutionalism,
which looked to the good king to provide a check on despotic ministers. That
the destiny of the Association should have been its eventual evolution into a
radical club, and subsequently an element in the formation of Hyndman's
Democratic Federation, is suggestive of the complex derivation of values and
beliefs affecting popular attitudes towards the monarchy. Antipathy towards
monarchy within popular radicalism was not automatic, so long as that
monarchy represented acceptable values, and upheld or defended
constitutional principles, for "the traditions of British popular radicalism had in
fact from their very inception been predominantly legalistic and constitutional."6
This characteristic of the radical tradition can be seen as particularly significant
for a new party, such as Labour, of political "outsiders" seeking to use the
existing constitutional framework to achieve their political objectives. The
appeal to the Crown as the guarantor of "fair play" was recurrent in later
periods, as Labour strove for influence and then office:
"...there was, even among radical and labour politicians, a residual
constitutional rhetoric which saw the crown as an essentially British institution
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which had on occasion - mostly in the distant past in which myth and history
fuse - been the defender and preserver of British liberties."7
Significantly, the Chartists did not include the abolition of the monarchy in
their six points, and their slogan in 1848 was, "France has the Republic,
England shall have the Charter". However, Chartism was infused with the
rhetoric and ideas of anti-monarchism. 8 The general attitude taken by Chartists
was precisely that adopted by many in the Labour Party, even well into the
twentieth century.
"Although most Chartists would have declared themselves to be
republicans, they did not identify the throne as the seat of reaction or even as a
serious threat to reform."
However, some Chartists did want to abolish the monarchy. Hamey's
London Democratic Association claimed a membership of 3,000 in 1838, and
its aims were both political and socio-economic. It wanted to abolish the
monarchy, the House of Lords and the profit system. Unlike many other
Chartists, and later politicians who shared their relative indifference to its
abolition, Harney did not regard the monarchy as a mere relic of a passing
order, but recognised its active role in conserving inequality and injustice.
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"The nature of Harney's republicanism rested on his belief that monarchy
was a shield for the rule of a privileged aristocracy and the support for a
privileged Church. Democracy and social equality can be achieved only in a
republic."10
The extent of popular support for republicanism at this period is difficult to
determine, but appears to have been small. One explanation may be that it fell
victim to the split in the Chartist movement. Republicanism was a central
element in Harney's political programme. He sought the abolition of the
monarchy as well as the establishment of social and economic equality, and
around 1848 there was evidence of widespread republicanism within the
Chartist movement. However, this development proved weak, damaged by
events on the Continent and by the strength of Feargus O'Connor's appeal. He
opposed the republicanism and socialism of Harney's wing.
"The real centres of working-class radicalism and militancy in the Chartist
period were not in the London area but in the North. And here republican
propaganda was blunted by the 'magic' of O'Connor."11
In examining attitudes to the monarchy amongst political radicals,
fundamentally different positions are identifiable. On the one hand, monarchy
was represented as the defender of constitutional liberties, upholder of the
rights of the ordinary man in the face of attempts to corrupt the system and
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defraud the people. In contrast, another strain of radical opinion identified the
monarchy as parasitical and part of an old, discredited system. In this latter
perspective:
"Corruption, tyranny and the polarity between wealth and poverty within
existing society was ascribed to the political depredations of a parasitic
class...At least into the 1870's radical rhetoric of a republican kind referred
contemptuously to the inequality of treatment meted out to royal paupers at the
top of society and workhouse paupers at the bottom."12
The tension between these two strands of opinion could still be felt more than
half a century later, when even those who condemned the opulence and
extravagance associated with the monarchy looked to the royal prerogative to
defend parliamentary democracy against attack from reactionary forces.
The brief revival of republicanism in the early 1870's can be attributed to
several factors: dissatisfaction with a royal family which was seen as failing in
its responsibilities; economic depression; and the fall of the French second
empire. 13 This episode must be treated with care, as there were many strands
to the agitation. The political leadership of the republican movement had,
within months of the formation of the first republican club, split into a moderate
and an extreme tendency. The former was associated with Bradlaugh, who
was keen that they should remain strictly constitutional and avoid accusations
of sedition and treason. The latter, associated with the International Working
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Men's Association and Marx, unequivocally supported the Paris Commune and
all that it represented. In terms of numbers of people attracted to public
meetings, and in terms of the dissemination of its case, it was Bradlaugh's
"constitutional" wing which prevailed.
Part of the explanation for the greater success of Bradlaugh's
campaign lay in its concentration upon the expense of the monarchy and the
failings of individual members of the royal family. This drew upon an existing
anti-monarchism, described by Antony Taylor.
"Its opposition to the throne is based simply upon a stock of long-
standing radical images of corrupt practice in British politics. By drawing
attention to these it suggests that aristocratic and kingly rule is irredemably
flawed by the sloth, intrigue and dissoluteness of a leisured and pampered
lifestyle." 14
Whilst the founders and organisers of republican clubs identified the idea of a
republic with radical social and economic change, the spontaneous spread and
growth of provincial clubs, and the enormous public meetings addressed by
Bradlaugh, DiIke and others, drew their impetus from narrower political
concerns. The former were often ex-Chartists, members of the International
Working Men's Association and of the Land and Labour League, and looked
for a "social republic". Their position was summarised by a speaker at an East
End republican meeting in April 1871:
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"A republic, to be of any use to the masses of the people, must deal with
the social question affecting their interest."15
The leading public figures of 1870's republicanism, such as Bradlaugh and
DiIke, were radical democrats, and were hostile to socialism. It has been
argued that the republican movement was a movement from below, of popular
radicalism, and was identified with the aim of the social republic. 16 However, a
convincing case can be made that the real upsurge in popularity for
republicanism drew upon that particular form of anti-monarchism alluded to
above. Thus the rapid growth of provincial republican clubs received impetus
from the issue of a dowry for Princess Louise in 1871; then of an allowance for
Prince Arthur, and then the question of the Civil List in 1872. Furthermore, the
case against the monarchy expressed at the great public meetings, in the most
popular republican pamphlets such as Bradlaugh's Impeachment of the House
of Brunswick, and in highly publicised parliamentary debates, was that of
waste and dereliction of duty.
"Like much - indeed most - British republican writing then and later, these
stressed the expense of monarchy and attacked the extravagances and
failings of actual figures rather than arguing the case for a republic as a more
rational and democratic form of government."17
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This approach reflected and continued a further traditional concern of popular
radicalism; a commitment to retrenchment in central government expenditure.
Radicals saw the state essentially as an appendage of the upper classes, and
as inherently oppressive, inefficient and corrupt. It was this tradition that DiIke
drew upon in addressing the huge public gatherings of 1871:
"Stridently anti-monarchical in tone, his rhetoric relied upon received radical
antagonism to the evils of Old Corruption rather than suggesting novel
democratic mechanisms for social and economic change." 18
Favourite targets of radicals included the costs of the army, navy, the national
debt and the Civil List. Working-class radicals reacted angrily against Lowe's
proposed match tax in 1871 because it,
"...looked like treason against the sacred canons of Cobdenite and
Gladstonite taxation committed by a notoriously anti-democratic Chancellor in
order to compensate aristocratic officers for the abolition of the purchase
system and to provide Princess Louise with a dowry."19
Later in the century, Lib-Labs directed their fire on the House of Lords and on
grants to royalty. Thus in 1889, Mabon opposed a grant to the children of the
Prince of Wales. As will be demonstrated later, it was essentially the anti-
monarchical critique which provided the basis of Keir Hardie's attacks on
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royalty, and of the protests which the Labour Party intermittently made about
the monarchy in the early decades of the twentieth century.
The transformation of the monarchy and the decline of republicanism.
On many occasions, Labour politicians and writers in affiliated
journals noted that the rise of Labour coincided with the decline of
republicanism.
"The Republican movement, like the Agnostic movement, died out with the
advent of the Labour movement. Experience has shown conclusively that it
matters not whether a King wears a crown, or a President wears a chain."20
Nearly forty years later, J.R. Clynes made the same observation.
"Before the Labour Party was established, there was a considerable
republican party in this country. It is significant that as the Labour Party has
grown, respect for the monarchy has increased and republican convictions
have withered."21
There was more than coincidence here. Although remnants of republicanism
never entirely disappeared from Labour politics, it is clear that for many in the
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new Party, rejection of republicanism as a live political issue performed the
same function for Labour as it had for nineteenth-century radicalism. Taylor
observes that:
"Republicanism's greatest contribution to nineteenth-century
radicalism was.. .the degree to which it helped define a sphere of operations
independent of, and outside, mainstream Liberalism."22
There was a sense in which Labour marked out its ground partly by an
effective rejection of a republicanism which was strongly associated in many
Labour minds with middle-class radicals such DiIke, Bradlaugh and
Chamberlain. The virulent anti-socialism of Bradlaugh, as articulated in his
debate with Hyndman, helped to reinforce the separability of the two ideas.
The Labour Party emerged towards the end of a period in which the
monarchy had undergone a successfully transformation. The latter part of
Victoria's reign had seen an orchestrated attempt to change the public image
of the monarchy. In the last quarter of the nineteenth century, Britain became
preponderantly an urban, industrial society, with the associated growth of
class-consciousness, class loyalty and conflict. For a society suffering from the
dislocation of change, the need for a unifying symbol of national community
and of stability and permanence in an unstable world, became crucially
important.
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The decline of republicanism has sometimes been explained as the
spontaneous consequence of the serious illness of the Prince of Wales in the
winter of 1871, and, more generally, of popular enthusiasm for Empire, with
which the monarchy was closely associated. However, there are numerous
indications that the perceived threat of both republicanism and of working
class political advance produced a deliberate effort to reconstruct popular
belief in the monarchy. Gladstone, on a visit to the Queen in December 1871,
declared his aim of,
" [not]. ..merely meeting (republicanism) by a more powerful display of
oppposite opinion, but... .getting rid of it altogether, for it could never be
satisfactory that there should exist even a fraction of the nation republican in its
view."23
Ceremonial events were crucial. Previously, court pageants had been only
locally witnessed, but with the development of a widely read and influential
press, the sense of participation could be spread throughout the nation.
Pageantry enhanced the symbolic image of royalty, mystically embodying the
national will, and was central to the change. The pageants organised by Esher
were of a scale and character unknown in the earlier part of the nineteenth
century. Before the funeral of Edward VII, a quarter of a million people filed
past his coffin in Westminster Hall. The attitude of the popular press became
positive and favourable, and served to reinforce the intended effect of public
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appearances by royalty. When a public holiday was declared on February 27th
1872, large crowds gathered outside Buckingham Palace as the royal family
appeared on the balcony. Newspapers the next day contrasted "ideal
nationality" with the "soul-less philosophies of English Republicans". After the
Golden Jubilee of Queen Victoria, the Archbishop of Canterbury felt that
"everyone feels that the socialist movement has had a check"24.
One aim of the changes was to help contain and channel the spead
of democractic and socialist ideas, by invoking a national identity which
recognised itself through the reinvented royal identity. As McKibbin has
observed:
"The acceptability of both [Crown and Parliament] to the working class
underwrote the existing status-order and preserved the country's institutions
and class system more or less intact."25
Just as the Crown was seen to stand above partisan politics, thereby providing
a unifying symbol of national community, the "sense of oneness" which it
inculcated served to render the Constitution itself somehow "natural". Not only
did the monarchy become splendid, public and popular in this period, but it
went far to achieving the status of a neutral and disinterested arbiter in
constitutional matters. From having been partisan and unpopular in the earlier
part of the century, by the end it could be heralded as the,
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"....even-handed guarantor of the class-neutrality of Parliament, the
institution which ensured that the rules of the game would be followed."26
It was within this "class-neutral" state and to the rule-bound Parliament that the
new political forces of the working class looked to achieve their ends.
Labour. the Nation and the Constitution 
It was in the context of this change in the public image of the monarchy
that Labour sought to determine its own position towards the constitution and
the monarchy. As the preceding section indicates, the monarchy had moved in
public perception away from partisanship in politics, towards an impartiality
above the party contest. At the same time as the Crown was represented as
the guarantor of the Constitution, an attempt was made to reconstruct the
monarchy as the symbol of the nation.
The range of opinions about the monarchy within the early Labour
Party was a reflection of the interplay of several distinct issues: the theoretical
tensions between monarchism and socialism; the constitutional implications of
the Crown's continuing royal prerogative and its potential for political
interference; the social power of the monarchy to reinforce and perpetuate
caste and class division, and to perpetuate an "immature" political culture; the
popularity of the monarchy amongst the working class to which Labour
appealed for electoral support.
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Of the elements which coalesced to form the federally structured
Labour Party, it was the Social Democratic Federation (S.D.F.) which adopted
the clearest initial position on monarchy. This might be anticipated, as it
comprised in part elements drawn from earlier republican groups. As an
individual example, John Sketchley had been an organiser in local Chartist
politics in the 1830's, was involved with the republican group organised by W.J.
Linton in the 1850's, and then in 1875 founded the Birmingham Republican
Association. Sketchley was instrumental in establishing the Birmingham
Democratic Federation in 1884. Such individuals carried republican and
secularist traditions into the nascent socialist body, the S.D.F. In the official
programme of the S.D.F., the first of its "immediate reforms" was the abolition
of the monarchy. Bax and Quelch, in their New Catechism of Socialism,
included an unambiguously socialist rejection of monarchy.
"Socialists are essentially thorough-going Republicans. Socialism, which
aims at political and economic equality, is radically inconsistent with any other
political form than that of Republicanism. Monarchy and Socialism, or Empire
and Socialism, are incompatible and inconceivable. Socialism involves political
and economic equality, while Monarchy or Empire essentially imply domination
and inequality."27
Whilst the theoretical grounds for this position might appear to preclude
compromise, it is clear that the establishment of a republic quickly receded
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from being a priority for the S.D.F. In 1902, the Federation's executive
published an open letter to the King.
"We Social Democrats are working for a Social Democratic Republic in
which neither king nor aristocrat nor plutocrat will have a place. But we
recognise plain facts, and we should be no more inclined than are the
overwhelming majority of common Englishmen to depose you in order to set
up King Capital, with his horde of greedy sycophants, as President in your
stead. ,,28
One of the "plain facts" referred to was the degree of popular enthusiasm for
the monarchy apparent by the end of Victoria's reign. Theoretical objections
were tempered by electoral considerations.
The Fabian Society had no declared position on the question of
monarchy, and the evidence indicates divisions both within its leadership and
among its wider membership. At the time of Victoria's Diamond Jubilee, an
appeal was made by the Strand Board of Works for funds to decorate the
Strand, and the Fabian Executive Committee voted to make a donation, on the
grounds that,
"..the Jubilee is a national festival from which we, as Socialists, should not
dissociate ourselves, and that such popular holidays are only too uncommon in
England."29
56
This resolution was carried by eight votes to two, with Shaw and Bland in the
majority and Ramsay MacDonald in the minority. The Executive Committee
received protests "from about ten members", and was obliged to call a special
meeting to hear the views of the membership. 3° Wherry Anderson, a long-
standing member and a journalist on Reynold's News, moved a resolution at
that meeting, opposing the Committee's decision to make a donation, on the
grounds that,
"...it is the mission of Fabians only to support those public manifestations
which make for Socialism and Democracy. •,,31
This was passed by 23 votes to 11, and the money not paid. Amongst those
opposing the resolution were Shaw and Sidney Webb. The jubilee controversy
seems to have reawakened interest amongst Fabians in the question of the
monarchy. One of the regular Fabian lectures on contemporary issues was
devoted to the subject of "Socialism and Monarchy", and was given by Wherry
Anderson. Although there is no account of their contributions, Shaw, Pease
and Ramsay MacDonald all spoke at the meeting. Anderson advocated a
qualified republicanism, based upon social and political objections to
monarchy. Royalty created "an enormous crowd of grovelling flatterers", and
public offices tended to be filled with hangers-on. Anderson cited examples of
Victoria's and the Prince of Wales' political interference "against the interests of
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the democracy". How this position might be translated into political proposals
remained vague, and Anderson's contribution illustrates Taylor's point that
"anti-monarchism has no blueprint for change, nor does it present a broader
agenda for the overhaul of the Constitution". 32 Anderson, in line with that
tradition, was more concerned with exposure of corruption than with
constitutional change.
"Fabians could not encourage a hopeless conflict for a mere constitutional
revolution, but might well support proposals that served to harrass the Crown
and aristocracy, and further limit their corrupting influence."33
It has already been noted that the Fabian Executive Committee and
the membership were divided on the the issue of monarchy, and that opinion
was divided amongst the Old Gang. Shaw and Bland opposed moves to
criticise the Executive's conduct during the Diamond Jubilee, although Shaw
found the celebrations themselves repugnant, telling Ellen Terry that "the
Jubilee business makes me sick - ugh!".34 An extended discussion of
socialism and republicanism took place through a series of letters published by
the Saturday Review in late 1900. Shaw and Bland from the Fabian Society
exchanged views with Be'fort Bax of the S.D.F. In opening the debate, Bax
made the bold assertion that,
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"If there is one point upon which all Socialists are without exception
unanimous, it is that socialism of necessity presupposes republicanism."35
Acknowledging that a republic might be bourgeois and individualistic, and that
republicanism was an aspect of that old radicalism which socialism sought to
supersede, Bax nevertheless denounced "such a monstrosity as a non-
republican socialism."36
The response from Shaw sought to differentiate English politics and political
history from distracting and false continental parallels. He regarded the
"English constitution" as equally, if not more, likely to enable the realisation of
a socialist programme than the French one. Idolatry was as much a
phenomenon of a republic as of a monarchy. Far from incorporating
republicanism, socialism in England was its rival and antagonist, because of
the "inveterately individualistic" character of the former. The republican
upsurge in the 1870's saw the working class straining at the gnat of the Civil
List whilst swallowing the camel of untold millions going in rent and profit to the
capitalist. Bax's reply denied that socialism consisted simply of "state
appropriation" and "municipal doles". Socialism implied vast social changes,
the overthrow of the present system, and would express itself as republicanism
in the political sphere, as it would communism in the economic. To this
dialogue was added the voice of Hubert Bland.
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"To the Socialism of Mr Shaw, of myself, of a growing number of
Englishmen who take the trouble to think about these interesting matters, a
monarchy will be no obstacle for the next three centuries."37
A significant aspect of Shaw's case emerged in his final letter of the exchange.
Those whom socialists sought to win over to their cause were not likely to, nor
necessarily needed to, abandon all their existing attachments, including
attachment to the monarchy. Shaw welcomed the "ordinary, respectable
citizen" who had come to see that there was an alternative to leaving the
industrial organization of society to greed and chance, notwithstanding the fact
that such a new adherent might arrive "with all his social and religious
prejudices in complete working order". 38
 In its essence, the argument from
within the Fabian Society leadership was that republicanism was unnecessary
to the socialist project of economic transformation and was likely to deter
ordinary people from identifying with that project. It was an argument echoed
by the leadership of the Labour Party throughout the following decades.
If the S.D.F. manifested a qualified republicanism, it had explicitly stated
its rejection of monarchy. This was never the case with the I.L.P. At its
foundation conference, a programme of political aims was presented, which
had been drawn up by a guiding committee. Amongst the aims was the
abolition of the monarchy and of the House of Lords, along with demands for
adult suffrage, the use of the referendum and shorter parliaments. These
specific proposals were immediately dropped by the conference in favour of a
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vaguer, blander amendment, which was then incorporated into the "political"
section of the I.L.P.'s constitution.
"The Independent Labour Party is in favour of every proposal for extending
electoral rights and democratising the system of government."39
The prevailing attitude of those leading I.L.P. figures who committed their ideas
to paper was not radically different from that of the S.D.F. They acknowledged
the incompatibility of socialism and monarchy in theoretical terms, but then
denied the importance of the "purely political" question of monarchy or
republic, when compared with the issue of economic change. Contemporary
expressions of opinion constantly reiterated this theme. Thus, Philip Snowden,
speaking in 1900:
"I do not believe in a monarchy, but it would be a waste of energy to spend
time in agitation for its abolition. We have to strike at the institutions of which
the monarchy is only a symbol."4°
At this stage, Snowden was quite prepared to declare republican beliefs
openly, but always qualified this by asserting the irrelevance of republicanism
to the issues of the moment. In Parliament, he declared,
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"In theory I am a Republican, but I attach so little importance to this practical
question at present that I would not lift my little finger to interfere with the
monarchy."'"
Of the I.L.P. leaders in the early years of the century, it is Keir Hardie
whose name is most immediately associated with attacks upon the monarchy.
Despite the frequency, and ferocity, of Hardie's attacks, he shared the same
premise as others mentioned above. Making a distinction between the political
and the economic, Hardie not only gave priority to the latter, but denied any
positive role for republicanism as an impetus for political transformation.
'We might get quit of the royal family without getting rid of a single one of
our burdens... .Therefore, until the system of wealth production be changed, it
is not worth while exchanging a queen for a president. The robbery of the poor
would go on equally under the one as the other. The king fraud will disappear
when the exploiting of the people comes to a close."42
Ramsay MacDonald's Socialism and Government has the nearest
approach to an extended, theoretical discussion of where the I.L.P. version of
socialism stood in regard to monarchy in this period. Suffused with
MacDonald's ideas about "organic' change, the book exemplifies a different
strand of belief in the I.L.P. from those considered earlier. Rather than simply
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denying the relevance of republicanism to the immediate concerns of
socialism, it identifies positive attributes of monarchy.
"...as a political power, the Monarchy may be said to exist only in
potentiality, and so long as it continues to do so, the political reformer may
pass it by without notice, even though, on theoretical grounds, he may be a
republican. Indeed, he may see in it some utilitarian value."43
The advantages included: the avoidance of the "troublesome task" of holding
an election for president; the distancing of the head of state from political strife;
and the bringing of "dignity and gentlemanly sense" to the execution of formal
and ceremonial functions. The last has an ominous ring. As to whether in a
socialist state, the monarchy could survive, MacDonald avoided even the
semblance of a principled argument.
"In England, the power of the legislature will probably make a Republic
unnecessary unless the monarch were to side with the threatened interests.
But I am inclined to think that this question will be settled more by accidental
events than by the operation of political principle."44
A slightly different interpretation of how the monarchy fitted into the
legitimate concerns of a socialist was offered by Bruce Glasier. Although this
contribution was made at a later period and may also be characterised as
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idiosyncratic, it came from one of the I.L.P.'s senior figures, and one of its most
prolific writers.
"The fact is that the Government of Great Britain is already Republican in
spirit if not in form. The King himself is but a glorified hereditary President, but
the people are by no means impatient to take upon themselves the
responsibility of having an elected one."45
Writing later, as editor of the Socialist Review, Glasier provided a further
argument to the case for burying republicanism. What he characterised as a
"harmless monarchy" had failed to impeded the onward march of democracy.
"..democracy and liberty came without Republicanism, slowly it is true, but
fairly good democracy and freedom nevertheless ...and Republicanism died
what can be called a natural death."46
In the period following the Great War, there appeared a rash of
hypothetical plans for a future Labour government. These, while cautioning
against the socially corrupting character of the Court, found no theoretical or
practical objections to a continuation of the monarchy. Increasingly, reference
was made to the virtues of an hereditary constitutional monarchy. The Webbs,
drawing up their Constitution for the Socialist Commonwealth of Great Britain,
did not include the abolition of the monarchy.
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"It does not seem necessary to propose any change in the system to which
the country is accustomed, of this titular or ceremonial headship being
vested..., in a member... .of a particular family."47
Very similar themes emerged in an anonymously published account of Labour
Party aims. Like the Webbs, the authors drew a distinction between an
hereditary monarchy and an hereditary upper chamber. Whilst the latter was
"wholly inconsistent with socialist principles" the former could be comfortably
accommodated, and on a positive note:
"In a country without hereditary legislators or titles, a constitutional
monarchy is perhaps a reasonable solution of the state's needs for some
national figure-head.. .It is likely that constitutional monarchy will be the last
element of government to be democratised, and it is important to do first things
first... .At present it has, on the whole, fewer disadvantages than an elected
president who is too often not a figure-head but a politician."8
J.H. Thomas declared himself an enthusiast for the monarchy, believing that
"the least of all the difficulties facing a Labour Government would be that of the
Crown".49
 Thomas cited as a reason for this confidence the respect shown by
George V for the Constitution.
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Earlier in this chapter, reference was made to the distinction drawn by
many Labour and socialist politicians between constitutional questions and
socio-economic questions. Republicanism was identified only with the former.
Increasingly, the constitutional monarchy was regarded as an irrelevance as
an issue in itself, much in line with the observation of Marx and Engels that
"republican-minded radicalism had become passé - marginalised by the far
greater potential of working class development". 50
 The battle, as it was
conceived across the Labour and socialist spectrum, was with a hostile
economic system and with those who controlled it, whilst the monarchy was
seen as either unproblematic or as part of the superstructure that would fall
automatically when the economic system fell. Having established for itself the
perceived position of disinterested arbiter in constitutional matters, the
monarchy was increasingly regarded in Labour circles as politically
unobjectionable, and as an element of a constitution which could facilitate the
fulfilment of Labour's objectives. It was primarily on the narrow basis of the
constitutional role of the Crown that Labour approval of the monarchy grew.
Clynes, writing after Labour had held office, gave expression to these
convictions.
'Whatever complaints we may have about the working of the Constitution,
the most extreme of our economic doctrines are quite consistent with the
continuance of a Constitutional Monarchy. We believe that the King is a
guarantor of fairness to all political parties, ours among the rest."51
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The image of political neutrality and fairness which the monarchy
cultivated was not without a few stains. Labour's growing confidence that the
constitutional monarchy constituted no barrier to its social and economic aims
was subject to intermittent setbacks, and it became apparent that neutrality
was relative rather than absolute.
Clearly, there was scope within the vague limits of the Constitution
for an active and determined monarch to become closely involved in the
concerns of government. The extent of involvement depended not just upon
the restrictive conventions, but how much was allowed to happen by
contemporary opinion. The nature and scope of the royal prerogative was not
clearly defined, and there was potential for its extension in extraordinary
political circumstances. For the Labour Party, concerns about the monarch's
propensity and capacity to become involved in politics were heightened by the
strong suspicion that the King's political opinions rarely coincided with their
own. Edward VII's involvement in politics was far less extensive or intrusive
than his mother's, but then the political influence of Queen Victoria had not
been widely known during her reign. Particularly in diplomatic and military
matters, Victoria was not just highly attentive, but demanded that her opinion
be heard and acted upon. However, Hardie's attacks on the monarchy towards
the end of her reign did not raise these issues. During the reign of Edward VII,
at least some of the instances of royal "mischief' became public knowledge.
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Underlying the objections voiced within the I.L.P., and then within the
Labour Party, to Edward's involvement in foreign affairs, was a deep suspicion
of the King's circle of friends. The burden of complaint was not simply that the
King was exceeding his constitutional duties, but that his interest was highly
partial. This was especially the case with South Africa. Edward had a network
of links to the South African interests of those closely connected to the
Jameson Raid. His circle of plutocratic friends included some of the most
prominent financial figures implicated in the raid: Rhodes, Belt and Wehrner.
The Duke of Fife, the King's son-in-law was a director of the Chartered
Company, and according to the Labour Leader was "steeped to his lips in the
Jameson Raid". 52 The banker Horace Farquar, "the only peer who was
elevated to the Upper Chamber at the direct request of the King" and who later
held an appointment in the Royal Household, was involved in the Raid. 53 It was
from Hardie and the Labour Leader that the loudest objections came.
Following the establishment of a committee of enquiry into the Jameson Raid,
the newspaper foresaw danger for the monarchy.
'Whether the loss of South Africa will mean the break up of the British
Empire I am not prepared to say. The break up of the British monarchy is
certain when the facts come out and come home."54
Not only was Edward VII implicated, through his friends, in the raid itself, but
was further accused of attempting to interfere with the work of the committee of
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enquiry. Hardie accused the King of personally intervening to prevent Liberal
committee members from seeing papers which would have proved Colonial
Office complicity in the raid, and of supporting the interests of his guilty friends.
'While the King lingers fondly in the company of Lord Farquhar and the
Duke of Abercorn - men neck deep in the Raid - the tongue of gossip will never
be stayed."55
Whilst more recent accounts of the period have modified our understanding of
the degree of Colonial Office complicity, as far as Hardie was concerned, no
doubt existed about Edward's complicity.56
"It is no secret that His Majesty has all along been a party to the policy of
the war gang in South Africa. What his holding may be in Rand shares I have
no means of knowing."57
A more widespread disquiet amongst Labour politicians sprang from
their belief that Edward was exceeding his constitutional rights in attempting to
formulate foreign policy. The true extent of Edward's involvement and influence
has remained a matter for argument, although claims have been made for a
significant and "perhaps even decisive role" in bringing about the Anglo-French
Entente Cordiale. 58 It is a claim repeated in a recent work on royal involvement
in political events. 59 In contemporary Labour circles, there was fear that the
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Court and the King were attempting to restore the monarch's role in initiating
policy. The S.D.F. newspaper declared that the King had "more control over
the foreign policy of England than any monarch since the Plantagenets". 6° The
Clarion expressed fears that the King, "in his admirable zeal for peace", should
have outrun his constitutional rights in his friendly overtures to the French,
thereby alienating Germany. 61 MacDonald suggested that the Court was trying
to increase "the personal power of the King, suggesting to his mind certain
points of view.. .certain courses of action, certain lines of policy". 62 Jowett
condemned the King's attempts to involve himself in politics, and also those
politicians who allowed him to do so.
"The growing practice among Ministers of State of deferring to the King's
desire to play an important part in the direction of public affairs is especially
dangerous because there is an unwritten, but none the less inexorable rule,
among the leaders of both political parties, that where Royalty is concerned
there is to be no discussion between them."63
Jowett developed his argument to include what he termed "the
power of social influence in politics". Starting with the King and spreading
outwards to the Court and to "Society", this undemocratic influence stifled
democratic control of policy-making. Jowett indicated that this tendency had
assumed particularly serious proportions, and openly manifested itself around
Westminster.
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"The swell mob swarms all over the place. It flaunts its finery with
swaggering impudence and mocks at the world and its problems."64
The King's perceived transgression of the unwritten boundaries of his
constitutional responsibilities caused MacDonald, for one, to warn that the
issue of the royal prerogative was not a dead one, and that the process of
stripping political power from the Crown was incomplete. The King's personal
diplomacy, and his attempt in 1908 to ostracise certain M.P.'s, suggested that
the monarchy might become the "centre of a political party" and the struggle
between it and the people might be renewed.65
The reference by MacDonald to the exclusion of M.P.'s alludes to the
"Garden Party incident". Although it has been mentioned in histories of the
period and in biographies of those involved, it deserves to be addressed here,
as the first, and a rare official, clash between the Labour Party and the
monarchy. On the eve of the King's meeting with Tsar Nicholas at Reval,
Hardie criticised the visit because of the recent shooting down of
demonstrators in Russia. Hardie was part of a small group of radicals which
had then voted against a parliamentary motion congratulating the King on his
visit. When, shortly afterwards, invitations to a royal garden party were sent to
M.P.'s, four names were missing, including Hardie, Victor Grayson and Arthur
Ponsonby, then a Liberal. Grayson had referred to the Tsar as "the bloodiest
monster in existence" and "a loathsome brute". 66 Ponsonby's offence of
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criticising the visit was aggravated by his class treason: he was the son of
Lord Ponsonby, Queen Victoria's private secretary, and had himself been the
Queen's page. Such slights, by those whose families had previously been
associated with the royal family were deeply resented and never forgotten.67
Initially, the cases of Hardie, Grayson and that of Ponsonby were considered
distinct and different. As to the responsibility for excluding Ponsonby's name,
Reynolds Newspaper was in no doubt that it was an official who had taken the
decision, on the basis that the King's "great tact" in such matters would have
precluded such a move.
"In well-informed quarters there seems a disposition to accept the semi-
official explanation that the King himself was entirely ignorant of the omission
of Mr Ponsonby's name from the list of guests."68
Hardie's omission was regarded as less surprising, because it was known that
even if invited, he would not have attended the party. A meeting of the
Parliamentary Labour Party (P.L.P.) had been held and concern expressed
about the exclusion. Ponsonby later claimed that, having discovered the
omission of the names, he had approached Hardie, who at first showed
indifference. In Grayson's case, it was understood that he attached no
importance to the matter. However, the alarm was raised, an enquiry was
made to the King's private secretary, but no answer was forthcoming for a
week. When a reply came, it was to say that the enquiry should have been
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directed to the Lord Chamberlain. Correspondence with the Lord Chamberlain
followed, and there were reports that the Lord Chamberlain's letter, the
contents of which could not be made public, was unsatisfactory and that the
Parliamentary Labour Party would meet to decide on a course of action. 69
 That
meeting took place on 11th July, under Henderson's chairmanship, and
subsequently MacDonald issued a statement.
"The Party is of the opinion that an attempt has been made by the Court
to influence Members of Parliament in the discharge of their duties and in
expressing their opinions honestly on political questions."79
The P.L.P. had passed a resolution supporting Hardie and removed the names
of all its members from the list for invitation to future garden parties. Hardie
threatened to resign his Merthyr Tydvil seat and seek re-election "on a straight
issue of King versus People" if no satisfactory answer was received. 71 Hardie
spoke at length about the matter at a miners' meeting near Merthyr. He
characterised his exclusion as interference and a penalization of free speech.
Although he had never attended a garden party and probably never would, he
had always in the past received an invitation, as the M.P. for Merthyr. Hardie
did not seem in any doubt as to the responsibility for his exclusion.
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"Since the days of Charles I, the King had stood outside politics, and if the
present King was foolish enough to interfere with the politics of members of
Parliament, it would be a very bad day for him."72
Other Labour M.P.'s took up Hardie's case. Will Thorne denounced the "scurvy
treatment" of Hardie, and declared that much of the respect which the working
class may have had for the King had been lost by the incident. There followed
an vigorous declaration of his republicanism, which within a few years, was to
be replaced by an equally vigorous monarchism.
"I hope the time will arrive, and very speedily too, when there will be no
room for kings and queens, but when we shall be able to govern ourselves,
and I think we shall govern ourselves in a better manner than we are being
governed at the present time."73
At the time, the incident was regarded gravely. In the Clarion, A.M. Thompson
wrote that,
"The Windsor Garden Party is destined to become a landmark in history. It
will mark the active revival in British politics of the Republican sentiment which
died out as a force in the seventies."74
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Others regarded the incident as part of a wider trend of Court interference with
the free expression of opinion.
One incidental but illuminating product of the Garden Party incident,
was an exchange between two prominent journalists on the broader question
of how socialists should regard the monarchy. Representing two different
traditions, their respective arguments could still be heard in the 1930's and
beyond. Writing in Blatchford's Clarion, Alex M. Thompson expressed his
unhappiness at the King's recent diplomatic adventures, but did so as an
advocate of constitutional monarchy.
"British Socialism has hitherto distinguished itself from its Continental
connections by an all but unanimous adherence to the monarchic principle.. .we
have argued that a Professional specially trained for the work (of national
representative at public functions) was in many ways preferable to an
Amateur."75
Acknowledging the popularity of the present king, Thompson praised his
shrewdness and kindliness, and in terms that recall an earlier rhetoric of
radical constitutionalism:
"Our King, we boasted, was an English King, a Royal democrat, a prince of
good fellows, a loyal and able First Servant of the State."76
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The tenor of Thompson's article was that Labour felt its trust in the monarchy
to have been betrayed by recent events, and was surprised and disappointed
at being treated unfairly. In contrast, Justice carried an article by the Marxist
Theodore Rothstein which mocked the point made by Hardie; that he, as a
representative of the working class, had as much right to attend a royal garden
party as any other politician. Rothstein, interestingly, labelled this viewpoint as
radical rather than socialist.
"What has a Socialist to do with Monarchy and its mummery except
denounce it and denounce those who actively or passively support it."77
The Glasgow Forward seemed unsure how to handle the whole business.
It began by dismissing it as trivial and not worthy of space, but later carried an
article which claimed that,
"...a very important constitutional point of law is at issue - embryonic
arbitrary despotism. We cannot but think that the Labour Party arrangements
have not been strong enough to meet the occasion and take advantage of its
opportunities. So far, however, His Majesty has got a lesson, and will not in a
hurry interfere with spheres which are not his particular concern."78
How the Garden Party incident was ultimately resolved is not clear.
Speaking in Swansea in late July, Hardie declared that the matter was closed.
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It had been "trivial", the party had made its protest and "there the matter
stood". 79 Clearly, some private accommodation had been reached between the
party leadership and the Lord Chamberlain's office, with faces saved by
keeping exchanges confidential.
The limits of the royal prerogative, and the degree of adherence to
them by the monarch, were tested by far more serious events: the crisis over
the powers of the House of Lords and the Ulster crisis. The former spanned
the end of Edward VII's reign and the beginning of George V's. When Edward
called a conference of Liberal and Conservative leaders, Labour's reaction was
to protest that the problem should be resolved in the House of Commons and
not behind the doors of Buckingham Palace. Furthermore, there were strong
suspicions that the King would not be impartial. The language of Labour
politicians at this time interchanges the terms "involvement", "intervention" and
"interference", suggesting an uncertainty about which one the King's actions
amounted to. In itself, this reflects the ill-defined boundaries of the monarch's
constitutional rights. Hardie issued a warning about the King's role in
convening the conference.
"He [Hardie] hoped that it was not true that the King was intervening in this
dispute. So long as the King remained outside party politics he did no harm
and could be tolerated. The moment the Throne began to interfere in politics, it
was not only the coronet, the peer, that would go into the melting pot, but the
Crown would go along with it."8°
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When Edward VII received Asquith, Balfour and Landsdowne at the House of
Lords, Snowden was similarly concerned, but his remarks illustrate the
paradox in Labour's attitude towards the royal prerogative.
"It was a serious menace to democratic power in this country. He
[Snowden] knew the King was extremely popular. A popular king might be a
greater danger to democracy than a despotic autocrat. He thought they were
justified in assuming that the King was now interfering in this matter in the
hope of prevailing upon the House of Lords to pass the Finance Bill without
any condition whatever."81
In attempting to protect democratically determined policies from obstruction or
sabotage by such undemocratic bodies as the House of Lords, Labour
appealed to the undemocratic influence of the royal prerogative.
The accession of George V intensified Labour's uncertainty about the
potential use of the royal prerogative against the progressive interest.
MacDonald, acknowledging that he was dealing with rumour and hearsay,
nevertheless gave them credence by repetition. The King, he had heard,
"....was to follow the example of his grandmother and not of his father,
and that, though Mr. Asquith might have the right of entry at the front door of
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the Palace, Mr. Balfour would have the privilege of using private entrances and
back stairs".82
The belief that George was politically Conservative was well-founded, and
Labour anticipated the possibility of the Crown allying itself with the
Conservative Party in refusing to create sufficient peers to pass the Parliament
Bill. 83
 Hardie foresaw a revival of republicanism if this occurred, whilst Jowett
suggested that if the King refused to create the peers, the Government should
stop supplies." Every move was watched with suspicion, with even Court
appointments scrutinised for evidence of conspiracy against the democratic will
of the House of Commons. Thus, of one Court appointment:
"That it has been filled by the Duchess of Devonshire, a sister of Lord
Landsdowne and a lady in the centre of the reactionary conspiracy against the
House of Commons and popular government, &Ideates far mere t WA appeacs
to the eye of the beholder."85
The same underlying issues were raised by the Ulster crisis in 1914.
Labour's fears were based upon "grey" areas of the royal prerogative and the
King's reputation as a Conservative and, in this case, as a Unionist. Nor can
Labour's fears be dismissed as paranoia. There was serious discussion in
Conservative circles of the possibility of the Home Rule Bill being refused
Royal Assent. The advocates of this course used the disingenuous argument
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that as not all the proposed changes included in the Parliament Act of 1911
had been introduced, there existed a constitutional void, which could be filled
only by the sovereign. Bonar Law was the principal advocate of this line. Given
such provocation, it is not surprising that MacDonald should deliver so strong a
warning.
"...they would have no upsetting of the Parliament Act by Court
interference... Republicanism is at a discount in this country....but if by the
advice of responsible ministers or irresponsible court hangers-on the King is
going to do something against the House of Commons' liberty, then the flames
of Republican agitation will be lit at once."86
Indeed, George V appears to have considered extraordinary constitutional
measures, not perhaps for partisan reasons, but out of a genuine dread of an
ensuing civil war in Ireland. According to his biographer:
"The King had not abandoned his desire to see Home Rule put to the test of
a general election, even if that required so hazardous a measure as the
dismissal of the Government or the withholding of the Royal Assent."87
Publicly, the King's remark on opening the constitutional conference requested
by Asquith, that the "cry of civil war is on the lips of the most responsible and
sober-minded of my people", aggravated suspicions. 88 He seemed unduly
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sympathetic to armed rebels who were prepared to resist the democratic will of
Parliament. Hardie believed that the remark revealed that the Crown had
allied itself with "reactionary peers and rebellious Ulsterites" and would play a
part in the conspiracy to prevent Home Rule. 89 The evidence indicates that the
King was engaged in no such conspiracy, but was so desperate to find a
compromise and thereby avoid civil war that he took initiatives which
appeared to contemporary observers to be beyond his constitutional right. The
King convened a conference at Buckingham Palace to attempt to find
agreement on the question of County Tyrone, and thereby to facilitate the
exclusion of Ulster from Home Rule. The Liberal M.P. Charles Trevelyan
commented:
"If Asquith didn't supervise it, it is grossly unconstitutional and partisan. If
he did, he is responsible for allowing the King to justify the conduct of the
disloyalists. The only advantage is that it will lead to outspoken protests by the
Labour and Radical sections and a turning of the politics of working men
towards republicanism."99
The Daily Herald did carry one such protest, in the form of a leading article
entitled "King George and King Carson", unsigned but in fact written by the
young Harold Laski.91 In the article, Laski contrasted the King's initiative over
the Ulster crisis with his unwillingness to act over the suffrage problem and the
recent dock strike. Laski's charge against the King was dual. First, that "if he is
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to be kingly in one thing, let him be kingly in all", otherwise it would appear that
he was moved only by interests to which he himself was a party. This was
superseded by Laski's second point, which was that such "kingly" behaviour
was unconstitutional.
'We.... prefer that the King should stand out of our public affairs, for on no
single object for which we really care can he take, or would he be allowed to
take, an independent position. He represents not the nation but the classes,
and all his activities in connection with Ulster are for the sole purpose of so
arranging matters as to secure a triumph for Sir Edward Carson and his
aristocratic friends."92
Other Labour journals varied only in their degrees of certainty about what the
King had actually done. All issued warnings about Labour's response to any
unconstitutional acts. The Labour Leader, the official organ of the I.L.P., was
cautious, qualifying its accusations. Reports of the King's involvement are
hedged with conditional clauses and such attitudinal disjuncts as "apparently".
However, the King is identified with the interests of the aristocracy, the
fashionable classes and the military caste, and thereby in conflict with the
working class. As to responsibility for calling the Buckingham Palace
conference, it was "not clear whether the King acted on the suggestion of his
n 93Ministers or the Ministers on the suggestion of the King .
	 In contrast, the
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Glasgow Forward offered an uncompromising analysis of the events in an
article by Tom Johnston.
"It is time someone began to state plainly the attitude being taken up
by the King and the Court in this Ulster business. There is no sense in being
mealy-mouthed about it. King George and his Court are throwing the whole
weight of their influence on the side of the Londonderry aristocracy."
Johnston accused the Court of being behind the War Minister's readiness to
give guarantees to the aristocratic officers at the Curragh, and the King of
persuading Asquith to take no action against those responsible for running
guns to the Ulster Volunteers. He reminded his readers of the King's role
during the crisis over the Parliament Act, in which he took Court and
aristocratic advice rather than that of his Ministers. A stark warning was given.
"But if the Court gang contemplate a Royal coup d'dtat , a spring
over to Kaiser Wilhelm conditions, the Labour Party should take the bull by the
horns at once, and announce their intention of moving the discontinuance of
the King's salary when the next Civil List comes round." 95
The Parliamentary Labour Party sent a resolution to Asquith, to be forwarded
to the King, protesting against the King's intervention on two grounds: first
because it was "an act of undue interference on the part of the Crown", as it
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was "calculated to defeat the purposes of the Parliament Act"; secondly, two
of the representatives called to the Buckingham Palace conference were
"practically rebels under arms against constituted authority". 96 In explaining
the protest, George Barnes argued that the Parliament Act had led them from
the frying pan into the fire, as "we have exchanged the veto of five or six
hundred hereditary and irresponsible persons for the veto of one such
person". 97 Barnes lamented the apathetic response of the average citizen to
this extension of kingly power. Up and down the country, I.L.P. branches heard
speakers denounce this development, and the kinds of observations made
about the King were not dissimilar from Hardie's harsh words, which might
stand as evidence of the low esteem in which the King stood with Labour on
the eve of the Great War.
"King George is not a statesman. He is not the pieasure-Coving
scapegrace which his father was before him, but, like his father, he is destitute
of even ordinary ability. Born in the ranks of the working class his most likely
fate would have been that of a street-corner loafer." 98
Given such a low and hostile opinion of the King within the Labour movement
at this time, it was inconceivable that well before the end of his reign the same
man should be enjoying the reputation of being a model constitutional
monarch.
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The uncertainty and suspicion generated during those instances
when the royal prerogative became central to the resolution of constitutional
impasses, are clear evidence that, for the Labour Party, the political power of
the Crown was far from being a dead issue. Although its leading figures
sought, in the period leading up to the Great War, to persuade themselves that
the Constitution provided the neutral framework within which parliamentary
democracy could function, this confidence could be easily punctured. The
crises over the House of Lords and Ulster indicated that partisan intervention
by the monarch was still quite plausible. The royal prerogative continued to
offer the potential for discrimination against progressive and Labour interests,
and the issue was to resurface in the circumstances surrounding the formation
of the first Labour government, and the dismissal of the second.
The monarchy and social class. 
Drawing a distinction between the constitutional powers of the monarchy and
its effects upon social attitudes, it can be argued that it was the latter which
provided many in the Labour Party with the deeper sense of unease. Rather
than being identified exclusively with the aristocracy, the royal family, and the
monarch in particular, were increasingly projected as being above the class
system, at the head of the national "family" rather than at the apex of the
aristocracy. At the same time, the royal family was presented within settings of
great physical splendour, aimed at attracting popular attention through colour
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and pageantry. A most succinct appraisal of this contradiction came from
MacDonald, who regarded the social power of the monarchy as far more
problematic than its political or constitutional power.
"It [the monarchy] is the head of a social caste to which it is bound by all its
interests, and it may, therefore, be assumed that any attempt to weaken the
social or economic basis of that caste will be frowned upon by the Crown. The
Crown may derive its political support from the people, but its foundations are
embedded in the aristocracy."99
Royal occasions such as coronations or jubilee celebrations were liable to
ignite Labour resentments, as the contrast between the poverty of the ordinary
"subjects" and the opulence of royalty and its aristocratic entourage was
particularly stark. Whilst the monarchy aspired to symbolise national unity, its
public character served to illustrate the degree of social inequality over which it
ruled. Lansbury's commentary on the coronation of George V articulated
Labour's recognition of this paradox.
"[The coronation] serves to prevent us forgetting that the monarchy is the
apex of aristocracy, that whilst the King is the head of the State, he is also the
head of the nobility and the chief of the secular hierarchy, that the Crown is the
outstanding symbol of a privileged order and an hereditary caste."10°
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If the monarchy itself symbolised and helped to preserve an hierarchical
society, then Labour could be condemned for colluding in this process by
participating in its ceremonial aspects. The most public argument over this
issue took place in 1924, with the first Labour government, when the wearing
of court dress by the new Labour ministers provoked hilarity and mockery, but
also some perceptive commentary. The editor of the Daily Herald, Hamilton
Fyfe, saw the matter as crucial to Labour's hopes of changing society.
Economic and political change might be achieved, but social change was
more difficult. Setting out the theory of the "aristocratic embrace", Fyfe
attacked the Labour wearers of court dress for helping the "Old Gang" to retain
their enduring social power and prominence. The social hierarchy could
survive economic and political transformation.
"It is possible to imagine a Socialist state, with all the means of production
and exchange under public control, which, nevertheless, would be socially
much the same as the British state is now, in which there would be a hierarchy
of place and privilege, from which equality would be banished, as it is among
us today."ow
This extract cogently expresses the most fundamental Labour objection to the
monarchy on social grounds: that it offended against notions of equality; and
that the snobbery which it encouraged threatened to undermine Labour's
values and corrode its will to reconstruct society. Thus while Hardie, and many
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others, had so frequently declared that one might abolish the monarchy without
making any material difference to the economic and political systems, Fyfe
pointed out that the latter might be changed without altering the social
inequality symbolised by the monarchy. Superficially, these two propositions
contradict one another: in reality, they are complementary. Without the
establishment of a political republic, any socialism worth its name was
unattainable, whilst economic transformation was a necessary but not a
sufficient condition for establishing a society of equals. If anyone had come
close to appreciating the mutual necessity of economic and political change, it
had been Harney, who believed that the abolition of the profit system was as
important as the abolition of the monarchy and the House of Lords.
To illustrate how the separation of the political from the economic
generated a misunderstanding of social realities, one can offer the example of
J.H. Thomas, who celebrated the "classless" character of the new democracy,
evidenced by the King's acceptance of Labour ministers. This acceptance
showed "that no question of birth or power is involved in the occupancy of high
offices of state". 102 His view is representative of a strain of opinion amongst
some, principally working-class, Labour leaders, whose entry into offices of
state persuaded them that a social revolution of some kind had occurred.
Sharing Clynes' wonderment at "the strange turn of Fortune's wheel", they
were inclined to credit the monarch with a dismantling of class barriers. 103
Another recurrent complaint concerned the debilitating effect the
monarchy had upon the political culture. This view argued that the popular
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enthusiasm for royalty, the growing participation (as spectators) in pageantry,
led to political immaturity. It was a frequent complaint of Hardie that the
political intelligence of the working class was retarded by its affection for the
monarchy. The emotional and semi-mystical aspects of that attachment
restricted working class capacity for rational political understanding. Admitting
the deep and widespread attachment of the working class to the monarchy at
the turn of the century, Hardie explained it thus:
"It was due to the fact that they did not understand royalty. They did not see
that it was inconsistent with the dignity of manhood to stick to hereditary rule,
whether of a monarch on the throne or the House of Lords. The object of
working class power should be to purify the system of government by
eliminating whatever could not be supported on grounds of common sense."'"
Conclusion. 
Labour commentators at this period agreed that the working class
overwhelmingly supported the monarchy. This was frequently acknowledged,
often in tones of regret. Although Tom Mann looked forward to the day when
the country would "develop mentally" and dispense with monarchy, he
admitted that:
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"In our own country we have a limited monarchy - a monarch that is
respected, and perhaps deservedly so, for various reasons."105
This was written towards the end of Victoria's reign. The respect which Mann
referred to seems to have developed, by the end of Edward VII's reign, into
something which anti-monarchists considered unhealthy and threatening.
Hardie believed that:
"The temptation to abandon the policy of reserve towards the Throne as an
institution, which has characterised the working-class movement in this country
during the last quarter of the century, has been very strong of late."106
The popularity of Edward VII was evident, and the Labour press paid tribute to
his qualities as a constitutional monarch, though accompanied by a caveat. By
fulfilling his constitutional role so effectively, Edward VII had thereby
strengthened that institution and made himself popular; and democrats should
fear the popular monarch.
"Taking him [Edward] as a man and a constitutional monarch, we have no
doubt that the verdict of the critical historian of a democratic age will be the
verdict of the democrat of the street: 'As kings go, Edward was not a bad sort.'
And this verdict even Socialists will not hesitate to endorse.... But whilst his
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record has created a standard for his successors.. it must be recognised that..
(there has been an)... increase of influence for the throne."107
Inevitably, the popularity of the monarchy amongst Labour's potential voters
reduced the propensity of its Labour critics to make public criticisms. The most
they offered were declarations of personally-held republican views, as prefaces
to a declaration that the issue was of no contemporary significance and a
distraction from "real" problems.
Some of the themes which have emerged in this chapter arose during
the only debate on the subject of the monarchy to have been held at a Labour
Party conference, in 1923. Despite its brevity, the episode is full of irony and
suggestiveness. First, there is the blandness of the resolution:
"That the Royal Family is no longer necessary as part of the British
Constitution, and the Labour Party is therefore asked to state definitively its
view of the matter."108
Only three people contributed to the debate: a proposer who made no case
for abolishing the monarchy, except to claim that if the Labour Party
considered itself to be a socialist party, the motion should be passed
unanimously; a seconder who called himself a democrat and subsequently a
republican, and who believed the people would follow their lead on this
question; and a reply from Lansbury, an old republican and left-winger, who
91
sought to close down the question with arguments that were becoming almost
standard for mainstream Labour politicians when the topic of the monarchy
was raised. He personally was a republican, but,
"....why should they fool about with a question which was of no vital
importance and which would be settled whenever the economic conditions
were settled... .Years ago he used to think that the Monarchy and the nobility
were the people who made the workers poor, but Hyndman and Morris had
taught him that it was the capitalist system which made the workers poor."'"
There was no vote on the motion and the conference passed on to "more
important" questions. To an interested contemporary foreign observer of the
Labour Party, this treatment of the subject constituted an example of their
failure to understand themselves; a piece of "conservative clownishness".
"For a socialist the question of the monarchy is not decided from the point
of view of today's accountancy, still less when it is a false accountancy. It is a
question of the complete transformation of society, of its cleansing from all
elements of slavery. That work makes a reconciliation with the monarchy both
politically and psychologically impossible."11°
Here, as elsewhere, Trotsky's critique of the ideological frailties of Labour was
uncomfortably acute.
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However, the path on which the Labour Party was bound did not
involve a clean break with the past. On the contrary, its attachment to a
constitutional route to power, and in the absence of any proposal to abolish the
role currently exercised by the Crown, implied the indefinite retention of a
monarchy. There was never a serious plan from any quarter to substitute an
alternative for the Crown. If the Crown played by the rules, Labour could
happily co-exist with it. A strictly economistic version of socialism relegated
republicanism to a largely irrelevant side-issue, and few in the Labour Party
retained a strong sense of the social and psychological implications of
retaining an hereditary monarchy. Labour was seeking electoral success, and
could not fail to heed the fact that the monarchy's star was on the rise in the
early part of the twentieth century, and that the working class was no less
attached to it than any other. Whilst individuals might still classify themselves
as republicans, the use of the term "republicanism" had simply become a
rhetorical device to warn off the Crown from exceeding its constitutional
powers, or to give expression to anti-monarchical impulses which did not imply
any serious intent to replace the monarchical system.
To generalise about Labour attitudes to the monarchy in the early years
of the twentieth century, three positions seem crucial in understanding why
republicanism was effectively defunct. The following taxonomy does not imply
that individuals necessarily held one of these views exclusively; blends were
common. First, there was an element which positively approved of a
constitutional monarchy, even given a choice between a king and a president.
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This was a view which concentrated almost exclusively on the advantages of
the Crown as a constitutional fulchrum, but did not exclude some who were
monarchists in a very conventional sense. Secondly, there was a social-
democratic rejection of republicanism as a live issue, although individuals
espousing this view regarded themselves as republican. This view
differentiated between economic and political objectives, prioritised the former
and dismissed concern with the latter as a vestige of middle-class radicalism.
Finally, there were those in the tradition of anti-monarchism, as described
earlier. Its proponents called themselves republican, were vigilant critics of
monarchy and royalty and were quick to condemn examples of corruption,
extravagence, moral failure or political interference, but without ever
demonstrating a programmatic approach to their republicanism.
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Chapter Two Labour, the Monarchy and the Great War. 
Introduction. 
Mid-1914 saw the Labour Party indulging in bitter and widespread criticism
of the perceived partisan and unconstitutional intervention by George V in
the politics of Ulster (see Chapter One). Many sober figures, to whom the
cause of republicanism had seemed politically extinct, now exhumed its
rhetoric. However, the Ulster crisis, and with it the arguments
surrounding the role of the King, was overtaken by the outbreak of war.
The extraordinary conditions of wartime, the divisions, passions and
transformations which it generated, were reflected in complex
developments in Labour attitudes to the monarchy. Although a few of
these developments were entirely new (these tended to be products of
peculiar international conditions), it will be seen that most had pre-war
origins, but were given urgency and significance by the experience of a
nation at war. Amongst the latter were: the central involvement of the
monarch in the appeal to patriotism; the depth and extent of working-class
patriotism during the war; the periodically articulated concern about the
residual constitutional power of the Crown; the foreign (and more
specifically, the German) origins of the family which was supposed to
symbolise the nation; the involvement of royalty in charitable and voluntary
initiatives for the relief of distress, which were designed to appeal to
Labour's values but which tended to be at odds with Labour's conceptions
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of state responsibility for social matters; and, finally, the developing
popularisation or "democratisation" of the monarchy, which in wartime was
characterised by a vastly increased public visibility and geographical
mobility of the monarch, and by a series of political gestures designed to
cultivate an image of the royal family sharing in the sacrifices and
privations of wartime Britain. Deriving impetus from the unpopularity of
foreign monarchies and from their overthrow towards the end of the war,
as well as from their diplomatic intrigues (perceived to be the major cause
of the war), republicanism in Britain experienced a brief but lively revival.
Underlying all of the rhetoric and controversy surrounding these topics
were two powerful historical currents: the monarchy was evolving,
unwittingly or not, into an institution aware of and responsive to its public;
and the evident growth of public, including working class, affection for and
attachment to the monarchy.
Labour, patriotism and the war. 
Historically and theoretically, radicalism and socialism had
attached great value to "international brotherhood", which expressed
solidarity with the poor and oppressed of other countries. There was,
nevertheless, an equally pervasive conviction of the value of certain
aspects of Englishness, and particularly of the British constitution.
Manifestation of a particular conceptualisation of Englishness has been
termed "radical patriotism": and although the concept must be handled
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carefully, it has some relevance to this period. In tracing the origins and
trajectory of radical patriotism, Cunningham refers to the 1730's:
"The...sources of English patriotism had jelled into a composite
whole in which England, the favoured nation, was the home of liberty and
endowed with a constitution to protect it."1
With some interruptions, the language of radical patriotism continued to be
used through the Chartist period. Radicals not only described themselves
as patriots, but, when denouncing oppression and tyranny, invoked
liberties and rights which Englishmen had enjoyed in times past.
The declaration of war in 1914 called into play existing Labour
conceptions of international brotherhood, patriotism, national identity and
of the British constitution. A separate section will address one aspect of
the latter; the powers remaining to the Crown to introduce and give effect
to emergency legislation. The specific matter of patriotism is quite crucial
to an understanding of Labour's attitudes to the monarchy, at this period
and in others. National identity was deeply associated with monarchical
sentiment. Particularly in wartime, the King became the outward symbol
of national unity. In addition, those (majority) Labour voices which sought
to justify Britain's participation in the war, frequently referred to the need
to defend the political benefits conferred by the British constitution, in
which the Crown occupied a central role.
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Some of those in the Labour Party who supported British
participation in the war drew upon the rhetoric of radical patriotism. The
enemy was characterised as foreign despotism, whereas Britain was the
land of the free, with its freedom protected by the Constitution. These
tenets were articulated at a meeting of the pro-war Socialist National
Defence Committee in 1915, addressed by several prominent Labour
figures.
"Mr [John] Hodge was subjected to further interruption when he
alluded to our freedom and liberty, but again he forcibly retorted: 'You
would have precious little liberty if you had the jackboot of Prussian
militarism upon your neck.'"2
Another Labour M.P., George Roberts, expressed his gratitude at the
British soldiers' "defence of their motherland and of liberty and Democracy
in Western Europe", against the "Hohenzollern despotism" and a
"militarism infinitely more crushing and fatal to progress than any that
Europe has hitherto endured".3
Those elements of the I.L.P., probably a minority, which opposed the party
leadership's anti-war position, couched that opposition in language drawn
from radical patriotism. At a meeting in Birmingham, called in response to
the I.L.P. anti-war manifesto, dissident I.L.P. city councillors expressed
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indignation with their party's public statements. As one councillor told the
gathering:
"The war was one of progress against reaction, and of democracy
and freedom against despotism... he did not speak that night in any spirit
of jingoism, and he hoped no socialist would raise his voice against the
action of England."
Another councillor was prepared to resign from the I.L.P. over its anti-war
position, and again it was "England" and Englishness that was celebrated,
rather than "Britain". The labels themselves link the contemporary
arguments with those of previous eras.
"It was a privilege to be an English citizen, and the English
atmosphere was worth keeping. No nation could supply us with the same
freedom as England could."5
These expressions of patriotism had come from Labour and I.L.P.
defenders of British participation in the war, but similar sentiments were to
be found on the other side of the divide. Ramsay MacDonald had
frequently, in the early part of the war, been described as unpatriotic, even
by some fellow-members of the I.L.P. 6. Nevertheless, he could still
produce a classic expression of radical patriotism, in warning of the threat
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of domestic military dictatorship at a period when anti-democratic
solutions were being mooted to avert defeat, in 1917.
"I am one of those patriots whose patriotism consists in love
for his country... When I like to think of my country at its best 1 think of it as
the great liberal land where exiles came to dwell... The I.L.P. for the last
two years and eight months has been standing by the soul of Great
Britain... .We must not allow Prussian militarism to come into this land
under the pretence that it alone can defend the nation."7
MacDonald placed constitutional rights and liberties at the core of his
conception of the nation's "soul". His case is rather austere, and abjures
sentimental evocations of Englishness. The latter were more
characteristic of socialist advocates of war participation. Their patriotism
was imbued with celebrations of Englishness which might equally have
been found in the pages of John Bull. Alex Thompson in The Clarion
offered a version of cultural patriotism which sat alongside more
conventional radical patriotic allusions to "the defence of rights and
liberties" and "our native laws and liberties".
"Our idea of 'patriotism' is... .that the achievements of our
Raleighs, Drakes and Nelsons should snuggle closer to our hearts than
those of Caesar, Napoleon or Frederick the Great; that the tongue of
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Shakespeare and Keats and Sterne and Dickens should sound more
homely to our ears than that of Rabelais, Moliere, Kant or Goethe."8
Whilst conceding importance to these military and literary icons of
nationhood, Thompson was at pains to distinguish his version of patriotism
from what he labelled "Pinchbeck Patriotism", with its "waving flags,
blaring trumpets and beefy men-at-arms practising the goose-step" 8. His
own version, Thompson labelled "true" patriotism. Throughout his article,
and in countless other contemporary discussions of patriotism, the term
itself is enclosed in quotation marks, indicating the contested and shifting
nature of the signifier. To illustrate the extent of that contestation even
within the I.L.P., the remarks of those Birmingham I.L.P. councillors and of
Ramsay MacDonald may be contrasted with the unambiguous
conclusions of the Scottish Division of the I.L.P., as presented at its 1917
Annual Conference.
"Conference expresses the opinion that War, Secret
Diplomacy, Patriotism, Militarism, Annexation and Colonial Expansion are
in consequence of and inseparable from the Capitalist System of
production."10
Patriotism stood condemned by its company. This was an unusually
severe view of the matter, even by I.L.P. standards, and raises the
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question of whether Scottish socialists were less susceptible to patriotic
and monarchical appeals. Certainly, they were unlikely to respond to
appeals which drew upon notions of Englishness and the glories of an
essentially English historical and constitutional heritage. This particular
question re-appears in the section on the royal family and its German
origin.
Particularly on the anti-war left, the terms "patriot" and
"patriotism" were continually worried over, and the former, frequently given
ironic status by inverted commas, employed derogatively to describe the
jingoistic owners, editors or journalists of the pro-war, right-wing press, or
capitalists and their political allies who were making huge profits from
wartime production. Amongst those socialists who were anti-war or who
were pacifist, some attempted to counterpose an alternative version of
patriotism to the "Pinchbeck" type characterised by Thompson. In general,
it sought to detach patriotism from simply nationalist feelings, and to
extend the scope of its relevance from locality on the one hand to
internationalism on the other. Through this device, the depth, breadth and
naturalness of patriotism could be acknowledged, without necessarily
setting it in opposition to socialist values. At the I.L.P. conference of 1915,
Walter Ayles described,
"...a higher patriotism than that which involved the
destruction of another country... The sense of patriotism had extended
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from the family to the tribe, from the tribe to the nation. Now it should be
extended to the whole human race."11
The same argument was made even for nationalism. Just as the socialist
was "truly" patriotic:
"The Socialist is the true nationalist. Socialism will remove the
economic influences which keep the individual in subjection. Socialism
will, consequently, promote the healthy growth of the community of
individuals, the nation; and the economic root of international conflict
being removed, will make possible the realisation of the internationalist's
vision."12
Try as they might to reconcile socialism with patriotism and even
nationalism, or to employ the language of radical patriotism, there was a
sense in which the arguments of Labour and socialist politicians cited
above were beside the point. Although the intensity of patriotic feelings in
the country may have fluctuated during the war, the type of patriotism
which prevailed amongst the pro-war working class seems to have been
nothing like as sophisticated or nuanced as the versions detailed above.
For a more conventional version of patriotism, as expressed by a Labour
leader, Ben Tillett's remarks to a meeting of the British Workers' League
provide an example.
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"'I am for my class in a strike — right or wrong. In a war, I am
for my country — right or wrong.' When German democracy, he continued,
determined to throw in their lot with Kaiserism, he respected their right to
love their Fatherland. He claimed the same right as a Briton to love his
country."13
Evidence points to this, rather than previously described patriotisms, as
being the dominant version amongst the working class. At certain
chronological and geographical points, this patriotism may have been
tempered by class interests and consciousness, but it was powerful and
overriding.
"Workers' patriotism was often an adapted version of the
values expounded by the dominant classes. It was fluid through time, but
for most it remained throughout the war a limiting context for their class
consciousness."4
The same author concludes that "patriotism was the hegemonic ideology"
among the working class, but argues that Labour patriotism was not
exclusively of a conventional King and country type. 15
 There were local as
well as national examples of Labour bodies portraying the war as one
against "Prussianism", but one major distinction to draw is between those
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who saw only the threat of "Prussianism" from Germany, and those who
saw it emanating from domestic as well as foreign enemies. Those who
might legitimately be held to have worn the political mantle of radical
patriotism were socialists for whom cherished rights and liberties were too
valuable to be sacrificed, even to the demands of war. An explicit
statement of the distinction to be drawn between a narrow but dominant
version of patriotism and a radical alternative was made by the I.L.P.
activist and writer, C.H. Norman.
"The intellectual attitude of all governing classes is to insist
that patriotism should be limited to the duty to defend the country, when
those governing classes choose to embark on a war; but the true
importance of patriotism and its universal value, under present conditions,
is in upholding the rights and liberties of the people against tyranny."16
In contrast, the old radical organ, Reynolds News, which was pro-war but
with an eye to the interests of its working-class readership, offered
something close to Norman's governing class version of patriotism, in
which class interests were overridden by the national emergency.
"After the first shaking declaration of war the duty of each
citizen and patriot was to face without flinching the difficulties ahead, and
to do all in his power to lighten the load of the authorities who have the
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responsibility of directing and controlling our national affairs.. .the
bonds 	 have been tightened and drawn together in such a way that
there is now scarcely a mutter of class hatred or threat of a class struggle,
and the whole nation is of one mind."
To be fair to Reynolds News, it did, in the fullness of time, cover and
comment vigorously upon the social tensions generated by wartime
profiteering. However, the type of patriotism invoked in the text cited
above appears to have been Waites' "hegemonic ideology", and one
recognised as such and condemned by its minority opponents in the
Labour movement. The latter employed rhetoric which echoed the
language of radical patriotism. Here, for example, is Philip Snowden,
writing in 1917, referring initially to Henderson, Hodge and Wardle:
"There appears to be no length to which these Labour leaders
will not go in support of Mr Lloyd George, Lord Curzon and Lord MiJner in
their attacks upon popular liberties and democratic power... It has been an
inexplicable thing that during the course of this war the Trade Unionists
should have shown such willingness to believe in the patriotism, the
honour, the disinterestedness and the democratic sympathy of the very
men and the very newspapers who before the war were always fighting
Labour."17
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The treatment given to the topic of patriotism by the Labour and
radical press appears to confirm the view of Waites that the conventional
image of mass working-class enthusiasm for the war was inaccurate and
simplistic. 18 It would also, thereby, confirm the much earlier assertion that
it 'was some time before the mass of British workers became thoroughly
inflamed by enthusiasm for the war".18
The tenor of discussion in the Labour press about patriotism
changed radically from that established at the outbreak of war. In August
1914, the objects of scorn were the crowds demonstrating their patriotic
feelings in the street. The Daily Herald, describing the crowds which had
gathered outside Buckingham Palace after the naval reserve had been
called up, quite pointedly identified them as lower middle class in
composition. They were roundly mocked, labelled as "patriacs" and
"maffickers", and their patriotism represented as the indulgence of clerks
and shop assistants. Category labels expressed an intense class-based
contempt for the patriots:
a hundred helots of the drapery counter
a hundred serfs of the counting house
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double-collared heroes
a pallid young chin-warrior and a hundred straw hats
throwing out their diminutive chests
the little people
Along with their occupations, dress and physique, the characteristic non-
standard London accent was mocked (an accent which many of the
Herald's own London readers must have shared).
Gawd Sive Ahr Gricious King
RI Ri Ri, they shrieked
The noisy and unseemly demonstration was contrasted with the silence of
the poor in the East End of London. For the Herald, as for the Labour
movement more generally, patriotism and patriots soon ceased to be in
themselves the objects of scorn. The guileless "dupes" who were mocked
in the extracts quoted above were replaced as objects of scorn by the
"false patriots" typified by the jingoistic newspaper proprietors and their
editors. The terms "patriot" and "patriotism" came to be employed
positively, except when enclosure within quotation marks indicated their
ironic status. "Jingoism" and "jingo" became the terms of abuse, and into
such categories fell not only the likes of Northcliffe and Bottomley, but
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members of xenophobic mobs which indulged in attacks upon innocent
German or German-sounding individuals.
Another shift which occurred and which is exemplified in this
same Herald article, is in the treatment of the monarch. On the eve of
war, the King could be, and was, represented as the natural leader of the
war-mongers, and mocked for lending support to the pro-war faction whilst
remaining immune to the consequences of military action.
"The windows of the palace opened and George, by the
Grace of God, a non-combatant, stepped forward to the balcony in
company with his wife, and bowed to his intelligent subjects, as a puppet
might bow, mechanically."20
Within a matter of weeks, the tone and content of this article had become
unthinkable in the mainstream Labour press, and dangerous if uttered at
public meetings. The impact of the Defence of the Realm Act (D.O.R.A.)
upon public statements referring to the monarch will be dealt with later, but
even before D.O.R.A. had been passed, remarks hostile to the monarch
were made at the speaker's or writer's peril. Thus, three months after the
Herald article quoted above, prosecution was faced by a Birmingham
socialist who addressed a gathering in the following terms:
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You say you are fighting for the land. Their land, not
yours.. .You say... .'Your King and country need you'. Damn your King and
damn your country. Your King and country are your wife and children, and
the best queen you can fight for is your wife... .You have no damned
country.'"21
The charge brought alleged the use of words in public which were likely to
vilify or degrade the King in the esteem of his subjects. The poke esgued
that the remarks amounted to sedition, although the court did not,
ultimately, agree. No doubt such prosecutions helped concentrate the
minds of Labour newspaper editors and public speakers, but there must
also have been self-censorship, which derived in part from a realisation
that the war, patriotic sentiment and the King's new role as symbol of the
nation at war, had an impact upon Labour supporters. The King could no
longer, fairly or safely, be portrayed as the head of a social caste remote
from the majority of people.
In summary, wartime conditions thrust patriotism to the forefront
of political discourse, and except at the political and geographical margins
(i.e. Scotland), it could not be mocked or denied. However, in type and
intensity, there were distinct variations of patriotism. Large numbers of
Labour activists and supporters subscribed to the "hegemonic" variant,
albeit with inflections of class interest at various junctures. The intensity of
patriotic feeling of this type appears to have fluctuated throughout the war
112
among the working class. A vigorous minority in the movement sought to
deploy a radical alternative, and sought to accommodate 'natural'
patriotic instincts within a wider socialist and internationalist outlook.
Those who opposed the "domestic tyranny" threatened
by emergency legislation, used the language of radical patriotism, seeking
to legitimate their minority case by association with historical rights as well
as with the powerful concept of patriotism.
Labour and the "German" royal family. 
A minor theme of the wartime period was the German origins of
the British royal family. The subject is perhaps most readily associated
with the 'jingo' press, and the most extended and vigorous campaign for
the German ties to be cut certainly came from the politica) right. 22 It was a
topic regarded as distasteful by certain mainstream Labour voices.
"So far as there is any personal animosity in the country
against the reigning house, it is entirely the work of the Jingo Press, with
its screams of 'Once a Hun, always a Hun', and its befouling of anything
remotely German."23
Despite this assertion, it was not the province exclusively of the political
right. There is evidence that the vulnerability of the royal family on this
score was consciously exploited by some in the Labour movement, and
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that in addition, hostility based upon the "alien" character of British
royalty was an inherited feature of domestic radicalism.
"Xenophobia has an established pedigree within the English
radical tradition, and stigmatising monarchs by association with `alienness'
was a long-standing populist tactic of all the major post-Napoleonic War
movements of political protest."24
To this native English radical tradition, one must add the influence of anti-
monarchical traditions in both Scotland and Ireland, which impinged upon
the particular manifestations of hostility to "alien" royalty during the Great
War.
For sustained hostility to the royal family on the grounds of its
German origin, the Glasgow Forward was in a class of its own. This
rhetoric was a continuation of pre-war habits. Commenting on an imminent
visit by the King to Scotland in June 1914, it mocked calls for a display of
loyalty.
"Loyalty to what: to whom? To a stupendously rich family of the
name of Wettin or Guelph, who draw from our pockets half a million
sterling per annum... "25
1 14
Certainly the use of the name "Guelph" drew on a long anti-monarchical
tradition in England as well as Scotland. 26 However, another article, which
referred to George V as "the Wee, Wee German Lairdie" drew upon a
specifically Scottish tradition. 27
 This is a clear reference to the Jacobite
ballad on George I.
"Wha the deil hae we gotten for a King,
But a wee, wee German lairdie."28
The same newspaper pursued this line doggedly in the early months of
the war. It combined an attack on the large allowances made by the British
state to members of the royal family, which were compared to the derisory
amounts given to war widows, with an emphasis on the German
connections of the royal recipients. For example, Princess Christian "of
Schleswig-Holstein-Sonderburg-Augustenburg" received six thousand
pounds per annum.
"Schleswig-Holstein, please note — a fine old English name — and
her eldest son fighting in the German army against us, and shooting down
the soldiers who pay his ma the six thousand.. .the Duchess of
Albany. .ekes out her sewing with six thousand pounds of a pension from
the British taxpayer. The Duke of Albany is in command of German
troops."29
115
It is arguable to what extent republican socialists who adopted this line felt
genuine indignation about the German connections, or whether the latter
was an opportunist move to attempt to regenerate a republicanism which
had been dormant for over forty years. In the case of Forward, and the
Scottish republicanism which it articulated, the anti-Germanism appears to
have been more than a temporary political tactic, but to have comprised
part of a radical anti-monarchical tradition. This tradition, besides the anti-
Germanism alluded to, generated other stock features which recurred in
Forward's handling of British royalty before and during the Great War.
Prominent amongst these were ironic comparisons between the wealth of
royalty and the poverty of groups of their subjects, and personal
lampoons of the monarch. 3° The very same lines of attack had been
pursued in the nineteenth century by radical journals.31
In wartime Britain, the pointed references to the German
origins of the royal family had more potential to inflict damage, given the
family links to the Kaiser, but the case described below suggests that the
Government did not regard such attacks as a particularly serious threat to
the royal family's standing. In 1915, one reference was cited by Lloyd
George as part of the case for suppressing Forward. 32 In defending the
newspaper, its editor claimed that the offending article was concerned
mainly with the Kaiser's alleged insanity, but that claim is hard to justify.
In truth, the article focuses upon the German origins of the royal family,
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and with that family's inadequacies. The tenor is apparent in an offending
section.
"John Bull has always had to import his August Monarchs. He
has been ruled by Normans, by Angevin Plantagenets, by Welsh Tudors,
by Scottish Stuarts, by a Dutchman, and, alas, by the meanest and most
sub-mediocre of German dynasties, the Brunswick Guelphs and Coburg
Wettins...Anyhow, the day will come, early or late, when the British people
will get rid of their extraneous Manchus, and let us hope, in much the
same humane fashion as Republican China recently disposed of its
superfluous Manchus. We could well afford to pay our Germanic Manchus
almost any price, however fabulous, to take themselves off..."33
It must be added that the article from which this passage was taken had
appeared six months before suppression was ordered. Indeed, Lloyd
George's parliamentary critics over the suppression observed that
Forward had been "allowed to attack the King, but it was not allowed to
report a speech made by the Minister of Munitions".34
Whilst the attack on the monarchy may have been a side-
issue in the suppression of Forward, the anti-monarchism of the
newspaper was, as has been noted, consistent and drew upon a long
historical tradition. However, the political importance of republicanism
was not agreed upon, even within the newspaper. Differences of
1 17
emphasis were articulated during the immediate pre-war period, and
followed the publication of H.G. Wells' open letter to the Daily Herald in
which he called for that newspaper to display a more rebellious character,
including republicanism.
"Does the DAILY HERALD rebel against the Crown, or does it
mean that remarkable institution to go on to the Millenium?...Or does the
DAILY HERALD think the Crown is a negligible factor in our present
affairs? And spare it for its weakness?"35
Responding to Wells's letter, Forward carried an article which explored
the nature of contemporary republicanism, and set out the principles which
informed the newspaper's attacks on the monarchy and royalty.
Acknowledging that the political danger from royalty was "negligible", the
social effects nevertheless constituted a umalificence [which] can hardly be
exaggerated".36
"It is the express incarnation of social inequality and political
privilege. The people interested in royalty may be roughly divided into two
great classes — they are either knaves or fools — persons moved by self-
interest or superstition, or, it may be, by a cunning compound of both."37
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Thus, republicanism was not incidental to the socialist programme, but
had to be at its heart, for "the Crown is at the very core of the entire
accursed social and economic system against which we are in revolt". 38
Two months after this unambiguous statement of the need for socialism to
incorporate republicanism, an editorial bearing the style of Tom Johnston
made a familiar qualification, and one already indicated in Chapter One of
this work. It suggested again the permanent dilemma: the socialist
recognised the salience of republican ideas to his own project, but
simultaneously recognised the political disadvantages of incorporating
those ideas into the socialist programme.
If the Scottish part of the Labour movement had its own
peculiar interest in the German origins of the royal family, then certain Irish
nationalists indubitably deployed this topic in an attempt to inflict damage
on the symbol and head of the British state. The relationship of this
phenomenon to the Labour movement may have been tangential, but as
will become clear, there was involvement with and by Labour
organizations. In the House of Commons, attention was drawn to the
case of two royal dukes, entitled to sit in the House of Lords, who were
reported to be commanding German troops. The two M.P.'s who harried
the Government on this matter were Irish Nationalists, Arthur Lynch and
Swift MacNeill. Labour M.P.'s remained silent. However, two points can
be made. First , Arthur Lynch was, within two years of his parliamentary
protests on this subject, a Labour candidate, and had in the meantime
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joined the I.L.P. and taken his republican campaign to Labour and socialist
forums, including the Albert Hall meeting to celebrate the Russian
revolution. Secondly, there is some evidence that the controversy
surrounding the Duke of Cumberland and of Albany had provoked a
response in parts of the Labour movement. Those parts were, the
evidence suggests, on the margins. Reports of public meetings have
socialists alleging pro-German sentiments among the royal family, as well
as making verbal attacks on the two dukes. The local police stated that a
speaker in Birmingham's Bull Ring had said that,
"The Government are paying two German Princes six
thousand pounds a year and they are helping to kill your working sons."39
The I.L.P. candidate for Aberdare was reported to have attacked the King,
accusing him of pro-German sympathies.° In Birmingham, a local
socialist was alleged to have said that 'the present King of England has
not a drop of British blood in him. He is a German."'" The police were
unable to produce any witnesses to these words, but the socialist was
given three months hard labour under D.O.R.A. The Surrey constabulary
in May 1914 drew attention to a local socialist who was "against Royalty
generally, including the late King Edward VII and H.R.H. the Duchess of
Albany who resides nearby.. i42 This socialist, Henry Mills of Oxshott,
later produced a pamphlet which was printed by the National Labour
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Press. In this, anti-German sentiment supplemented the dominant theme,
which was a denunciation of hereditary rule. Mills seems to have played a
populist anti-German card to advance the cause of republicanism and to
increase hostility to the locally resident Duchess of Albany.
"Her German son is fighting against us in this bloody and most
awful war. He has publicly insulted England and Englishmen, his mother's
sympathies are naturally on his side, and she ought to have been sent out
to him directly the war started, and her pay from the British taxpayer
stopped instanter [sic.]."43
Xenophobia was given full rein, as Mills demanded that all Germans "high
and low" be sent out of the country, and their pay stopped. Whilst men
such as Mills, and others cited earlier, may be and were dismissed by the
police and Home Office as local eccentrics or hotheads, other more
prominent figures made contributions which suggest that suspicions about
pro-German attitudes within the royal family, if not necessarily anti-
German xenophobia, had widespread currency in Labour and socialist
circles. The radical Liberal M.P., Sir William Byles, who had been a
Labour candidate in 1900, addressed the City of London Branch of the
I.L.P. in July 1916, and was reported by police as saying:
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"Here are two grandsons of Queen Victoria, both rulers of their
great civilised Christian nations, which have got into deadly conflict and
are trying to destroy one another. Is there such a great difference between
these two grandsons? In our Court they speak English with a German
accent, and in the German Court, no doubt, they speak German with an
English accent. Does it really matter which grandson is your Monarch?""
Harry Snell, later a Labour M.P. and subsequently a peer, was convinced
that the Kaiser would not ultimately be punished, as his "relatives will see
that nothing happens to him, which is one more argument in favour of an
immediate revival of republicanism". 45
 However, in a later piece, Snell's
argument seems to reflect the point made about the 1870's revival of
republicanism.
"As in... previous campaigns, the emphasis placed by
reformers upon the Germanic origins of the House of Hanover allowed
them to connect strongly with broader currents within English popular
culture."46
In commenting on the decision of the royal family to adopt the name of
Windsor, Snell suggested that fewer Germans were now likely to marry
into the pseudo-British family, and that "this turning down of the crowd of
royal cuckoo Germans who lay their eggs in others' nests is enough to
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make poor Queen Victoria turn in her grave". 47 Snell, harking back to the
radical tradition of referring to the Germanic origins of British royalty, was
astute in his prediction that the people would now be deceived into
imagining that royalty was their own. If never entirely forgottten, the
German theme was not a feature of inter-war anti-monarchical politics.
Finally, it must not thought that the anti-German
propaganda emanating from Labour and socialist sources was
representative of the wider movement. Journals from the Herald to
Justice distanced themselves from cruder anti-German passions, and
invoked the royal family only in opposing the indiscriminate internment of
"aliens". Thus the Herald attacked the jingo newspapers' charge of "Once
a German, always a German" by logically extending it to "ladies who have
married into the royal family", some of whom were "known for their good
works and highly respected". 48
Likewise, Justice denounced the attempt to imprison even naturalised
Germans. Alluding to the case of Prince Louis of Battenberg, it asked why
49the same should not disqualify a man from being king. 	 Only on the
fringes of the labour and socialist movements did the anti-monarchical
tendency to allude to British royalty's German origins descend into purely
anti-German xenophobia.
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Labour and royal philanthropy.
Although this topic is situated within a chapter devoted to the
Great War, it can, of course, be traced and extended outside this period.
However, the war intensified levels of activity and response, and the
period illustrates in microcosm the issues generated by royal philanthropic
activity. The latter includes the promotion of charitable bodies and
campaigns, the direct donation of money to charitable causes, and the
conscious setting of a moral example to the nation. In all of these fields,
there was a substantial history of royal involvement, in some cases from
the Victorian period, and in others from much earlier times. 5° There is
clear evidence that the impulse for, and intensity of, such activity came, in
the early twentieth century, from a perceived threat from the rising Labour
movement. The King's secretary expressed the concerns felt about the
monarchy's role in these uncertain times, and outlined the directions which
the monarchy might take.
"We must endeavour to induce the thinking working classes,
Socialists and others, to regard the Crown, not as a mere figure-head and
as an institution which, as they put it, 'don't count', but as a living power
for good, with receptive faculties welcoming information affecting the
interests and social well-being of all classes, and ready, not only to
sympathise with those questions, but anxious to further their solution."51
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The topic touches upon two distinct but related matters: Labour's attitude
to the monarchy; and Labour's attitude to charity and philanthropy. Both
were complex, and war-time experience induced changes to previously-
held attitudes. It will be argued here that the Great War saw the monarchy
entrench its position, in part through an increasing "social" role, and that
Labour was obliged to acknowledge the popularity of the monarchy's
philanthropic activity amongst its own supporters.
Two projects which sought to alleviate social distress will be
examined here: the Prince of Wales's Fund, also known as the National
Relief Fund; and the Queen's Work for Women Fund. The two projects
involved differing degrees of genuine royal involvement, as the Prince of
Wales played only a symbolic role in the former, whilst Queen Mary was in
direct and regular contact with those operating and administering the
latter. However, they both impinged upon the lives of the working class,
and provoked a range of responses within the Labour movement.
The Prince of Wales's Fund was in existence until 1921,
having been established on August 6, 1914, following an appeal from the
Prince. The King gave five thousand pounds and the Prince three
thousand. It was established as the first signs of war-related
unemployment and distress were appearing, and the response from
Labour was two-fold. First, Labour recognised a clear need for schemes
of relief, which were likely to be administered by local citizens' committees
as well as national ones. Secondly, Labour sought to ensure that it was
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adequately represented at all levels. Following the Prince's appeal, the
Labour movement's Joint Board, consisting of representatives from the
Parliamentary Committee of the T.U.C., the General Federation of Trades
Unions and the Labour Party, adopted a resolution that "the unions be
recommended to urge upon their working members to subscribe liberally
to the Prince of Wales' Fund. 52 The assertion that "the Prince received a
good deal of favourable publicity from the project" 53 is certainly borne out
by the immediate response in Labour's own daily newspaper. An open
letter to the Prince paid tribute to his "truly gracious act" which 'set an
example to the youth of the nation". 54 It was the Prince's appeal for social
solidarity which particularly struck a chord, drawing on Labour's concern
for the worst off and upon a tradition of mutual assistance amongst the
working class. By making an appeal for all sections of society to contribute
to the Fund, the Prince defused (if not eliminated) the accusation that
this was a case of the affluent offering dole to the poor. The Prince had,
in the eyes of the Daily Citizen, aligned himself with the ambitions and
values of the Labour movement.
" 'At such a moment we all stand by one another,' you say. May
it be so, sir, and what emergency has taught us may we not forget when
the emergency has passed. The sacrifices and sufferings that this struggle
must bring in its train will not have been endured in vain if they teach us a
livelier sympathy, a deeper community, a quicker sense of our obligations
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to one another. Your public life has begun by an inculcation of those great
truths."55
The small-scale and humble origins of so many of the contributions were
what particularly impressed, "the poorest as well as the richest" offering
what they could afford. A further point in its favour, and an additional
credit to the Prince of Wales, was the latter's request at the outset that the
Fund be used, as far as possible, to give people employment rather than
doles. When it became apparent that the reality was to the contrary, the
Prince's words were recalled, and he was explicitly excluded from criticism
about the Fund's misuse. 56 Both the Prince of Wales and Queen Mary
were at pains to emphasise that work and not dole was the desired
outcome. This position was calculated to appeal to Labour's preferences,
and led to a distinction being drawn between the Prince and the Cabinet
on this issue.
"The Prince of Wales very sensibly asked that the Fund
should be used as far as possible to give people employment rather than
doles... .The Cabinet Committee, in spite of the Prince of Wales,
apparently prefers doles to any other method of meeting the emergency.."
57
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The tone adopted by the Daily Citizen was far from typical. Whilst the
Fund could be used to demonstrate national solidarity, it could also be
invoked to demonstrate the disloyalty of the rich. A Labour journal which
supported British participation in the war ridiculed the amount raised for
the Fund, accepting the necessity and urgency of charitable relief, but
condemning the "paltry doles" which large companies were offering. 58
Implicit in their argument was an approval of the Fund's establishment,
and of the royal appeal, but with two reservations: if corporate
contributions did not increase, the state should oblige companies to pay;
that it was the state's duty to maintain dependants of serving soldiers.
The status of the relief fund was much argued over. Was it
charity pure and simple, or was it in some way different from such
previous examples as the King's Fund? The Webbs welcomed the
impetus which the Prince of Wales's Fund gave to a new approach to the
relief of distress.
"This new sense of the unity of the war's social consequences
both at home and abroad was, they believed, a profound advance.
Unemployment or distress was no longer shameful and relief need not be
ignominious in wartime, since, at least until the armistice, the welfare of
every citizen was the welfare of all."59
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This was a change of attitude from Fabians, who held strict views on the
responsibilities of the state. However, public funds were deemed
essential, to supplement the otherwise inadequate amounts provided by
donation." In this instance, the alternative of maintenance under the
despised Poor Law made the Fund more acceptable.
A slightly different position was adopted by the I.L.P. The
National Administration Council (N.A.C.) of that organization declared that
the relief of distress was a government pledge, and the schemes for giving
relief and for creating employment should be under the control of Labour
representatives. Clearly conscious of the unacceptable nature of
charitable doles, the I.L.P. asserted that "the relief is not charity but a
public right". 61 The Fund may not have been dependent exclusively on
charitable contributions, but in part it was. Deeply held objections to the
charitable relief of poverty and to the middle-class character of voluntary
organizations emerged during the war.
"To begin with, the problem of relieving distress should have
been a charge on the nation and should not have been handed over to a
voluntary fund. Secondly, the Local Representative Committees were
practically delivered over to the tender mercies of the 'social worker', so
that an atmosphere of 'pauperization' resulted,b62
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The latter point echoes the I.L.P.'s complaint that relief was too often
being channelled through "organisations dominated by Charity
Organisation Society (C.O.S.) ideas". 63 The files of the War Emergency
Workers' National Committee (W.N.C.) are full of complaints from local
Labour organizations about the Fund, but their complaints are about the
allocation of money to the wrong people and about the lack of public
accountability. Often, the failure of the Fund's administrators, national
and local, to meet the objectives set out by the Prince of Wales is
emphasised. Sidney Webb made this point in a draft memorandum
drawn up for the W.N.C.
"...no idea was given by the Prince of Wales, in making his
National Appeal, that the fund would be devoted primarily or chiefly to
soldiers' and sailors' families or that the need of the civilian population in
distress would be in any way postponed or subordinated." 64
This point was one repeated often, with state responsibility for relief
payments to dependants of dead, injured or serving military personnel. 65
The response of the Labour movement to the National Relief
Fund was fragmented. Principled opposition to the use of charity rather
than of state provision for the relief of distress was cut across by three
considerations: the declared intention to use the Fund to establish locally
determined schemes of work, and not for doles; the potential for Labour
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organisations to become crucial determinants of how the Fund was
operated; and the sheer urgency of the need to provide relief. Once the
Fund was in existence, Labour objections were: that the Fund was badly
administered; that Labour was not adequately represented on the bodies
which allocated money; that the Fund was being "raided" for the wrong
purposes; that doles and not employment schemes were the outcome;
and that the responsibilities of the state were being evaded. For none of
these failings was the Prince of Wales held to blame. On the contrary, he
emerged as the advocate of an acceptable approach to the relief of
distress. In addition, he was the instigator of a Fund which drew on such
a breadth of financial support that it could appear as a genuine
expression of social solidarity, touching on traditions of working class
mutual assistance.
One subsidiary of the National Relief Fund was the
"Queen's Work for Women Fund", launched on August 20, 1914. The
genesis of this fund illustrates the rapid re-orientation of royal philanthropy
in the face of an increasingly vocal Labour movement. There was an
astute re-positioning of royalty; from being the patron of essentially
middle-class voluntary organisations, to a wider identification with the
interests and needs of the working class, as the latter themselves saw
these. This involved personal contact with leading figures in the women's
Labour movement, to the apparent advantage of the royal family.
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At the outbreak of the war, Queen Mary's involvement with
philanthropic response came through her Needlework Guild. This was a
classic example of a traditional charity, in which genteel ladies worked
voluntarily, knitting socks and making shirts for soldiers. Within days,
Buckingham Palace had received protests from the Labour movement
about the impact of the Queen's voluntary needleworkers on women's
employment. Objection to this form of philanthropy was vigorously typified
by a resolution sent from the London membership of the British Socialist
Party (B.S.P.) to the Workers' National Committee, protesting against,
"....the methods adopted by Queen Mary's Charity Fund,
which amounted to nothing short of philanthropic blacklegging and must
generally increase the number of unemployed...[and]....the presence in
such numbers of members of the Charity Organisation Society, directly
antagonistic to the well-being of the workers, on the Local Citizen
Committees dealing with want and unemployment."66
The reaction was speedy, and revealed the same sensitivity to Labour's
desire for work and not dole as had been shown by the Prince of Wales.
By mid-August, the Queen and her advisers, including "industrial experts
and representatives of working class women" were developing a scheme
for promoting women's employment. 67 Now, the aim was to "supplement
and not supplant paid labour". 68 The composition of the committee
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established to administer the Fund was as innovative as its aims. There
was an unprecedentedly heavy representation of Labour interests, for
amongst the original thirteen members were Mary Macarthur, Margaret
Bondfield, Susan Lawrence and Marion Phillips. Mary Macarthur was
invited to meet the Queen on several occasions, and took away a
favourable impression of the Queen's commitment.
"Here is someone who can help and who means to help!' Mary
Macarthur excitedly shouted at Gertrude Tuckwell on her return from
Buckingham Palace... Soon jocular members of the Labour Movement
were referring to 'the strange case of Mary M. and Mary R." 69
The orientation of the Fund's work certainly made a good initial
impression, with the Labour press giving favourable attention to the
Queen's message to the nation. This message contained the monarchy's
redirected philanthropic emphasis, proclaiming that "prevention of distress
is better than its relief and that employment is better than charity"."
These main points of the message, reported in the Willesden Call, were
exactly in accord with the demands made in an earlier editorial in that
Labour newspaper.71
As was the case with the Prince of Wales's Fund, the
objections to the Queen's Fund resulted more from its operation than from
its conception. The workrooms established under its auspices offered a
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maximum rate of pay of ten shillings a week. The Herald led a vigorous
campaign against the wage level, and in so doing demonstrated that not
everybody in the Labour movement was convinced by the new direction in
royal philanthropy. The latter was bracketed with other examples of
Labour incorporation and received caustic comment.
"These are great days we are living in. Trade Unionists and
Socialists are now sitting round tables side by side with Royalties,
millionaires, and other comfortably-placed people, all gathered to help the
poor, organise the poor. We are told that class distinctions are being
broken down, and that men and women of all classes are eager to prove
by action that we are all one family. It is surely time we practised what we
preach. ,,72
This note of dissent should qualify, but not invalidate, the impression
which emerges from the experience of royal philanthropy during the Great
War. By an astutely amended policy, the royal family were associated
with projects which were distinct from the traditional C.O.S. organizations
and ethos. They were consciously aligned with Labour's preferences for
employment rather than relief, and the breadth of appeal and involvement
made them appear genuinely popular and all-inclusive. With an appeal to,
and direct assistance to, the working class, and with the deliberate
involvement of Labour organizations and personnel, the monarchy and
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the royal family were able to project themselves as being closer to the
lives of their working class subjects and in sympathy with the broader aims
of their political movement.
Two other minor gestures by the King deserve some
comment. In both cases, they represent the monarch attempting to set a
moral example to the nation. As far as the Labour movement was
concerned, the gestures were not absolutely to the advantage of the
monarchy, but may have contributed to the imperceptibly improving
personal image of the King. The King's "pledge" to abstain from alcohol
during the war was received positively by the temperance element which
formed part of the socialist and Labour movements. It was not publicly
known that the pledge was made reluctantly, only at the instigation of
Lloyd George, and probably not kept. 73 The "drink question" was one
which profoundly divided the Labour movement, as was illustrated in
responses to the shipbuilding employers' call for the total prohibition of the
sale of alcoholic drink as an emergency war measure. The allegation of
excessive drinking amongst shipbuilding workers was rejected by the
Boilermakers' and Steel Shipbuilders' Society and by the general
secretary of the Federation of Trades Unions. However, other prominent
Labour figures, including Robert Williams and Harry Gosling, accepted
that there was a problem, and agreed that the most drastic action was
required.74 Sections of the Labour press praised the King for his good
example, whilst admitting that his example was not being followed.
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"Months ago, King George led the way in a great campaign
against alcohol; very few followed his example. This failure did not in any
way detract from his actions."75
Even a year later, the King was praised in a long article by Lansbury, who
contrasted the liquor ban at Buckingham Palace with the failure of the
House of Commons to close its own bars and with the irresponsible
conduct of the liquor producers. 78 For temperance socialists such as
Lansbury, the King was on the side of the angels, although "the [liquor]
trade proved too strong, even for the King"77 However, outside the
temperance faction, prohibitionism was hardly the most popular of causes
in the Labour movement. Arguments against it included: the defence of
personal liberty, including the liberty to drink alcohol; the perceived need
of some industrial workers to consume large quantities of liquid; the
undeniable popularity of drink amongst the working class; that the
suppression of one vice would only lead to the expansion of others, in
particular prostitution; that the move to prohibit alcohol was aimed at
increasing the worker's efficiency and was a capitalist attack upon the
worker's social life to that end. 78 As far as the King's initiative was
concerned, the minority temperance element in the Labour movement
gave personal credit to the monarch, whilst there appeared little personal
hostility towards the King from the opponents of prohibition. On balance,
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the King may have done his reputation no harm amongst a vociferous
element in the Labour movement.
A further gesture, intended to present the King as an
example to the nation, came in the so-called "Economy Campaign".
Responses to this propaganda tactic varied in the Labour movement, but
one called for the King to shame the "plutocrats and monopolists" by
instituting his own economies. 79 The King's returning of one hundred
thousand pounds to the state, to be used as the Government saw fit, was
received positively in the Labour press. This gesture was classed with the
King's abstinence pledge, and praised as being in contrast to the
behaviour of the "governing classes". 80 When, later in the war, a Royal
Proclamation on the food crisis was issued, appealing specifically for
economy and frugality with grain, it was received equally enthusistically,
and the pro-war Justice regarded it as "more than enough to remove any
feeling that may have been growing up against the monarchical principle"
. 81 There were isolated voices raised against "people of wealth and
position" teaching others to be economical. 82
Overall, the effect of the King's moral example was to
encourage more positive Labour perceptions of the monarch. After being
associated with the ruling class in the House of Lords and Ulster crises,
the King's wartime initiatives helped not only to project an image of
personal decency, but to counterbalance the pre-war pattern of
monarchical identification with the governing class. In contrast to the
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monarchy's association with reactionary peers or Ulster rebels, wartime
Labour opinion often portrayed the King and the royal family in opposition
to the socially and financially powerful. Thus, the philanthropic initiatives
with which royalty were connected suffered from a lack of financial support
from the wealthy, and the Prince of Wales's original intentions for his Fund
were frustrated by the Cabinet. In both the economy and anti-alcohol
campaigns, the King's example was contrasted with the selfishness or
indifference of the ruling class. When compared with pre-war Labour
opinion, the King and the monarchy had come in from the cold.
The King's Visits. 
The practice of organizing royal visits to centres of industrial
production did not begin with the Great War. In the immediate pre-war
period, there had been a number of visits to mining and industrial areas,
undertaken on the advice of Esher. However, the frequency of such visits
greatly increased, and there was the innovation of deliberately sending the
King to places of current industrial unrest. Lloyd George attached much
value to these visits, particularly "the spontaneous resolve of the King to
go about among them [industrial workers], to shake them by the hand, talk
with them and make a direct appeal to their patriotism and citizenship". 83
Although Lloyd George does not refer to it, the origin of the visits policy lay
with the Cabinet. Far from ensuring that the King avoid centres of unrest,
the Cabinet sent him to such locations, made arrangements for him to
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meet local union leaders, and lifted restrictions on publicising the King's
movements around the country, in order to maximise the propaganda
value of the visits." At the time of the Engineers' strike in 1917, royal
visits formed part of the state's response, with careful timing both of the
visits and of any punitive actions against the strikers. Thomson records
F.E. Smith's report to a Ministry of Munitions conference, called to
respond to the strike.
" 	 that as the Cabinet had sent the King and Queen to
the strike areas, it would be wrong to prejudice the success of their visit by
arresting the strikers until they have left the north. The conference was to
reassemble... when the King would have left the dangerous area. " 85
The motivation behind such visits was not simply the reduction of tension
in key areas of industrial production. As one period of industrial difficulty
coincided with a sudden upsurge of republicanism, the interests of the
monarchy were also served by the King's high profile visits. The latter
may also have been useful to ministers in convincing the King's advisors
of the advantages to be had from the visits. Addison's chronicle hints at
such.
"Wigram and I went over the Lancashire and Northern Tour and
I urged him, in view of the present temper of people generally (which,
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although thoroughly friendly to our own monarchy, was becoming
prejudiced against monarchies in general) to fall in with L.G.'s suggestion
that the King should make a point of visiting shipyards." 88
The success and value of these visits from the Government's point of view
was unqualified, providing "great satisfaction...[andi demonstrations of
loyalty on the part of the workers". 87 One calculated aspect of the
wartime visits was their newly informal character. The change was made
to symbolise the monarchy's preparedness to forego extravagance and
pomp in the national emergency, and it helped to democratise the
monarchy's image. This change was noted at the time, although its
motivation was not. 88 Despite the more informal approach, there was
criticism from some socialists about the unnecessary expense of the visits.
Robert Smillie told Leicester I.L.P. that the King's recent visit to Glasgow
had involved,
"...the labour of many men, and a large amount of money was
spent on this visit, and yet they were told to economise. He would have
preferred the King to have visited in a different manner, and to have seen
the slums of Scotland...." 89
Coming from a pro-war position, but commenting in a similar vein,
Justice drew attention to the cost of the King's 'tourist tickets", and
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detailed the work-time lost at two shipyards visited by the King. 99 Again,
the costs were contrasted with the official calls for economy and the
avoidance of unnecessary work. The "real object" of the visits "was to
bring the working people into closer touch with royalty". 91
That the Government genuinely attached value to royal visits,
particularly to trouble spots, was demonstrated by the continuation of the
practice into the difficult post-war period. During late 1918 and early 1919,
when at least an element of the British ruling class feared revolutionary
uprising, its agents repeatedly declared their belief in the loyalty to the
Throne of the working class, and in the importance of royal visits in
sustaining that loyalty. Thomson's Fortnightly Reports on revolutionary
organizations frequently make this point, and the converse:
"[the Liverpool correspondent] thinks that this indifference [to
the King] is due to the feeling in Lancashire that the people have been
slighted because His Majesty is so seldom in the county as compared with
his visits to Scotland and foreign parts." 92
Another correspondent remarked that "whenever His Majesty can find time
to visit industrial centres, the effect is felt at once", 93 The Prince of Wales
was sent to the particularly worrying area of South Wales, and his visit
was deemed "a great personal triumph". 94
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Although the testimony to the effectiveness of the visits in
generating loyalty to the monarchy comes exclusively from agents of the
state, there is no counter-evidence to challenge their impressions. The
increased frequency and informality of the King's visits to industrial areas
set a new pattern of contact between the monarchy and the working class,
which strengthened the feelings of affection for the King in particular, and
thereby restricted the potential of any future anti-monarchical politics. In
this matter, Ziegler's assertions seem no exaggeration.
"The war cemented the relationship [between the monarchy
and the proletariat]. The rapport which had developed between the King
and the factory workers enabled him to make direct appeals for harder
work in a way which could have been perilous for a politician." 95
The Great War caused the King to be seen, and to be seen in a new light.
If the results cannot be quantified, they cannot be denied.
The Crown, the Constitution and Civil Liberties. 
This section focuses less upon the monarchy and royalty during
the Great War than on the role of the Crown; and upon constitutional
questions involving the royal prerogative and, in particular, Orders in
Council. The extraordinary conditions brought about by war resulted in
extraordinary legal developments, some of which were highly
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objectionable to sections of the Labour movement. Whilst the King was
not personally implicated (unlike 1931 for example), certain aspects of
the Crown's residual powers attracted Labour attention. Many prominent
and ordinary Labour people were involved in the struggle to defend civil
liberties during the war. As an illustration of this fact, the composition of
the National Council for Civil Liberties (N.C.C.L.) in 1917 may be
considered: its president was W.C. Anderson; its retiring president was
Robert Smillie; its treasurer was Philip Snowden; its committee included
Lansbury, Robert Williams and Beatrice Webb; of its 545 affiliated bodies,
95 were ILP branches, 98 were trades councils and labour parties and 150
were trade union branches. Whilst the general question of Labour and
civil liberties during the war extends beyond the scope of the present
study, the specific matter of the use of the Crown's powers in the
curtailment of those liberties is certainly relevant. It raises, inevitably,
Labour's attitude towards the British Constitution and its inherent
flexibilities. For those libertarians who denounced the "Prussianisation" of
British society, was it a case of unconstitutional change, or evidence of a
flawed constitution? Their rhetoric of liberty and tyranny draws upon a
tradition of radical libertarianism. " Indeed, the use of the royal
prerogative, and more precisely the recourse to the powers of the Privy
Council, had been raised during the 1870's by radical Liberal M.P.'s. 97
The source of current discontent lay in a series of Defence
of the Realm Acts, the first of which was passed on August 8, 1914, and
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which gave the Government power to make regulations for public safety
and the defence of the Realm. Further Acts followed at the end of August
1914 and in March 1915. 98 The first Act was passed without discussion or
dissent from the Labour Party, an event explained later as a regrettable
oversight.
"The legislation, being at the time urgent, was passed through
the House of Commons with great haste and insufficient consideration.
Part of the phraseology was wide and vague. In large measure the Acts
were a kind of skeleton, and the real power has been taken under Orders
in Council, Regulations, and legal interpretations."
Snowden, one of the libertarians, argued further that it was not simply a
case of oversight or misunderstanding, but that the attack on liberty and
democracy was made with the support of the majority of Labour members
of Parliament. 109 For the minority who came to oppose D.O.R.A. and its
social and political consequences, there could be no argument that the
Acts themselves were other than legally achieved. It was the resort to
Orders in Council which was challenged, along with the constitutionality of
the regulations which were issued.
Two separate powers were involved in the emergency
regulations to which libertarians objected: the royal prerogative and
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Orders in Council. The respective natures of these sources of regulation
have been summarised:
"While the Crown has some emergency powers under the
prerogative, particularly in time of war, those powers are generally too
uncertain for the executive to rely on them. In practice, the executive will
prefer administration by a set of regulations to the use of wide, but vague,
prerogative powers...Shortly after the outbreak of war in 1914, the United
Kingdom was in effect placed under military law by the Defence of the
Realm Act 1914....The Defence of the Realm Acts 1914-15 empowered
the Crown to make regulations by order in council for securing the public
safety or for the defence of the realm." 101
The implications of the use of the prerogative and the Orders in Council
were perfectly well understood. Labour was under no illusion that the two
essential principles of the British Constitution, control of the executive by
Parliament and the rule of law, had been "impaired" during the previous
three years, and that the constitution itself had been changed. 102
The Defence of the Realm Acts had "great constitutional
importance" as they "recognised the power of the King in Council — that is,
the Cabinet — to issue regulations". 103 Legislating by Regulation and by
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Order in Council was the last stage of a wartime "constitutional evolution",
which meant a loss of popular control over the Executive. These Orders
were not marginal, but central, to the loss of popular control, because "the
great mass of the regulations touching every aspect of our political liberty
have been introduced by Orders in Council and not by Act of
Parliament".1"
The text summarised and quoted above was produced during
the War, although it was published only in 1919. Coming in an official
Labour Party publication, the critique of constitutional changes is
surprisingly trenchant, and the conclusions concerning the Constitution
unusually radical.
"Whether on the conclusion of the War, the British
Constitution will be restored in its original form is doubtful. One thing at
least is certain: the security of an unwritten constitution, which jurists had
always stated to be the more unassailable because its principles were
assumed and not expressly affirmed, has been found, in a time of crisis, to
be nought. In the reconstruction or restoration of our constitution after this
crisis we shall perforce have to take cognisance of this fact." 105
However, the fact that these opinions were offered in an official party
publication should not disguise the fact that public opposition to the use of
Orders in Council, to other extraordinary methods of legislating, and to
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their effects, came from a minority of Labour voices in Parliament. The
previously mentioned list of Labour bodies affiliated to the N.C.C.L.
suggests that opposition was more widely spread, if still very much in the
minority, amongst Labour and socialist organisations in the country.
The role of the Crown's reserve powers, particularly that
wielded by the King in Council, was but one of many matters relating to
the erosion of civil liberties discussed at Labour forums and in Labour
publications. Nevertheless, it was raised regularly. As was indicated
earlier, Labour's Parliamentary Report for 1915 included reference to the
power being exercised through Orders in Council; measures which, with
others, had "infringed the constitutional rights and liberties of British
subjects". 106 Successive I.L.P. conferences saw the topic raised. In 1916,
C.H. Norman alleged, in reference to regulations providing for a secret
session of Parliament, that:
"For the first time in modern history, the Privy Council and
the King had proclaimed what the procedure of the House of Commons
should be before consulting with the House. In [Norman's] view this
constituted one of the gravest attacks ever made on the liberties of
Parliament." 107
The 1917 I.L.P. conference heard a resolution calling for an enquiry into
how effective public control of the Executive might be achieved, accusing
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the Government of "suspending for the duration of the war the British
Constitution". 108 The secretary of the N.C.C.L. told an I.L.P. meeting that
"laws are now made by Orders in Council and not by Parliament". 109
Most critics made clear that the powers invested in the "King in Council"
had been appropriated by the War Cabinet, but whilst this implied no
criticism of the monarch, it was the Crown's residual constitutional powers
which had provided the possibility for quasi-martial law.
If blame was not attached directly to the Crown, still less to
the monarch himself, for the erosion of liberty and parliamentary control, it
is worth considering the one aspect of the political context in which Labour
objections to rule by the "King in Council" were made. Some right-wing
elements were advocating the King's assumption of real political power.
Thus, at a meeting of the Imperial Defence Union, Horatio Bottomley
offered a remedy for the disastrous military position in July 1917.
"You have a King. What is the good of a king if he does not
rule? The time has come when the King, I do not care whether he be King
George V or anybody else... .let [him] say to his ministers, it is obvious
that public opinion is against you, get out of the way. I have power to rule
Council. I will select men for it who have no suspicion of personal
ambition and I will add to it men of undoubted Patriotism." 110
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Such words, however wild and from whatever source, may have fuelled
anxieties about the undemocratic inclinations of the Government, if not
about the King's respect for the role of a constitutional monarch. Similarly,
Bruce Glasier's pamphlet Militarism alluded to the power available to the
King if he chose to use it. Glasier quoted from a book published in 1903,
which discussed the form of government required in war-time. If politicians
failed to adopt an authoritarian approach, "then the King, backed by the
armed forces will seize control". 111 Periodic calls for failing politicians to
be replaced by military personalities, particularly during the most
disastrous phases of the war, must have made the fears raised in
Glasier's pamphlet more credible. It was in the light of all the misgivings
exemplified above that Labour reflected upon the British Constitution.
How did libertarian Labour deal with the constitutional
implications of the departures from parliamentary control of the executive
and from the rule of law? Had the Constitution been suspended, or were
the dangerous developments made possible by its very vagueness?
Much of the language used about the Constitution by libertarians in the
Labour movement drew heavily upon radical constitutionalist rhetoric.
Thus Norman wrote of "upholding the rights and liberties of the people
against tyranny". 112 Langdon Davies spoke of "the redemption of the
liberties of the people". 113 Bruce Glasier romanticised about "this sea-girt
Land of Freedom of ours", and offered the English radical's conventional
list of constitutional freedoms: "the birthright of British citizenship
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embodied in the Magna Charta, Habeas Corpus and the Bill of Rights". 
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A socialist journal alluded to "our old land of liberty". 115 A resolution at the
1916 I.L.P. Conference referred to the" menace to all the cherished rights
and liberties of the people". 116 A contemporary N.C.C.L. pamphlet
claimed that "the British constitution is the peculiar contribution of this
country to the civilization of the world". 117 This uncritical portrayal of the
Constitution by Labour libertarians was not the only available
contemporary view of it. Some perspective is offered by the conclusion
reached in a non-Labour journal.
"The British Constitution is so loose and its forms so variable
that with all the will in the world we may find great difficulty in restoring the
liberties we are in the process of surrendering. ” 118
Whilst this was not an opinion which found much expression amongst
Labour's libertarians, the wartime experience elicited responses which
suggested that the opinion was shared by a growing number in the Labour
movement. Although nothing concrete resulted, there were calls for
reports and studies of how the Constitution might be reformed.119
Despite such calls, the enduring legacy of radical belief and
confidence in the Constitution appears to have inhibited Labour criticism of
it. The looseness and vagueness of such aspects of the Constitution as
the royal prerogative and Orders in Council were not in themselves held
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responsible for the destruction of liberty. Instead, alternative explanations
were offered. The most popular was that the Constitution had been
suspended for the duration of the war. 120 Responsibilty for this
suspension lay with an authoritarian Executive and a supine House of
Commons. Under this interpretation, political persecution occurred
because constitutional rights had been abrogated, not because certain
elements of the Constitution permitted it.
"Parliament, the constitutional bulwark of democracy, was itself
the first to haul down the constitutional flag and surrender unconditionally
to the King's ministers." 121
The principal question posed asked why the attack on liberty had
occurred, rather than how. Ramsay MacDonald wrote extensively about
the war and civil liberty without touching upon the role of the Crown's
residual powers in the matter. In one suggestive account, MacDonald
substituted the concept of "the State" for the Constitution, when discussing
the wartime attack on democratic values and practices. 122 However, his
analysis carries implicit reference to the Constitution; state authority and
the Constitution were unavoidably related, despite MacDonald's silence on
the latter. His attribution of blame is noteworthy.
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"Before the war, the British Socialist had no memory or
experience of the State as anything but the political organisation of a
tolerably free people, working democratic institutions....lf they failed, the
fault was not in them but in the people who worked or ought to have
worked them.., we have not only become familiar with militarism in power,
but we have been brought hard up against the crude idea, contributed
mainly by Trade Union officials, that in order to prove their allegiance to
democratic government, minorities must allow themselves to be
suppressed." 123
MacDonald's remedy was for socialists to rid themselves of the idea of the
servile political and military state. Elsewhere, MacDonald had quoted
approvingly the opinion of Lord Halsbury on D.O.R.A., as being "about the
most unconstitutional thing that has ever happened in this country " . 124 He
did not address the question of how the Constitution had allowed
unconstitutional measures to come about. Others placed the blame upon
"enemies of the Constitution", who were hostile to the growing democracy
and thus to the Constitution which had protected it. 125 For these critics,
there was a real danger of militarism continuing into the post-war era. 126
The various calls for consideration of constitutional reform
were to little effect. In spite of the 1919 Labour Year Book"s telling
analysis of the ways in which the "peculiar" British Constitution had
facilitated the suppression of civil and industrial liberties, the issue was not
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addressed in Labour's 1918 election manifesto. Individual pieces of
legislation were indicted, but neither the Constitution nor the powers of the
Crown were nominated for reform.
"The Labour Party stands for the destruction of all war-time
measures in restraint of civil or industrial liberty, the repeal of the Defence
of the Realm Act, the abolition of Conscription, and the release of all
political prisoners." 127
Whilst the broad question of civil liberties during war-time was widely
discussed in Labour circles, it remained a minority interest. The majority
had no objection to the temporary surrender of some freedoms in the face
of a national emergency. The minority libertarian element were united in
condemning militarism and "Prussianisation", but were divided on the
constitutional ramifications. Suspicion of, and hostility to, the use of such
extraordinary devices as the royal prerogative and Orders in Council
conflicted with the radical's predisposition to cling to the British
Constitution. Labour libertarians who felt strongly about the dangers
inherent in the Crown's residual powers were too few, and the urgency of
the matter too temporary, for reform of the Constitution to become a long-
term concern for Labour. The powers of the Crown remained a subject of
intermittent attention, but only for so long as a crisis, such as over Ulster
in 1914, or the events of 1931, lasted. For the most part, Labour's
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approval of the Constitution closed off discussion of the Crown, and the
war-time experience of the Constitution's anti-liberal potentialities receded
into memory.
War-time Republicanism. 
Chapter One dealt with the controversy surrounding the King's
involvement in the crisis over Ulster. It will be recalled that Labour's anger
with the monarch generated talk of a revival of republicanism. This was
less a measured response to evidence of the Crown's continued capacity
to affect political change than a spontaneous expression of outrage. It was
a rhetorical flourish rather than a declaration of political intent. During the
latter part of the war, the rhetoric of republicanism returned to political
discourse, but it was largely a response to a particular set of
contemporary conditions. It subsided rapidly when those conditions
passed. The extent of support for republicanism during the peak of
agitation in 1917, is difficult to gauge. Contemporary assessments of its
extent conflicted and lacked objectivity. The King and some of his more
influential informants on the subject developed an exaggerated notion of
the strength and breadth of republicanism. 128 However, it was certainly
not to be compared with the widespread and intense phenomenon of the
1870's, despite the claim to the contrary in Prochaska's recent study.129
Unlike the 1870's, the republican agitation of 1917 occurred in a period
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which possessed growing and increasingly confident Labour and socialist
organizations. It therefore enables analysis of the relationship between the
latter and the republican cause, and thereby of some of the continuities
and tensions between socialism and radicalism. These tensions had a
significant bearing on Labour attitudes to the monarchy and to republican
ideas.
Before the war, republicanism retained a foothold in socialist
politics, but it was a small and dormant tendency. It required the impetus
of war-time developments to produce, albeit briefly, a recrudescence.
Those developments were, in particular, the first Russian revolution, and
the attempt to save and to impose monarchies in other parts of Europe.
The first was of much greater significance than the second. At the Albert
Hall demonstration in April 1917, to celebrate the Russian revolution, the
previously mentioned Irish Nationalist M.P., Arthur Lynch, received great
applause for his republican appeal. He was not yet speaking from within
the Labour movement but within a year had joined the I.L.P. At this stage,
his agenda for republicanism lay outside the Labour and socialist
movement.
"The Russian Revolutionists put their Government in the dock
and found it guilty. I hope this meeting will not dissolve away before we
see a concrete result in the establishment of a great Republican Party."13°
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Longstanding republicans drew inspiration from the Russian example,
without drawing inaccurate parallels between Russian autocracy and
British constitutional monarchy. Thus Harry Snell, after arguing that
republicanism should be revived, asked:
"The Russian people have led the way; will the English people
have the courage to follow?" 131
Another socialist posited a Britain "fallen from that high pinnacle of
freedom and government so long the admiration of less fortunate nations",
but predicted that "the democracy of Britain may find its power and voice
and demand startling things of its rulers". 132 The Russian experience was
behind the new mood in Britain.
"The Russian revolution has definitely raised the issue of
monarchism and republicanism as one of the vital problems to be settled
by the war. The writing is on the wall." 133
Hyndman agreed that the Russian revolution had "produced a very great
effect in this country", and that the impending establishment of a republic
there elicited the question ' "why not a British Republic?" ' /34 As the
pattern of change which had begun in Russia moved across Europe,
some British socialists convinced themselves that Britain would follow
156
suit, albeit with local variation. A manifesto issued jointly by the executives
of the I.L.P., B.S.P. and S.L.P. proclaimed:
"The great movement of working class insurrection which first
burst forth in the Russian Revolution is now sweeping westward across
the mid-European states, the monarchies and military despotisms in
Austria and Germany have been overthrown... That this movement will in a
greater or lesser degree manifest itself in Great Britain it is impossible to
doubt." 135
Projections of a republican future for Britain were understandable in a
climate of euphoria at the fall of autocratic monarchies, and where the
war-time suppression of liberties in Britain had reduced the distinctions, for
some on the left, between Russia under the Czar, Germany under the
Kaiser, and a "Prussianised" Britain.
Other developments on the Continent, less prominent than
in Russia, produced a republican response of a different order. Rather
than focusing only or mainly upon the possible replication of revolutionary
and republican change in Britain, the intention was to offer support to
continental republicanism. This, essentially, was the position assumed by
the Fabian Society, and by H.G. Wells. Wells's interventions on
republicanism were important in themselves, as they attracted national
attention, but they also have value for the responses they elicited in
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Labour and socialist circles. His letter to The Times seems to have been
more commented upon than read, for many shared Nicolson's
misapprehension that Wells had called for the British to rid themselves of
their monarchy. 136 In truth, Wells had been at pains to distinguish
between continental monarchies and the "peculiar one" in Britain, which
was in essence a "crowned Republic". 137 Wells sought to establish an
organisation in Britain "for the encouragement of a Republican movement
in Central Europe". 138 This organisation might initially consist of "loosely
affiliated 'Republican Societies', centreing in our chief towns, which could
enrol members, organise meetings of sympathy with our fellow-
Republicans abroad..." 136 At then end of December 1917, a "Society for
the Study of Republican Institutions" was formed, with plans for local study
groups, and with Arthur Lynch as president and Wells as one of the
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vice-
presidents. The academic nature of these groups, their preoccupation
with continental politics, and their apparently modest size, rendered them
quite unlike the republican clubs of the 1870's. Wells insisted that "such
activities need not conflict in any way with one's free loyalty to the
occupant of the Throne of this 'crowned Republic' ". 141 He elaborated
elsewhere his ideas for the future of the British monarchy, indicating that
the "crowned Republic" was not quite yet a reality.
"It is the fashion of apologists of monarchy in the British
Empire to speak of the British system as a crowned republic. That is an
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attractive phrase to people of republican sentiments. It is quite
conceivable that the British Empire may be able to make that phrase a
reality... " 142
Citing the kings of Italy and Norway as types of "life president", living
simply and remaining accessible, Wells argued that "along that line the
British monarchy must go if it is not to go altogether". 143 One change he
regarded as essential was the severing of the British monarchy from the
German dynastic system, by abandoning the restrictions on British princes
marrying British, French and American subjects.
The Fabian Society had already, by the time of the
publication of Wells's letter, begun to consider republicanism, and a
public declaration came in the form of a manifesto drafted by Bernard
Shaw. 144 Although it too was motivated by opposition to developments in
Europe, particularly in Greece and Bulgaria, the proposals were distinct
from those of Wells. Shaw advocated the formation of "a definitely
international republican party", devoted in domestic politics 'to the reform
of the constitution with the object of making the British Empire a Federal
Republic". 145
What of the extent of republicanism within the Labour
movement in 1917 and 1918? Those who ventured an opinion were often
firmly on one side or other of the republicanism/monarchism divide, and
their judgement about numbers tended to coincide with their preference.
159
Thus a correspondent informed Justice that he had been astonished how
frequently he had overheard conversations which "turned upon the danger
of Continental monarchies and the uselessness of the monarchy here at
home". 146 Hyndman was sure that "there is no enthusiasm for Monarchy
as Monarchy in the United Kingdom today". 147 The veteran republican,
Arthur Lynch, declared himself "amazed to find how widespread and deep
is this current of republicanism which is now manifesting itself in England".
148 Even some with no enthusiasm for republicanism at that stage were
prepared to concede its contemporary popularity.
"Mr Wells is probably right when he says that a great volume of
republican feeling exists in this country." 149
The Clarion was more circumspect, believing more in 'the possibility of a
great volume". 150 The New Statesman offered a refined analysis,
suggesting,
"...there is no kind of movement afoot for the disestablishing of our
crowned republic in favour of any more republican republic. But there is
unquestionably a strong and widespread feeling that British progressives
ought to organise in order to give moral support to all Continental
movements against Continental autocracies..." 151
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Thomson's reports to the Cabinet in late 1918 suggested a continuing
strength of anti-monarchical sentiment, describing a "very widespread
feeling among the working classes that Thrones have become
anachronisms", and that "this feeling does not seem to be confined to the
declared revolutionaries". 152
 Naturally enough, the right-wing press were
keen to downplay the size of the republican agitation, and Blatchford, who
was unimpressed by the case for a republic, did not believe 'that there
exists, at present, any active desire amongst the people for a Republic".153
VVithin the Labour movement itself, some evidence about the
breadth of republicanism lies in the concerns of those who regarded it as a
distraction. Their observations suggest a notable upsurge. The Daily
Herald confessed itself anxious that "the working class of this country
should not be led off on a side issue". 154 A local I.L.P. chairman lamented
"indications of an attempt to sidetrack our movement on to Republican
lines". 155 The 1917 T.U.C. heard unusually strong statements in criticism
of monarchy. In the context of a debate concerning secret diplomacy and
the conspiracy to defeat the revolution in Russia, a delegate from the
Railway Clerks Association called for all monarchies to be swept away,
and Robert Williams too refused to make an exception of the British one.
"It is time that we put an end to this damnable witches'
caldron. Kings have gone already, and we are told that the Kaiser must
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go. Then I say, praise God when there will be a notice 'To Let' outside
Buckingham Palace." 156
Another delegate called for the establishment of a co-operative republic.
Meanwhile, further evidence of the contemporary increase of
republicanism was to be found in local resolutions to Labour bodies. There
was an attempt to amend the Constitution of the Scottish 1.L.P., so that its
object would be the establishment of the "Socialist Republic", although
the word 'republic' was changed to 'commonwealth'. 157
 At the I.L.P.
Annual Conference in 1918, several local parties demanded the abolition
of the monarchy, a situation repeated in 1919. Whilst the proportions of
the republican upsurge remain difficult to gauge, it is beyond dispute that
an upsurge there was. The association of the British monarchy with
continental autocracies was, however, questionable, even to confirmed
republicans. Additionally, the personal integrity of the King and his
positively regarded war-time conduct made republicanism seem to many
in the Labour movement to be as unprofitable a political move in 1917 or
1918 as it had been pre-war. To an overwhelming majority of Britons,
whether working or middle class, the King was and had been the leader of
a nation in a difficult and, at times, desperate struggle, and as possible
military defeat turned into ultimate triumph, prospects of success for a
republican movement receded fast.
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Finally, what insights does the war-time republican agitation
offer into the vexed relationship between republicanism and socialism? It
was, in general, a complex matter, which divided socialists and generated
strong feelings on both sides. It was not a new issue, as Chapter One
recounted, but stretched back into the nineteenth century, when some
socialists adopted republicanism as an integral part of their political
platform. Others did not, as Bernard Shaw reminded his Fabian audience
during the 1917 republican upsurge.
"He explained at some length why in old days Socialists
regarded Republicans as antagonists, and insisted that the enemy was
capitalism, and not monarchy in spite of its civil list and perpetual
pensions." 1"
The continuing legacy of this old split between the economistic concerns
of socialists and the political concerns of radicalism was a major factor in
restricting the influence of republican ideas within the Labour movement.
Even at a moment as promising for republicans as 1917, with all the
advantageous domestic and international conditions, their movement was
dogged by the scepticism, if not the hostility, of a large section of Labour
opinion. This attitude is exemplified by the editor of the Huddersfield
socialist journal, in response to Wells's letter to The Times. Republicanism
was characterised as antiquated and irrelevant, and condemned by its
163
association with radicalism, from which socialism had sought to establish
a distinct identity. Snell, who was a regular contributor to the newspaper,
came in for censure for his republicanism.
"People who are Radical rather than revolutionary respond
very readily on any of the political issues around which many notable, and
sometimes bloody, battles have been fought in by-gone times. Even our
own Mr. Snell reveals that weakness, and he has more than once
confessed a yearning for an old-fashioned scrap with the institution of
monarchy. If it could be shown that monarchy must be destroyed before
capitalism can be dealt with, these ardent Radicals would rightly have the
ear of the Socialist movement; but that idea cannot be seriously argued in
Britain." 159
Few socialists argued for the virtues of a constitutional monarchy over a
republic. There was near-unanimous opinion that the "if Socialism is
established it is inevitable that republicanism will be the form of
government". 160 This point was put trenchantly by Hyndman.
"Social-democrats are and always must be Republicans. But
they, of necessity, regard political forms as mere instruments, and
therefore of far inferior importance to the vigorous assertion of social
demands." 161
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For Hyndman and many others like him, the examples of republics in
France and the United States were evidence that not only was, in terms of
inequality and exploitation, a republic not superior to a constitutional
monarchy, but that "a capitalist Republic... may even, in some respects be
worse than such a Constitutional Monarchy". 162 Blatchford agreed that "in
practice we do not find Republicanism an improvement upon limited
monarchy". 163 In several of the arguments cited above the conviction was
expressed that agitation for social and economic democracy could not be
conducted simultaneously with demands for a republic, because "the
public mind will not face more than one big issue at once". 164
As for those socialists in favour of the establishment of a
republic during 1917 and 1918, they were motivated by a variety of
interests. For some, the path of the Russian revolution, including the
abolition of the monarchy, was the one to follow. Others drew attention to
a 'trade union' of kings, and its malign influence on the course of
European politics. George V was, if not quite in the class of autocratic
monarchs, a de facto member of the union, and would share the fate of his
colleagues. If this stimulus to republicanism was short-lived, there
remained a small but enduring republican element in the Labour
movement which derived its inspiration from the radicalism of the late
nineteenth century .	 Its appreciation of the social, cultural and
psychological effects of monarchy contradicted the argument put by some
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in the Labour movement that a change of Head of State from king to
president would alter little. Although his exposition of this belief was
written just before the outbreak of the war, Morrison Davidson, once an
official of the Republican Club movement, put the view of the old anti-
monarchists who found the upsurge of 1917 and 1918 a welcome revival
of interest in the cause.
"The political danger from Royalty, it is true, is now almost
negligible; but socially its maleficence can hardly be exaggerated. It
affords a convenient screen behind which there is hardly a job, aristocratic
or plutocratic, too gross to be hatched. It is the express incarnation of
social inequality and political privilege." 165
When all the sound and fury of the wartime republicanism had died away,
it was this belief in the absolute irreconcilability of monarchy and
socialism, and of the centrality of republicanism to the socialist project
which maintained for republicanism a tiny but permanent place in Labour
politics.
Conclusion. 
Considering the alarms expressed within royal circles in 1917
about the position of the monarchy, and the felt need to anglicise the royal
family, the British monarchy emerged from the war with much to its
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advantage over its pre-war standing. 166 As far as patriotic Labour and the
working class were concerned, the King had shown himself to be an
industrious and committed leader of the nation at war, despite his German
connections. The calculated deployment of the monarchy in industrial
areas, on informal visits, reduced the old perception of remoteness and
aristocratic caste-leadership. The King became a more genuinely national
symbol. The charity associations and moral lead of the royal family were in
areas likely to appeal to Labour, and this too was a calculated policy. With
his "personal" initiatives, the King's own reputation for decency began to
grow in Labour circles, a gradual process of which the long-term results
were evident during the Silver Jubilee celebrations in 1935. Unease at the
role played by the Crown's powers in assisting the development of
militarism did not outlive the wartime emergency. Finally, the noisy and
brief revival of republican rhetoric was more alarming than dangerous to
the monarchy, and it too receded as the post-war international settlement
took shape. The republican upsurge within the Labour movement was
hampered by the socialist-radical split, and the powerful economistic strain
in Labour. All in all, the King had not had a bad war, and whatever
temporary unpopularity monarchy had experienced, particularly during
1917 and 1918, this did not reflect on George V personally, Principled
objection to monarchy remained a minor element of Labour politics, and
growing affection for the monarch himself made republican ideas even
less attractive to a predominantly uninterested Labour movement,
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Chapter Three: the Royal Prerogative — 1931 and after. 
From late 1931 until 1934, the question of the political influence of the
Crown resurfaced, in response to the demise of the second Labour
government. Discussion of the matter was conducted in private and in public,
and at one point attracted the attention of the national press and thereby a
wider audience. Like much which occurred in the overheated atmosphere on
the left in the early 1930s, that discussion appears untypical of Labour's
attitudes before and after. Although the King's role in the formation of the
National Government was criticised on the right as well as on the left of the
Labour Party, the tone and content of those criticisms were widely different in
the two cases. This chapter traces the genesis of the debate concerning the
royal prerogative, and the attention it received on the party's left. Although the
catalyst for debate lay in 1931, discussion of the prerogative tended to look
forward rather than back. How would a future Labour government be affected
by, and how should it react to, attempts to obstruct it which might involve the
powers of the Crown?
Having observed that the renewed debate about the actual and potential
role of the Crown in politics derived from the events of August 1931, it must be
stated at the outset that such a debate was not necessarily an immediate or
spontaneous reaction to those events. In the months which followed,
responsibility for the fall of the Labour government and the formation of
MacDonald's "National" administration was placed upon the Prime Minister
173
himself and upon international bankers. After the disastrous election results of
1931, J.S. Middleton wrote to every defeated Labour M.P. Most replied, and of
those correspondents who identified guilty men in the events of 1931, none
mentioned the influence of the Crown, all mentioned MacDonald and some
Snowden. 1 That some people had been quick to identify a malign influence at
Buckingham Palace is indicated by Hannen Swatter's vigorous denial.
"Some silly people have attributed to him [the King] some kind of part in the
Cabinet differences. Stuff and nonsense! His Majesty, as always, acted with
perfect constitutional propriety."2
Who such "silly people" were, Swaffer does not specify. However, they would
not seem to have included Laski, who was to develop the most extensive and
radical critique of the powers of the Crown. In his early reflections on the
constitutional implications of August 1931, and the subsequent election
campaign, Laski fails to mention the role of the Crown in what he characterises
as "deliberate sabotage" of the Constitution. Although already developing the
hypothesis of how Labour might be thwarted in its attempts to introduce radical
policies, Laski's attention was focused at this stage upon "a small knot of
financiers", and also upon the role of The Times. 3
There were some early public indications, however, of disquiet about
the King's role. Leonard Woolf accepted that the King's action in asking
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MacDonald to form a National government might have been technically
constitutional , but there were grave implications.
"It is said that the King personally induced Mr MacDonald to do this. If
so he was doing something which may prove highly dangerous to the
Crown... For one can see how the precedent might be developed so that the
Crown could be used to break down the democratic system of party
government and to introduce, under the disguise so inevitable in Great Britain,
a system not materially different from that of a dictatorship."
Published and official Labour responses to the events of August 1931 made no
reference to the Crown's role. The Labour Joint Manifesto of August 27th,
produced by the T.U.C. General Council, the party N.E.C. and the Consultative
Committee of the P.L.P., explained the crisis as a "bankers' ramp". Sidney
Webb offered two slightly different accounts, only one of them for publication.
Although the unpublished version acknowledged the importance of the King's
appeal to MacDonald to act as a patriot, and also that kings had a "hankering"
for national governments, Webb maintained that events proceeded to a plan
concocted by MacDonald. The published version was careful to assert that the
King "never went outside his constitutional position".5
It is evident from two sources that discussion of the role of the Crown
must have been more widespread in the party than the contemporary
published evidence suggests. First, the retrospective accounts by participants
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in the crisis, published years or decades later, reveal the unease felt at the
King's intervention. Herbert Morrison criticised the King's failure to consult
senior Labour privy councillors such as Henderson or Clynes, in order to
discover Labour's views. Morrison would not label the King's action
unconstitutional, but did call it unwise.
"...I think his (the King's) judgement was at fault. He was
himself...overfavourable to a very speculative course of action."6
Whilst avoiding the term "unconstitutional", Morrison pointedly remarked that
"the natural constitutional course would have been to ask Baldwin to form a
government with Liberal support"! He hints at the concern behind Labour's
silence, and states the reason for it, recalling that the King's name had been
invoked during the election campaign.
"None of us wished to speak up too pointedly on that matter in view of the
general desire to keep the Crown out of politics, and pretty dangerous politics
at that."8
What emerges from Morrison's account is a Labour Party aware both of the
central role of the Crown in determining the course of events, and of the highly
unusual character of that course. Public display of their unhappiness was
restrained by two factors. Given the unclear constitutional limits of the royal
176
prerogative, the Party might have found difficulty in substantiating any charge
that they had been unfairly treated. Moreover, to have become embroiled in a
controversy involving the much-respected George V would have entailed great
political risk.
The other source of evidence that there was indeed great concern on
the question, is private records of groups and individuals. Dalton did not share
Cripps's belief that MacDonald was "outmanoeuvred by the King, the Tories
and the bankers", but did not dismiss accounts of the efforts made, over an
extended period, within the Court, to bring about a national government. 9
"Let them [courtiers] beware of being publicly caught in flagrante delicto of
interference in our domestic politics."10
In the policy discussion groups which met in the aftermath of Labour's election
defeat, the use and potential of the royal prerogative was discussed frequently.
It was by no means only those on the party's left wing who raised the issue.
Minutes of the 1932 annual general meeting of the Society for Socialist Inquiry
and Propaganda (S.S.I.P.) record Ernest Bevin sharing the apprehensions
which were generated by 1931.
"The road to political power lay through the political machine, but we must
watch what use was made of the royal prerogative."11
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At a Friday Group meeting in May 1932, at which there was a broad mixture of
right and left-wing Labour participants, discussion centred on the political
conditions which might confront a future Labour government. Whilst Cole
feared a financial rather than a constitutional crisis, William Mellor foresaw
Labour's opponents asking the King to refuse to summon Parliament in the
event of a Labour election victory. Laski was requested to produce a
memorandum to consider, amongst other matters, "the extent to which it is
possible to use the Prerogative today"12
The importance of the royal prerogative to any future Labour government
lay in the discretion which it allowed the Crown to refuse a request to dissolve
Parliament, to facilitate the formation of a "non-party" administration; but also,
and this became the salient issue, to overcome obstruction from the House of
Lords or to abolish the Upper House altogether. Whilst the Labour Party might
be a victim of the prerogative through the first two instances, it might ultimately
be dependent on the Crown's powers to defeat the Lords.
Abolition of the House of Lords was unequivocally agreed to be essential
to the success of a future Labour government. At the Friday Group meeting
referred to earlier, leading figures from right and left, including Addison, Attlee,
Dalton, Lansbury, Cole and Laski, agreed on the earliest possible abolition of
the Lords. The only matter of debate was whether or not abolition should be
included in the party's election programme, as this carried the risk of provoking
Conservative moves to reform the Lords in order to make it a more difficult
body to attack. The majority view was that it should be an election issue
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precisely because this would leave the King with no doubt as to the Party's
mandate on the question. The Haldane Society of Labour Lawyers made this
point central in the advice it offered to the New Fabian Research Bureau
(N.F.R.B.) on legislation necessary for a socialist government to deal with the
probable crisis conditions in which it would assume office.
"It will meet, naturally, with the opposition of that body (the House of
Lords) itself; and it must not overlook the possibility of reluctance or even
hostility on the part of the Monarch himself.."13
The highly unusual course of events which led to the formation of a
National Government, and the crushing nature of Labour's defeat in the
subsequent election, challenged and, for some, shattered, confidence in the
workings of the Constitution. The decimation of Labour's parliamentary body
thrust to the fore left-wing figures who embraced and advocated a radical
response to the perceived constitutional challenges. These left-wing
parliamentarians, along with similar minded intellectuals, were attracted by
what has been termed "constitutional dictatorship". 14 This tendency towards
`Jacobinism' was the result of some dire projections of anti-democratic and
unconstitutional behaviour by Labour's opponents. The residual powers of the
Crown figured amongst the concerns, principally with regard to confronting or
abolishing the House of Lords. It was strikingly ironic that those who classed
themselves as socialists and democrats showed so much interest in the pre-
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democratic vestiges of monarchical power, albeit as an instrument to achieve
power; a case of ends justifying means. Much private and public discussion of
this matter took place within groups such as the S.S.I.P., which was adopting
an increasingly left-wing tone, and then, from 1932, the Socialist League. An
S.S.I.P. memorandum on the Constitution, written by Cole and G.R. Mitchison
in 1932, raised, rather than answered, a number of issues concerning the
powers of the Crown.15
"Use of royal prerogative by socialist minority — how far should it be
the Socialist policy to restrict the present powers of the Crown, or to make use
of them? Should the question of republicanism be raised at an early stage? — if
so, what constitutional changes would this involve, and what should be the
powers of a Socialist President if such an office were created?"16
What should be the nature of the guarantees to be demanded from the Crown
before Labour took office, concerning the abolition of the Lords and the
introduction of emergency powers? Cole drew up in September 1932 a draft
manifesto for a future Labour government, which he presented to the S.S.I.P.
He included a frank warning:
"Our attempts to put this policy into force will be met with obstruction and
sabotage by the capitalist classes, with the veto of the House of Lords,
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possibly with attempts by the Monarchy to oppose the advance of socialism... If
the Monarchy opposes, the Monarchy will have to go."17
However, S.S.I.P. discussion in succeeding months focused upon the Crown
only insofar as its powers would be required for abolition of the Lords.
Evidence that constitutional issues were of concern to the party
leadership can be seen in the establishment of an N.E.C. policy sub-committee
in early 1932, to examine, amongst other things, the machinery of government.
This body, the Constitutional Sub-committee, received memoranda on
questions such as the House of Lords and emergency powers, written by
Laski, Durbin, Ivor Jennings and others. The membership of the sub-
committee contained senior party figures: amongst these were Clynes, Dalton,
Attlee, Laski, Cripps, with Citrine and Walkden representing the TUC. Although
few of its reports and minutes remain, there is evidence that the sub-committee
remained in being into the late 1930's, with its brief including such matters as
attendance by Labour representatives at ceremonial functions and the award
and receipt of honours. The broad constitutional concerns of the sub-
committee coincided with those of the S.S.I.P. and the N.F.R.B., although the
tone and emphasis were very different.
"For Dalton, Morrison and Bevin, the party's moderates, talk of 'emergency
powers' and of abolishing the House of Lords smelled of the 'temporary
dictatorship of the proletariatm18
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This assertion has to be qualified in the light of the apparent consensus,
mentioned earlier, of the Friday Group meeting, which included Dalton and
Bevin, that the House of Lords should be abolished. Differences were about
the tactics involved in bringing about abolition. Nevertheless, a widening gulf
between left and right in the party over the type and degree of constitutional
problems confronting a future Labour government is impossible to deny. From
1932 onwards, Dalton, Citrine and Bevin expressed their anger and
disagreement with articles and speeches from prominent figures in the
Socialist League which foresaw the necessity of extraordinary constitutional
measures.
19
 Within the Socialist League, the events of 1931 had reinvigorated
republican tendencies, with the preliminary agenda for its first annual
conference including a resolution from the Westminster branch, which
"declares its faith in a Socialist Republic and repudiates the principle of a
Monarchy in whatever form".2°
Whilst the focus upon constitutional issues within the Labour left was
provided by more than one individual, Laski was by far the most energetic and
prolific expositor. His views received an airing through his membership of
committees and research bodies, through his speeches to Socialist League
gatherings, and through articles and books which reworked themes. Nobody
on the left in the early 1930s could have been unaware of Laski's ideas about
the British constitution and its pitfalls for a socialist government. Unlike some
others, Laski's interest in the Crown and the monarchy long preceded the
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events of 1931. As mentioned in Chapter One, his first article in a national
newspaper had been an attack in the Daily Herald on the conference
convened by King George on the Irish Home Rule crisis, in which he examined
critically the constitutional powers of the Crown. 21 In a 1929 article
complimentary to the King, who was ill at the time, Laski remarked on the
peculiar difficulty faced in situations "in which the validity of the constitution
itself has been in debate in an atmosphere rendered more perplexing by the
fact that nobody is perfectly clear as to what the constitution is".22
In 1932, there began a flow of books and articles in which Laski, his
subject given relevance and urgency by the events of 1931, developed a
critique of the Constitution and a set of dire-sounding hypotheses of Labour's
prospects under it. In a pamphlet published in February 1932 entitled The
Crisis and the Constitution, Laski indicated that the lesson to be drawn from
1931 was that the Crown was an "efficient" not less than a "dignified" part of
the Constitution. He criticised MacDonald for undermining the principles of
collective Cabinet responsibility and of party government. As far as the King
was concerned, Laski's charge was that the choice of MacDonald to lead a
national administration was undemocratic, having been selected not as the
leader of a party but as the King's "favourite"; an individual who might be able
to command a majority in Parliament, but who lacked the legitimacy of being a
party leader. Without a party behind him, MacDonald's significance was purely
personal and,
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"....it can only have become more than that by the significance which the
King chose to attach to him at a period of crisis."23
Later in the year, Laski began to extrapolate from 1931, and to consider the
implications of those events for the future. Far-reaching economic changes
required large-scale constitutional changes, and the royal prerogative was an
indispensable instrument to achieve such changes. Abolition of the Lords
would require the creation of sufficient peers, and Laski raised the possibility
that the King might refuse to give a guarantee that the prerogative could be
used. Additionally, Labour's opponents might advise the King to dissolve a
newly-elected Parliament with a Labour majority, in the hope of a different
result emerging from conditions of national crisis. Laski recognised the
paradoxical character of this prospect. A Labour government which was
permitted to rule constitutionally could not succeed unless it operated the
instruments of the Constitution with the same determination to innovate as had
been shown by others in 1931. Laski had no illusions about the class character
of the monarchy, but argued that its constitutional role had to be confronted
pragmatically. At the S.S.I.P.'s Digwell Park Conference in July 1932, Laski
argued that,
"Labour must recognise the absolute neutrality of the Crown and when it is
returned to power it must accept office only on the condition of it being given
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absolute power and freedom to pursue its policy. This entailed the power to
abolish the House of Lords".24
The assumed constitutional neutrality of the Crown was, however, embedded
within a monarchical system about which Laski had no illusions.
"Every instrument which will come under its [Labour's] hand, from the
Monarchy downwards, is steeped in traditions alien from its purposes because
it was devised to secure quite different ends."25
Of these instruments, the monarchy was the most delicate problem facing a
socialist government, because of its influence, prestige and popularity. The
social contacts which the monarchy had were with anti-Labour elements, and
its special relationship with the armed services made the Crown's attitude of
great importance. Any abandonment of neutrality would operate to the
detriment of Labour. Laski did not, however, see republicanism as a necessary
or desirable alternative.
"That would be a grave misdirection of effort, even though a Monarchy and
a Socialist democracy are not, in the long run, easily compatible. For there is
practically no republican sentiment in Great Britain; on the contrary, loyalty to
the Crown is wide and profound.. .to make it the spearhead of political attack
when it has not seriously challenged criticism would be a strategy of
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unexampled foolishness. It would wholly mistake means for ends and it would
concentrate upon Socialist policy a profound hostility in fact unconcerned with
real economic substance."26
This familiar argument, put in their time by, amongst others, Hardie, Tom Mann
and Snowden, was that Labour should interest itself in economic
transformation, and that any attempt to end the political and social power of the
monarchy would be a distraction and an electoral hindrance. 27 However, Laski
did not propose to leave the monarchy unreformed. The prerogative should be
narrowed: the Crown's right of veto on legislation must go; the King's right to
exercise personal discretion in the choice of Prime Minister should be ended;
the theoretical right of the monarchy to dismiss a ministry in times of crisis
should be ended. Apart from defining and limiting the royal prerogative, Laski
called for the "democratisation" of the monarchy. Social functions which
involved associating with the snobbery and social hierarchy of the Court should
be minimised, as:
"...it is obvious that men who begin by living in the ways of a Court end
also by thinking those ways good. Everyone knows that there were Labour
Ministers, and not least their wives, who believed that a new epoch had
dawned in human history because they were summoned to dine at
Buckingham Palace."28
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The fact that Laski gave only secondary importance to the social and
cultural contribution which republicanism might offer to socialists, did not mean
he underestimated the significance of the monarchy in perpetuating social
inequality. In longer and more theoretical works, he revealed an acute
understanding of its pernicious effects. The King implies a Court: the Court
involves an aristocracy.
"..the whole impact of the Crown and the social system it necessitates is to
preserve that temper of inequality it is the purpose of the Labour Party to deny.
It gives birth to a set of values which are both irrational and dangerous... My
point is the simple one that the psychology induced by an inegalitarian society
fortifies privilege by making it seem natural. •,,29
In broad terms, the monarchy makes for continuity with the past, and its
interest is in preserving the status quo. As that status quo is capitalist
democracy, which a socialist government would seek to transform, a Labour
demand for the prerogative to be used to achieve its objectives would put the
Crown's neutrality severely to the test. In Laski's opinion, the Crown had been
neutral only because the situation allowed it to be so. After writing his 1932
pamphlets, Laski was asked by the King's private secretary to discuss the
views he had expressed. He summarised his interview with Wigram:
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"Charming as he was, I left him a convinced republican. He made me feel
(I) that the King's power, though intangible, is immense (II) that he is the vital
pivot, and almost necessarily so, in a constitutional crisis... .that he regards his
formal powers as contingently active for emergency purposes. In other words,
in a big fight, the Crown would almost certainly be on the Tory side, and if it
assumed a constitutional form, the monarchy would be precipitated with its
immense social prestige into politics."30
Others took up the same general theme as Laski, if not with the same
frequency or persistence. G.D.H. Cole used the New Clarion to reiterate the
need of any future Labour government to secure a guarantee from the King
that he would create sufficient peers to overcome the Lords opposition and
then to abolish the upper chamber. 31 His general view of the British
Constitution mirrored that of Laski, but his hypothetical scenarios were, if
anything, even blacker. Cole did not rule out the possibility of a defeated
capitalist government refusing to leave office, with the King dissolving
Parliament. Cole admitted to having the example of contemporary Germany in
mind. Further, Cole took into account suggestions by some Tories that reform
of the House of Lords should be made in order to prevent its abolition by
constitutional means.
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"Any such reform of the House of Lords would be a deliberate and
unambiguous challenge to revolution; and it could be met only by
unconstitutional means."32
Whereas Laski held out the possibility of, as well as the need for, reform to the
machinery of government to enable a socialist administration to implement its
changes, Cole was more sceptical.
"I have a strong suspicion that many members of the ruling
classes.. .are believers in the parliamentary system only as long as it serves as
the guardian of their class interests, and will have no further use for it if it
shows signs of turning into an instrument of Socialism."33
In making this assertion, Cole was not simply expressing a generalised
scepticism about the capitalist's commitment to democratic values. There was
hard evidence that some Tories were prepared to use whatever irregular
constitutional courses were open to them to obstruct a socialist government. At
the 1932 Conservative Conference there was a move, led by the late Deputy
Speaker of the Commons, to revive the use of the royal veto, and talk about
reform of the House of Lords has already been mentioned. Laski cited the call
for a revival of the royal veto when responding to Citrine's criticism that
agitation about the royal prerogative was nothing but a grave electoral
handicap. 34 On the right of the party it was felt that Laski, Cole and like-minded
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individuals were over-reacting to rumour and to the wild talk of a few
reactionary Tories. In May 1933, Laski approached Dalton with rumours that
members of the Government were discussing whether an election might be
postponed beyond 1936, and until the Government advised the King that it was
safe to return to party politics. Dalton discounted this and Laski's other
concerns about constitutional irregularities because,
"...in his scare story of the King refusing to play constitutional ball with a
Labour Government, he leaves out one of the most important considerations:
namely the danger to the Crown, if it is thought to be making unconstitutional
innovations, of stirring up the sleeping forces of Republicanism or even of
revolt."35
Even more than Laski, it was Cripps whose pronouncements on the
influence of the monarchy and the prospects for a Labour government drew
both national headlines and scorn from his colleagues on the right of the party.
Cripps's remarks on the monarchy in his "Buckingham Palace speech" became
notorious, generating much heat in the Labour as well as in the bourgeois
press, and causing Henderson to rush back from Geneva. In fact his views, as
expressed before and after the speech, were not deeply radical. In his Socialist
League lecture delivered in January 1933, "Can Socialism come by
Constitutional Methods", Cripps followed Laski and Cole in rehearsing various
possible scenarios following the election of a socialist government. The
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demand to employ the prerogative to overcome the Lords' rejection of an
Emergency Powers Bill might be refused by the King. The Labour government
could resign, or it could stay in power, unconstitutionally ignoring the Lords.
Cripps dismissed the latter option. He went only slightly further in his
discussion of "Democracy and Dictatorship".
"It is true that by the conventions of our unwritten constitution the Crown
can only act in accordance with the advice of its ministers, but this convention
has never had to stand the test of an attempt to abolish the capitalist basis of
society."36
Cripps was in no doubt that any refusal by the Crown to create sufficient peers
to permit passage of emergency legislation would be unconstitutional, but then
immediately qualified his statement in two ways. He acknowledged that the
Crown had the constitutional right to exercise some discretion.
"The Crown must in case of doubt exercise its own judgement as to whether
or not the Government has received a clear mandate at the polls for the
passage of the particular Bill in question."37
Secondly, he was prepared to give the Crown the benefit of the doubt for the
meantime. It was not necessary to contemplate the unlikely prospect of an
unconstitutional refusal to create peers. In a privately circulated memorandum
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on "the Constitution and the Machinery of Government", Cripps denounced as
unnecessary and stupid any tendency to suppose that a particular monarch
would jeopardise his position by departing from normal constitutional practice
on the election of a socialist majority. The memorandum argued that "the
existence of individuals with the position and influence vested in a King.. As
inconsistent with a logical socialist outlook", but Cripps concluded that
influence and prestige were inevitable in any head of state and that,
"...it is very questionable whether vesting such powers in an elected
President....has not more practical disadvantages than its existence in a
person who owes his position to heredity and nothing else."38
There seems to be a considerable disparity between the careful and
qualified statements cited above, and contemporary accounts of Cripps's
private observations, some of which provoked Dalton into referring to Cripps's
state of "adolescent Marxist miasma". 38 The speech which aroused most
controversy was delivered to the University Labour Federation at Nottingham,
on 6th January 1934. The offending remarks were:
'When the Labour Party comes into power they must act rapidly and it will
be necessary to deal with the House of Lords and the influence of the City of
London. There is no doubt that we shall have to overcome opposition from
Buckingham Palace and other places as weir°
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Predictable expressions of outrage filled the Conservative press, and the
Labour leadership rapidly sought to limit the political damage. It is worth
considering the explanations offered at the time and later for Cripps's remarks,
the variety of responses within his own party, as well as Cripps's own gloss on
his speech.
One of Cripps's biographers identified reasons for his belief that
opposition might be met from the Palace.'" As a young man, Cripps had
witnessed the crisis over the Parliament Bill in 1911, in which his father, then a
Tory M.P., had been involved. Also, Cripps was under the influence of
Lansbury, who believed he [Lansbury] had been excluded from office in 1924
through royal influence. Ultimately, Cooke believed, it was the result of political
inexperience. Herbert Morrison felt that Cripps had been saying what his
audience, drawn from the Socialist League, wanted to hear. 42 Attlee portrayed
it as an indiscretion which had been seized upon and distorted.43
Within the Labour Party, Cripps received support and criticism. The
Socialist Review felt his remarks should not be objectionable to any socialist.
He was being perfectly reasonable in assuming the impartiality of the King,
"but left it to be clearly understood that even the most rigorous of
constitutionalists could not assume a similar impartiality from the Crown's
advisers"." The Labour peer, Lord Marley, gave Cripps some guarded
support, interpreting the speech in the sense in which Cripps subsequently
claimed it was intended.
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"By 'Buckingham Palace', I think Sir Stafford meant the social organism
round which a certain section of society centres. I consider that the possibility
of Fascism is a very serious danger. I would be the last to suggest that it would
be organised from Buckingham Palace, but it might have support from similar
portions of the social system."45
However, the weight of Labour's publicly expressed reaction was negative.
The general attitude was that to speculate publicly on such a sensitive issue
was unjustified, irresponsible and damaging to the party's interests. Clynes
typified this reaction.
"To anticipate future conflict with the Throne is, in my view, the worst way
for any party to win an election, and the Labour Party must not be the first to
bring Buckingham Palace within the range of party political conflict. A
reference to Buckingham Palace will, of course, be taken as an allusion to the
Throne itself. I prefer to assume that our own loyalty will secure from the
Throne continued respect for the decisions of the electors when Labour is in
power."46
Morrison recalled that "responsible" members of the party immediately issued
statements dissociating themselves and the party from Cripps's remarks.'" The
speech was largely ignored by the Daily Herald, but was scathingly attacked in
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the Birmingham Labour newspaper both for its political ineptitude and its
mistaken assumptions. Cripps's speech was a "free gift" to Labour's
opponents. Moreover, there was no justification for suggesting that
Buckingham Palace would attempt to interfere with the work of a socialist
government.
"We believe that King George is far too sensible and democratic to
encourage or instigate any Court intrigue against the people's will.. .We have
little time for kings, but we have a great deal of respect for our present
monarch who... is honestly trying to do the right thing by the people of this
nation, irrespective of their party or creed.""
For those holding these views, the events of 1931 had not destroyed
confidence in the constitutional propriety of the Crown or in its political
impartiality. To raise doubts over either issue was implicitly to impugn the
integrity of the King. Laski, Cripps and their Socialist League comrades might
theorise and hypothesise about the workings of the Constitution, driven by the
events of 1931, by frustration at Labour's impotence, and by an awareness of
the fragility of democratic institutions under attack from Fascism in
contemporary Europe. Others in the party saw no reason to doubt that the
Constitution, and in particular the present monarch, would treat Labour as fairly
in the future as it had done in the past.
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What of Cripps's own account of his behaviour? It was noted earlier
that Cripps had been circumspect in his observations on the workings of the
Constitution in his pre-Nottingham articles. There is evidence to support
Morrison's conviction that Cripps was speaking to please his immediate
audience. Cripps, under fire, immediately qualified his Nottingham speech by
insisting that his "Buckingham Palace" reference had been to Court advisers
rather than the King.
"The term (Buckingham Palace) is a well-known expression used to
describe Court circles and the officials and other people who surround the King
at Buckingham Palace...I cannot understand why anybody would have thought
that I was referring to the Crown. One always assumes the complete
impartiality of the Crown in this country. That is the great basic assumption of
our Constitution."49
Cripps' private correspondence in the aftermath of the speech is consistent
with his public claim of a distinction between monarchy and Court. In reply to a
correspondent who strongly supported the monarchy, Cripps wrote that:
"I entirely agree with you as regards the advisability of having a
Constitutional Monarchy, as I think it is probably the best system. I do think we
shall have great opposition, as I stated, from Court circles and from Capitalists
who are attracted round Buckingham Palace."5°
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When attacked by a republican socialist for having "climbed down" on his
Buckingham Palace speech, Cripps presented a rather different argument.
Instead of claiming the status quo as the "best system", he argued the case for
its practicality and for responding to necessity.
"My own view is that, looking at it from a practical point of view,
Republicanism is not a matter of vital importance at the present time. The first
job that we have got to do is to get a change of the economic system and I
believe it will easiest (sic) to start this under a Constitutional Monarchy. As a
matter of practical politics I believe it to be a mistake at present time to confuse
Socialism with Republicanism."51
In the following days, Cripps made more qualifications, each one absolving him
further from the accusation of republicanism. First he cteakt With the treqtierty
voiced concern about the use of the prerogative to abolish the House of Lords.
"If the Lords stand in the way, there will be constitutional methods for
getting rid of them. The Crown is essentially democratic, because the Crown is
bound to act upon the advice of the Ministers.. .and therefore there will be no
difficulty whatsoever from the Crown."52
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Next, Cripps declared, to a Glasgow audience, his preference for retaining the
monarchy.
"I am in favour of a Constitutional Monarchy. In my opinion, you have got to
have some figurehead for the state. Russia has Stalin (A voice: "A better man
than you.") I believe the alternative to a Constitutional Monarchy is a political
President and I vastly prefer a Constitutional Monarcriy.
He was careful to leave open the long-term constitutional arrangements
appropriate to a socialist society, falling back upon the familiar argument that
discussion of the monarchical system was an unnecessary distraction.
"The policy of the Labour Party is not Republican, because we do not
believe that it is going to help anybody to raise the issue of Republicanism at
the same time as Socialism, whicti we regard as infiniteil more imponant.4
For Cripps too, as for a long and distinguished tradition of Labour politicians,
the two were quite separable, and the latter by no means conditional upon the
former.
We can compare these statements with Cripps's address, in July 1935, to
the Nottingham branch of the Socialist League, and reflect on Morrison's
observation that Cripps had been tailoring his ideas to suit his listeners, but
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had then been caught out when those ideas had reached a far wider audience
than anticipated. Cripps declared that,
"...in 1931 Lombard Street determined that it was time to finish the life of the
Labour Government. It was finished not by the traditional method of a hostile
vote in the Commons, but what he dared to mention in Nottingham (in January
1934)- and caused a considerable uproar in the Press - the Buckingham
Palace influence."55
Although it was the King, not the Court, who had requested MacDonald to form
a government, and who had persuaded the Prime Minister not to resign, one
could argue that Cripps's speech merely reinforced his earlier comments about
the malign influence of the Court. However, given the circumstances of August
1931, it would have been stretching a point to have claimed a clear distinction
between Crown and Court and then to have blamed only the latter for what had
occurred.
The account thus far has demonstrated an increasing divide in the early
1930's between the party's left, as it found an organised voice through the
Socialist League, and the right. On constitutional questions, this divide was
not, however, clear cut or unchanging. In late 1931 few voices, even on the
party's right, were heard against proposals to abolish the House of Lords. This
was hardly a new or revolutionary policy. It had been a feature of Labour's
post-war manifesto, Labour and the New Social Order, published in 1918, and
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would appear in 1937 in the unrevolutionary setting of Attlee's pamphlet,
Labour's Aims. However, the issue, as part of the general discussion of how a
future Labour government would fare under the Constitution, became one
focus of the struggle by the party's right wing to reassert itself and re-establish
a climate of "moderation" in the party. The party conferences of the mid-1930s
testify to this struggle. The 1933 conference saw Cripps demanding the
immediate abolition of the Lords, to be achieved constitutionally, which
required the clearest of electoral mandates on the issue. Attlee was equally
anxious that the mandate should be clear enough to leave the Crown in no
doubt about its duty to meet Labour's demands.
"If you go to the Crown without a mandate to deal with the House of
Lords, you will be sent back, and that is where the danger of Fascism comes
in."56
It was an Emergency Powers Bill, a feature of the left's programme for rapid
and complete moves to socialism, which many in the centre or right of the
Party, such as Lees-Smith, regarded as most problematic. He foresaw its
rejection by the House of Lords, and the likely response of the King to a
consequent demand by Labour for the creation of 500 or 600 new peers. The
King could argue that it was not a crisis, and therefore the 1911 Parliament Act
could take its course, allowing a two-year delay to the Bill. If then, as Cripps
argued, Labour should call an election on the question,
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"It would be an election on not 'Labour versus the Banks' or 'Labour versus
Capital', but an election on 'Labour versus the King'. This would throw the
movement back to controversies which were fought fifty years previously and
would sidetrack Labour from economic proposals."57
Cripps's amendment was not taken further, but at the following conference, left
and right achieved a compromise on the question of abolition of the Lords.
Whilst the Socialist League wanted the commitment to include immediate
abolition in the party programme For Socialism and Peace, the N.E.C. felt that
would delay social and economic progress. The compromise involved dropping
the point about immediate abolition and including in an appendix to the N.E.C.
report a less dramatic commitment:
"A Labour government meeting with sabotage from the House of Lords
would take immediate steps to overcome it; and it will, in any event, take steps
during its term of office to pass legislation abolishing the House of Lords as a
legislative chamber."58
One can see that at the same time that the left, in speeches and articles, were
speculating about constitutional crises involving the Crown and the House of
Lords, official party policy on these questions was really no more radical than it
had been in 1918.
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Conclusion.
After 1931, both the manner of the fall of the Labour Government and the
electoral disaster which followed caused deep and widespread resentment
across the Labour Party. Initially and mainly, this resentment focused upon
MacDonald, but some also was directed at the King. Beatrice Webb's diary
provides a hint of the kinds of private conversations which took place, and
were still taking place a year after the events which provoked them. Recording
a visit by Arthur Henderson, she notes that,
"....the talk was always reverting to stories about JRM's perfidy and
Snowden's shameful malignancy and the King's unconstitutional action in
asking MacDonald to form a Cabinet when he was no longer leader of any
political party. All the same, Henderson did not welcome my observation that
the Labour Party should make their displeasure felt at Buckingham Palace."59
Historians who have examined the constitutional questions raised by the
formation of the National Government and the subsequent general election
conclude that Labour critics of the King's actions had every justification for their
views. A recent account, produced by an historian sympathetic to constitutional
monarchy, drew the following conclusion:
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"The king's role in the formation of the National Government was much
greater than is generally thought. He was not merely the facilitator of the new
government as he had been in 1916, but the instigator of it."6°
Furthermore, the subsequent general election had been called in dubious
circumstances, as "the king granted a dissolution under conditions which broke
both the letter and the spirit of the agreement on which the government had
been formed. .Only the king could defend the agreement. He did not do so."61
At the party conference in October 1931, Webb had noticed a change in
attitude amongst the parliamentary leadership. They would not in the future act
as caretakers of the existing social order. Instead they would,
"...lay down, on the first day of office, a positive policy of immediate
legislation and executive control of the nation's income and investment of
savings - with no damned nonsense about House of Lords obstruction or Court
objection."62
If Webb was correct about this new spirit, it failed to translate into a radical
departure from the entrenched belief that the Constitution provided the
necessary mechanisms to transform the social order, just as it offered the
mechanisms to preserve it. Only on the party's left were serious questions
asked about the neutrality of its instruments, and even here the way forward
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remained unclear. There was no decisive resolution of the paradox of Labour
and the royal prerogative: without it, Labour could not hope to achieve its aims
constitutionally against the obstruction of the Lords; but while it remained, its
undefined power could permit Labour's opponents to obstruct or even
overthrow a socialist government. In an international environment in which
democratic systems were being undermined and destroyed, a preoccupation
with even hypothetical threats to the parliamentary system was perhaps
understandable.
There was reluctance on the Labour right to countenance public
discussion of the role of the Crown, and ultimately an unwillingness on the
Party's left to condemn outright the formally undemocratic elements of the
Constitution. The swift retraction by Cripps, and Laski's rather tame proposal to
trim the powers of the royal prerogative, despite the fundamental misgivings he
had about Crown and monarchy, were indicative of a powerful truth; the
inescapable reality of a genuinely popular monarchy. There was no political
mileage to be had from attacking the monarchy or advocating a republic. Such
sentiments may have drawn applause at a Socialist League meeting, but
outside they remained anathema. Labour's respect for George V,
wholehearted from some, grudging from others, was combined with the clear
awareness that deep unpopularity awaited those who denigrated not just the
King himself, but the institution with which he was inextricably linked in the
mind of the nation. It had been the dubious constitutional events of 1931, and
thus the political Jacobinism of the Labour left in the early 1930's, which had
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drawn the Crown and monarchy back into political debate. As later chapters
will reveal, 1931 was not forgotten, but the royal prerogative all but
disappeared as an issue for the Labour Party, as Laski's proposal of a
reduction in its scope gradually came about.
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Chapter Four - Two celebrations and a funeral. 
Introduction. 
This chapter examines three events which occurred within two years: the
Silver Jubilee of George Vs reign; the death of George V; and the Coronation
of George VI. Besides their proximity in time, the reason for juxtaposing the
first and last of these events is the similarity of dilemma which they posed for
the Labour Party. Both were national celebrations of the monarchical system,
and required the party at all levels to declare its position on the celebrations.
At the national level, the leadership was under pressure from some of its local
parties not to participate, and had to respond. At the local level, Labour-
controlled councils were faced with decisions about whether and how to
participate in those celebrations. The diversity of responses within the party,
and the depth of the problem which royal celebrations posed, were generated
by divergent attitudes to monarchy, nation, class and patriotism.
The Silver Jubilee - May 1935. 
Differences of opinion within the Labour Party over the question of
the monarchy were never as clear or exposed as at the time of George Vs
Silver Jubilee. In order to explain this fact, attention must be paid to a peculiar
set of contemporary political circumstances. Previous chapters of this study
have referred to the diversity of opinion in the party, from enthusiasm for the
monarchy, through many shades of qualified acceptance and scepticism, to
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outright republicanism. Impinging strongly upon already existing beliefs were
several contingent factors. First, there was the King's popularity in the country.
George Vs reign was widely regarded as a model of constitutional kingship.
The most controversial moments of that reign, the Ulster rebellion of 1914 and
the formation of the National Government in 1931, were not completely
forgotten on the left, but in general the King's reputation stood high. His
domestic life raised none of the ethical concerns generated by his father's
private life. The personal qualities of the King, as well as the length of his
reign, helped generate respect and loyalty amongst those in the Labour Party
already well-disposed towards the monarchy. Next, one must consider the
political context. There was a general election imminent, with an obvious
advantage to the National Government of a country unified by a mood of
celebration. Moreover, the Labour Party was in opposition to a government
which had appropriated the label 'National', and which might expect to benefit
from an upsurge in popular patriotic feeling. Domestically, political debate was
much focused upon unemployment and poverty, so expenditure on
celebrations was a particularly sensitive issue. The international context was
one in which democracy was under attack from dictatorship. More attention
than usual was paid to the political and constitutional factors underpinning
stable, democratic government.
Controversy over the Jubilee began early in 1935, once the
Government had decided that there would be nationwide celebration of the
anniversary. By February, the Labour Party's National Executive Committee
had already received enquiries from local parties about participation in the
forthcoming celebrations. The party N.E.C. decided to take the same approach
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as the National Council of Labour had already done, which was to recommend
that Labour organisations throughout the country should reflect "the general
sentiments of their membership" in celebrating, but called for simple
ceremonies, for public money to be spent on schemes of permanent value,
and for no worker to lose income through a public holiday.' The party N.E.C.
called for "prominence to be given to the more peaceful characteristics of the
Jubilee, and the wise expenditure of such funds as are available for the
celebrations". 2 Middleton sent a letter to local parties in March setting out
these points and observing that "our people can assist in making the day
memorable". 3
 By the middle of March, the N.E.C. were receiving protests "day
by day" about the official party attitude towards the Jubilee, and North
Hammersmith D.L.P. had circularised all local parties urging protests to be
made to the N.E.C. Although there is no evidence of the exact number of
protests made to the N.E.C., it is clear that they were neither isolated nor
spasmodic examples. Set against these protests were the preparations for
local celebrations being made throughout the country by Labour-controlled
councils . Whilst protests by local parties were numerous, no big-city Labour
councils refused to sanction expenditure on the Jubilee or to organise its
celebration. However, where there was internal, public division, it served to
expose ideological faults on the issue of monarchy and to demonstrate the
problematical nature of Labour's electoral dependence on the support of a
working class which appeared overwhelmingly attached to popular monarchy.
Particular local cases illustrate both of these phenomena, and merit
examination.
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The actions of the Labour mayor and Labour-controlled council in
Bermondsey attracted much contemporary attention. This was a working-
class district of south London, and the Labour mayor was a cleaner who
worked on the railways; no hint of middle class radicalism in this case. Part of
the interest lies in the radical differences of opinion both within the
Bermondsey Labour group on the council and between the Bermondsey
council and neighbouring Labour-controlled councils in Lambeth, Camberwell
and Deptford. The origin of the controversy lay in the refusal of the Mayor of
Bermondsey, G.R. Weightman, to attend a reception at which the King would
meet the mayors of south London boroughs. Weightman argued that the costs
of his attending the reception would be better spent on alleviating poverty, and
specifically would deprive a group of local children from poor families of a
seaside holiday. In this decision, he was supported by the Bermondsey
Council, which refused to take part in the Jubilee celebrations, and in March
1935 voted not to allocate any funds for them. The response from local
"loyalists" included the burning of Weightman's effigy and the daubing of his
house with obscenities. Support for mayor and council came from, amongst
others, the N.U.W.M., with public meetings addressed by Hannington and J.R
Campbell. Within the local Labour Party, a division opened up when five
Labour councillors introduced a motion to censure the mayor for his "grave
dereliction of his civic duties and responsibilities... .thereby precipitating an
unprecedented position and causing discontent among the local ratepayers".4
The councillors dissociated themselves from the local party's position, and
claimed to be in harmony with the national party and its leadership. One of the
five rebels claimed:
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"We do not consider it to be a political matter. Our action was an effort to
remove the slur cast upon the ancient and royal borough of Bermondsey."5
Following this public split, a two-hour private meeting of the Labour group on
the council resulted in the five rebels dropping their opposition to the council's
position. At the subsequent council meeting held to reconsider the decision not
to participate, the Labour group voted unanimously to confirm the boycott. The
council leader claimed that the party was united, but if a fragile local unity had
been achieved, it was not one which extended beyond the borough. The
Labour-controlled Deptford council participated fully in the celebrations, and its
leader claimed that its position reflected popular opinion.
"I think that the Council adequately carried out the desires of the people of
the Borough.. .We should have liked to have done more, but realising the
limitations of our borough we thought it best to limit our expenditure
accordingly."6
A former Southwark M.P. told that local party that he found little to applaud in
Weightman's attitude, and wondered if it was worth it. The Labour Mayor of
Camberwell attempted to dissuade Weightman from his position, and blamed
the Bermondsey party for dictating to the mayor; something which would never
occur in Camberwell. Of the Labour mayors invited to the royal reception,
Bermondsey's was the only absentee. However, the local Labour magazine
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claimed that events at the May Day demonstration in Hyde Park on 5th May
indicated widespread support and sympathy for the stand taken.
"Bermondsey's banners and mottoes were greeted with loud and
continuous cheering as our ranks passed through the Park gates. This was a
recognition by the huge crowd of the stalwart action of the Mayor and Council
in relation to the Jubilee celebrations."7
Whilst the Labour leader of Deptford Council argued that his council's
attitude had reflected popular opinion, there is little evidence that Bermondsey
Council had done likewise. Hannen Swaffer recorded in the Daily Herald after
a visit to Bermondsey during the Jubilee that:
"In the narrowest courts, there were scores and scores of small Union
Jacks outside slum dwellings."8
The biographer of Dr.Alfred Salter, the local Labour M.P. and a lifelong
republican, confirmed this picture.
"There was probably no borough in London which had a greater display of
flags for the jubilee. Only one dissentient gesture was to be seen - across the
windows of a top floor in Alscot Road stretched a banner 'God Save the
People'; but like its neighbours, the rest of the building was covered with Union
Jacks and loyal mottoes.°
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Given that the council's attitude was not likely to find approval amongst a
"loyal" working class electorate, local Tories saw an opportunity to damage
Labour. Under the guise of the "Bermondsey Constitutional Club", they
attempted to organise a "loyal address" to the King, as the council had refused
to send an official one. This in itself is less surprising than the response of the
West Bermondsey Labour Party. Indignant at the party political use being
made of the unofficial loyal address, the party sent a letter of protest to the
King, which closed thus:
"We are sure that Your Majesty will deprecate this dishonourable and
unconstitutional attempt to use Your Majesty's position for purely party ends.
We therefore feel it our duty to acquaint Your Majesty with the bogus and
dishonest character of the address."1°
The party was clearly concerned at the electoral damage which could be
inflicted on it, but there was a touching naivete about the implied message that
no loyal address at all was better than a bogus one. The letter also illustrates
the limited nature of the local party's original objections to the Jubilee. Implicit
in the letter is a residual belief that the monarchy would uphold the principle of
fair play, and could be appealed to by the victim of injustice. That the local
party had made a rod for its own back by its attitude to the Jubilee was denied
in its journal.
213
'Whatever attitude the Labour Party locally might have taken towards the
Jubilee, the people who run the Constitutional Club and the Conservative
Association would have tried to make capital out of the event just the same."11
The party took comfort from the expressions of support which Weightman
received from over one hundred organizations nationwide, including trades
unions, trades councils and "scores" of borough and divisional Labour parties
in London and the provinces.12
If the objection of the Bermondsey mayor, council and party was directed
at wasteful expenditure on the Jubilee, the local M.P. articulated a far more
radical critique. At the time of the Jubilee, Dr Alfred Salter was a most unusual
specimen: an overtly republican Labour M.P. He had been republican from the
time he joined the S.D.F. in 1890. The row over the Jubilee gave Salter the
opportunity not only to give his support to the Mayor and the council, but to
restate his republicanism. 13 Salter identified the press and radio as significant
instruments employed to strengthec\ popukes movesohl , .es\d, bl e.'Aew-%\ , t\e.
political status quo. Despite his conviction of the incompatibility of monarchy
and socialism, and despite his clear appreciation of the monarchy's function in
helping to preserve the status quo, Salter arrived at a familiar conclusion.
"...republicanism is not a political issue at present and is not likely to
become so for a very long time. Socialists have to get on with the job of
changing the basis of the social and economic system of which the monarchy
is the apex.. .When we have done that we shall have abolished classes and we
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shall be able to turn our attention to other matters of less importance, the
question of monarchy amongst them."14
Labour-controlled councils which refused outright to participate in the
Jubilee celebrations were few in number. Much more typical were Labour
councils which did participate, no doubt with varying degrees of enthusiasm,
and subject to criticism from within the party and from affiliated organisations.
Fulham Council had agreed to spend a relatively modest five hundred pounds
on the Jubilee, but this was sufficient to produce a "Fulham Jubilee Protest
Committee", composed of individuals who described themselves as "ardent
socialists". 15 The leader of the Labour group on the council was instrumental
in allowing the Protest Committee's petition to be presented to the council, and
their protest to be considered by a sub-committee, although he personally did
not identify with the petition. The council did not change its policy. In Sheffield,
opposition to the Labour council's Jubilee plans came from a more potent
source, the Trades and Labour Council. A Transport Workers' delegate
successfully moved that "no public money be expended on the Jubilee
celebrations and that no Labour councillors should take part officially in any
celebrations". 16 The majority Labour Group on Sheffield Council responded to
the demand in a manner repeated elsewhere in similar circumstances. The
council intended, as part of the celebrations, to give its own workers a paid
holiday on 6th May; the children of poor families would receive a free meal,
and the council would be pressing for an extra payment for those in receipt of
unemployment insurance and Poor Law relief. It was on these grounds that the
Sheffield Labour group on the city council defended their decision to spend
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public money on the Jubilee celebrations. If the Trades and Labour Council
(T.L.C.) resolution were acted upon, the poorest and most deprived would lose
out. One delegate on the T.L.C. responded that they had no objection to more
money being given to the unemployed. They "were against the imperialistic
and capitalistic propaganda being carried on. They should not have anything
to do with the Jubilee celebrations". 17 Opposing the T.L.C. resolution, another
delegate argued that it ran counter to the policy of the national trade unions.
Indeed, the advice regarding the Jubilee celebrations from the T.U.C. General
Council to affiliated unions was simply to try to ensure that workers did not
lose wages if firms closed down on 6th May.18
In Derby, another Labour-controlled council debated the question of
Jubilee celebrations, and manifested a broad range of opinion and an
awareness of the political constraints within which their policy was determined.
Some Labour councillors felt that if money was to be spent at all, it should be
directed towards alleviating poverty, or should result in some permanent
memorial which might have public benefit.
"It was a fundamental part of Labour Party policy that there should be wise
spending of public money. To spend two thousand pounds on spectacular
celebration was an affront to the poor."18
Another councillor would have preferred to discuss whether they should
celebrate at all, on the grounds that the King's reign had seen the bloodiest
war in history, and that, moreover, companies would close down on Jubilee
day, and workers lose a day's pay. One councillor thought the council had
216
done their best with the means they had to meet the wishes of the community.
He felt that the "council would be condemned if it stood aloof and had no
celebrations".2°
By opposing expenditure on the celebrations, Labour councillors were
open to the charge of meanness and the label of "killjoys". In Nelson,
Lancashire, the Labour council refused to implement a proposal to issue
Jubilee medals for schoolchildren, the response to which included opponents
painting the Town Hall red, white and blue. More common were clashes
between Labour councillors and their local Trades Councils. Such was the
case in London, Sheffield, Derby and Burnley, where the local Trades Councils
passed resolutions condemning Labour councils' participation in the Jubilee. It
should be borne in mind that Communist Party delegates to Trades Councils
were likely to initiate or at least to encourage such protests. The Daily Worker
provided maximum publicity for these cases, aiming both to publicise
Communist rejection of Jubilee and monarchy, and to embarrass the Labour
Party.
What of the Labour-controlled councils who were busy organising the
local celebrations? It is difficult to generalise about degrees of enthusiasm for
the event, as public expression of feelings varied between uncritical adulation
of the monarch and the monarchy, and a grudging recognition that anything
other than participation in the Jubilee would bring the party only unpopularity.
Examples of the former are legion. At a Jubilee reception in Cardiff for the
Prince of Wales, attended by Labour mayors from all over Wales, the Lady
Mayoress of Merthyr (Keir Hardie's old seat) boasted that "our Jubilee display
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equals that of any Welsh town of its size". 21 The Labour Deputy Mayor of
Coventry made a speech worthy of the most royalist of Conservatives:
"..the Throne today stood secure without the fear of any political
earthquake. That was largely due to the virtues of the Constitution and the
character of the people and to the virtues and wisdom of the last three
occupants of the Throne."22
In contrast to such genuine and uninhibited support for the Jubilee, one can
juxtapose the reluctant but "realistic" attitude of other Labour councillors. In
response to criticism from their local Trades Council, Labour councillors in
Derby argued that "the workers want a Jubilee celebration". 23 In Birmingham,
where Labour was in opposition on the Council, there was a critical
acceptance of the Jubilee celebrations, with most objection made to the
wording of the city's Loyal Address. Whilst demanding greater simplicity and
sincerity, Labour councillors were anxious to appear no less loyal than their
Conservative opponents. Councillor Jim Simmons introduced an note
reminiscent of Cripps into his contribution.
"The original Address had had to be submitted to those who surrounded
Buckingham Palace and whom those in the Labour Party knew very well and
had cause to know for certain advice they gave in 1931."24
Despite this resentment, Simmons was not against the Jubilee celebrations as
such, recognising that opposition would be an unpopular position to adopt.
218
"In keeping with the general feeling up and down the country, some message
should be sent to him who was head of our nation, whether a King or a
President did not matter; the question of loyalty versus republicanism did not
arise."25
The local Labour newspaper made much of the enthusiasm for the Jubilee
amongst the working class, and also invoked the issue of dictatorship.
'Whether we like it or not, the people themselves have manifested in a
wonderful manner the loyalty and affection to the present occupants of the
Throne, and we cannot afford to ignore or belittle that fact.. .What we have to
realise is that hundreds of thousands of those whom we hope and expect to
vote Labour at the next General Election were among those cheering crowds
last Monday. ,,26
Long-term political education and a better understanding of mass psychology
would be required before Labour could expect such deep-rooted attachment to
the monarchy to decline.
Testimony of the enthusiastic participation of the working class in
solidly Labour areas of London mirrored the accounts from Birmingham. The
Daily Herald political correspondent, Ernest Hunter, had witnessed a "riot of
colour and jollification" as great in Labour areas as elsewhere.
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"I went with one East-end Labour candidate into a district which is nearly
100 per cent Labour. On Monday it was 100 per cent loyalist. Mr Lansbury told
me it was the same in Poplar - everywhere the working classes were en
fete... It may be that the East End had simply seized the opportunity to make
merry, but I should think that the demonstration had a deeper significance. In
one good Labour street was a banner 'Poor - but loyal'." 27
Hunter feared that "unscrupulous politicians" might exploit this mood in a post-
Jubilee general election. There is some anecdotal evidence that London was
particularly enthusiastic in its display of loyalty. On his return to Glasgow after
the Jubilee, Maxton remarked on the contrast between the restrained
celebrations there and the excesses of London. He felt that "the people of
London had been lifted off their feet by a capitalist ramp". 28
Having identified some of the divisions at local level and between the
N.E.C. and local parties, what of the public attitudes of the parliamentary party
and the national leadership? The Government proposed to make a grant of
fifty thousand pounds towards the cost of the celebrations. When the proposal
came before the House of Commons, it was opposed by the I.L.P., with
Maxton reminding the Labour Party that at the recent annual conference of the
Scottish Labour Party, a resolution calling for the abolition of the monarchy
had been passed unanimously. No Labour members supported Maxton and
Buchanan in a vote, with Lansbury and other Labour M.P.s supporting the
Government's grant. As usual, the Labour Party in Scotland appeared less
well-disposed towards the monarchy than in England. It was Middleton's fate
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to address the Scottish Annual Conference immediately after the Jubilee
celebrations, and he received a hostile reception from his audience. Having
introduced the topic of the Jubilee into his address on the theme of democracy
and dictatorship, it was in the context of the latter that he defended
constitutional monarchy, in the face of dissent from the floor. Middleton put the
best gloss upon displays of popular affection for the monarchy, suggesting that
it was really an celebration of Britain's democratic system.
"It is the nearest approach to a carnival we have ever had. There is
something distinctly different in the feeling and temper of our people with these
celebrations than ever, probably, there has been before. Quietly, men and
women are making comparisons between our own nation and the nations who
are suffering abroad, and we feel in our hearts like thanking God for a
constitutional monarchy.. .We must realise that indeed we are fortunate living
under a constitutional monarch." 29
There is evidence that Middleton's principal argument was one which had
indeed tempered hostility to the Jubilee celebrations amongst Scottish Labour.
MacNeill Weir referred to the contemporary spectacle of the "failure of
republics, the terrorism of dictatorships", which might lead a Socialist on
occasion to say "Long live the King". 3° Another factor in the monarchy's favour
was the widespread belief in the party at this time that the Prince of Wales had
progressive views. Whilst the King had been fair to Labour, the Prince seemed
sympathetic to its own concerns about unemployment and poverty. Thus Tom
Johnston cited the Prince's donation of money to the miners' relief fund as
221
"one of several occasions" on which he had "gone out of his way to show that
the man is bigger than his surroundings". 31 Even the lifelong republican Emrys
Hughes was prepared to make concessions towards a progressively inclined
monarchy.
"No Socialist. .can have anything but approval for the way the Prince of
Wales appeals to the nation to clear away the slums. If the energies of Royalty
are employed in stirring the social conscience on housing and unemployment
then the popularity of the monarchy is unlikely to be diminished in an age
which is clamouring for a greater measure of social justice."32
This eagerness to see the monarch as a potential ally to Labour was not
unprecedented. It formed part of a longstanding predisposition to see good in
the monarchy, as exemplified in Williams's citation of Clarion's hopes in 1901
concerning the "advanced views" of Edward VII. 33 Lansbury provided a clear
expression of Labour's accommodation with the monarchy, achieved in part
through a capacity for dissociating the monarchy from those manifestations of
social inequality which Labour deplored. Lansbury's personal discomfort with
the trappings of royalty was deep and genuinely felt. He had avoided state
banquets and balls (with the King's permission) because he was "not very
happy at such gatherings".34 But on this occasion, Lansbury demonstrated his
sentimental attachment to the sovereign, at the expense of any critical
appreciation of the institution of monarchy.
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"There is nothing of a party or political character about these Jubilee
celebrations.. .Those who, like myself, are theoretically republican, join heartily
and completely with the most ardent Tories in these congratulations."35
Lansbury considered the King to be tolerant, sensible, well-informed and
kindly.
"Rightly or wrongly, I like to believe that King George is just one of us, who,
because of birth, has been called to a position of great responsibility and has
done his best to make us all feel that he is the friend of all. He cannot give us
industrial peace or social justice. He cannot help the fact that on this Jubilee
Day millions are out of work, and some destitute and without friends."36
In seconding a Commons motion to send a loyal Address to the King,
Lansbury, on behalf of the Labour Party, made several illuminating points. He
admitted that years ago he would have felt differently about the matter, but he
had learned that the British Constitution worked. Moreover, he felt that the
monarchy had not just witnessed but had assisted in a gradual erosion of the
class system.
"...the manner in which the Royal Family during these troubled years have
mixed and taken part in everything concerning our lives, have done something
to break down the feeling which prevailed when I was young that the
Monarchy would preserve for ever the domination of class. We are getting
away from that..."37
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When prominent Labour politicians did voice reservations about the Jubilee, it
was directed against Conservative exploitation of the event for their political
advantage. Arthur Greenwood denounced the intention of the Government to
"trail off in a blaze of glory on the backs of the Royal Family". 38 However,
Greenwood's prescribed response was for Labour to show the electorate that
they were as patriotic as the Tories. Ponsonby adopted the same approach,
regretting that "the Government, obviously for its own glorification,
had.. .arranged such an orgy of spectacular display"I . 39 Emrys Hughes
identified the "exploitation of the patriotic sentiment and emotion for sinister
purposes" as the reason why socialists were "suspicious of the campaign of
mass hypnotism that works up hysteria at a Jubilee celebration". 4° For one
commentator the novelty of a jubilee celebration at twenty-five years was in
itself grounds for suspicion. His conclusion was that the Government would
shortly go to the country, and "would seek to go as in a special and peculiar
way the King's Government". 41
One curious aspect of Labour's anger at the Tory exploitation of the mood
of celebration was a rumour about the King's own awareness of this unfair
behaviour. In an editorial which contained suggestive echoes of the nineteenth
century radical belief in the monarch as defender of the Constitution and of
"fair play", a local Labour journal reported royal intervention in the controversy
over the date of the next general election.
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"The Tories had decided to hold the election in July, in the expectation that
they could capitalize to their own advantage the patriotic enthusiasm
generated by the Jubilee celebrations. By identifying the Monarchy with a
'National Government' and a 'National Party' they hoped to sweep on to their
side the crowds that had hung out flags and cheered the King on May 6th. But
the King himself put his foot on that dirty trick and objected to being exploited
by the Tory party. At Westminster it is openly stated that a July election was
vetoed by King George's direct intervention."42
This sentiment recalls the nineteenth-century republican, William Benbow,
proclaiming during the Queen Caroline affair that the Queen would bring down
"corrupt conspirators".43
If Arthur Greenwood wanted Labour to match the Tories in their
patriotism, the Daily Herald certainly matched the popular Tory press in its
coverage of the Jubilee. Detailed analysis of that coverage will be found
below. The Herald dealt with the events as popular pageant, with the political
aspects rarely and briefly intruding. Reports concentrated on associated trivia,
such as local preparations for Jubilee Day, decorations and flag-waving and
news of petty concessions made to workers by their employers. From April, it
carried a regular column called "Jubilee News", comprising such items as
these. Only on Jubilee Day did the newspaper reflect on the significance of
the celebrations, and then only in the blandest form. An editorial remarked on
the social improvements which had occurred during the reign, and contrasted
the "sturdiness" of the British constitution in preserving freedom with what was
happening in Europe. It concluded:
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"King and people join today in a common celebration of the free
constitution in which both play their part. That is its true significance."
It was objection to the Government's attempt to exploit the Jubilee which
formed the burden of Stafford Cripps's public statements on this occasion. The
speeches of Cripps which drew headline attention were made in the period
following the Jubilee celebrations. First came an address to the annual
conference of the Socialist League in June, 1935. He complained that the
occasion had been used to stir up nationalist teeling, and that this, along With
the start of a re-armament programme, would be exploited to delude the
working class into supporting the Government. It was a later speech, at Caxton
Hall in September, which attracted most attention from the Tory press. In truth,
his allegations were no different from those made by other leading figures in
the party.
"The new phenomenon in our national life of a 25-year Jubilee has been
sedulously surrounded by the politicians with a well cultivated ballyhoo from
which they hope, and indeed boast, that they will derive electoral benefit... It is
understandable and reasonable that the people should express their loyalty to
their nation through the medium of a titular sovereign on appropriate
occasions. Apart from that aspect of the question, there is every reason in the
tragic and depressed circumstances of the workers today why they should
accept an opportunity for the relief and escape of a national jollification."45
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The difference between Cripps and the other Labour politicians who made the
same point was in emphasis and terminology. Cripps made few of the
conventional respectful observations about the King and his reign, and
seemed to suggest that, rather than simply seeking to profit from a national
celebration, the Government had created the event for its own benefit. The
terms "ballyhoo" and "jollification" carried a critical tone, notwithstanding
Cripps's claim to accept the celebrations. He wrote an article entitled "Don't be
Duped by Jubileeism or Militarism", in which he generalised about the use
made of the "patriotic" card."
"It is a sorry thing that an occasion reputed to be for a national celebration
should be used for party advantage. But then, as we know, the Capitalists
have always used the call of loyalty to crown, country or flag as if these
emblems of national sovereignty of the people were their exclusive property."47
When the Socialist League met for its annual conference in June 1935,
the Jubilee figured prominently in the debates. At a private session, resolutions
were passed regretting the attitude of the party's N.E.C. towards the
celebrations, and congratulating those Labour councils which had refused to
participate in them. Clearly, the Jubilee had served to regenerate interest on
the Labour left in the question of monarchy, as the conference then widened
the discussion. Whilst rejecting a proposal to work for the establishment of a
Socialist Republic as speedily as possible, the conference "affirmed the view
than an hereditary monarchy and the social distinctions inseparable from it
were ultimately incompatible with the Socialist conception of society." 48 This
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was a minority view in the Labour Party, but one which maintained a foothold
in the party over the decades, and which always retained the potential to
intensify and expand, given the right sort of catalyst.
Text Analysis. 
Daily Herald
Before turning to textual analysis, a brief profile of the Daily Herald in
the 1930's helps to establish a context. This is supplemented by the data
provided in the appendix to the thesis. At this period, the Daily Herald was the
product of a commercial agreement between the T.U.C. and Odhams press,
made in 1929. The T.U.C. held just under half of the share issue, and had four
members on the newspaper's board, including Bevin as vice-chairman.
Odhams also had four board members, with J.S. Elias as chairman. Whilst the
entire commercial management of the newspaper was left to Odhams, the
deeds of the trust stipulated that the politica( policy of the newspaper shoutd
be that of the Labour Party, and the industrial policy that of the T.U.C.
However, these stipulations were not the only factors which determined the
character of the Herald. It was to be a mass-circulation newspaper, aimed
primarily at a working-class readership. Its circulation figures quadrupled in the
first months after the T.U.C.-Odhams agreement, to a figure in excess of one
million, still some way behind the Daily Mail (1,845,000), the Daily Express
(1,693,000) and the News Chronicle (1,400,000). Throughout the 1930's, it
was involved in a circulation war of unprecedented ferocity with its popular
rivals, and by 1937 had increased its circulation to two millions, still behind the
Express, but having overtaken the Mail and the Chronicle. The character of the
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newspaper altered to meet Elias's commercial imperatives. Francis Williams
was one of three editors dismissed by Elias between 1930 and 1940, and he
described the shift in character.
"To increase [circulation] the paper must, [Elias] decided, be
made brighter, less political, less serious, more entertaining —altogether more
likely to catch the eye of the roving stray buyer at the railway bookstalls...He
did not try to turn it from Labour politics. He had undertaken that it should
remain a Labour paper and he held faithfully to his word: all he wished was
that its politics could be made less noticeable."49
As far as the Herald's interest in royalty was concerned, a former
editor (1922-1926), Henry Hamilton Fyfe, offered a brutal, bitter, but well-
founded observation.
"Like the other dailies during the interval between the wars, the
Herald had to play down to the low level of intelligence which its controllers
assumed to be general among the masses.. .The new controllers agreed that
'strengthening the throne' was good for business and a popular line to take
with women. The result of this was an attitude... .which had no precedent in its
history."5°
In an earlier book, contemporary with events under analysis in Chapters Four
and Five of this work, Fyfe identified a prime motivation behind the interest of
the popular press in royalty.
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"Events in which royalty is concerned are very closely bound up
with advertising; when newspapers publish Coronation or Royal Funeral
numbers, these are chiefly filled with advertisements... More readers, more
and more — that is the aim of the popular papers... That is why the Daily Herald
'plays up' royalty."51
It is a particularly relevant observation, in view of the Herald's perpetual and
relatively unsuccessful struggle to attract advertising, the consequence of
having the lowest income readership of any national newspaper.
"In 1936, the Daily Herald obtained less than half the gross
advertising revenue per copy of the smaller circulation Daily Mail ....Despite its
increased advertising, the Daily Herald was st((( tad(ng a( a (oss kikt(\ec n
became the western world's largest circulation newspaper in 1933.52
As mentioned above, the political policy of the Daily Herald was,
according to the terms agreed between Odhams and the T.U.C., to be that of
the Labour Party. Appropriately, therefore, the first extended commentary on
the Jubilee celebrations was by the party's leader, Lansbury, on April 30th. His
article, entitled "Make this a Jubilee to Remember", begins by attempting to
establish the reasons for participating in celebrations, without, at this stage,
acknowledging any internal dissention from this position. It is initially to the
personal qualities of the King that Lansbury directs attention. The universal
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appeal of the "good man" transcends political division. The relevant section of
the text is heavy with positive, evaluative adjectives:
kindly toleration
good common sense
one of the best-informed
kindly manner
sympathetic
considerate
By emphasising the personal appeal of the King, and thereby detaching the
monarch from the monarchy, Lansbury directs attention towards the
unobjectionably familiar and human, and away from the more problematic
institutional questions. It should not be forgotten that the roles of the Crown
and monarchy had been the subject of criticism from within the party, post-
1931.
Secondly, and perhaps with this latter point in mind, Lansbury articulates
an ideology of consensus on the question of the Jubilee. There were, of
course, as mentioned elsewhere, dissident voices within his own party. The
notion of "ideology of consensus" has been summarised by Fowler:
"Consensus assumes that, for a given grouping of people, it is a matter of
fact that the interests of the whole population are undivided, held in common;
and that the whole population acknowledges this 'fact' by subscribing to a
certain set of beliefs.."53
THEM
mean-spirited partisans
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One of the linguistic processes commonly employed in representing a
consensus is that of "dichotomizing". Consensus decrees that there will be
someone outside that consensus. Participants are labelled and located in one
of two categories: "us" (the consensus) or "them" (the outsiders). Lansbury's
categorisation is revealing:
US
with thousands of others
myself and many thousands of others
we the masses
the nation
our people
He dismisses the outsiders with a negative evaluative adjective, conceding to
their position no legitimacy or validity. The consensus is represented first as
numerically overwhelming. Furthermore, the category labels selected indicate
various types of inclusiveness. The nouns "masses" and "people" are
accompanied by highly-significant pronouns, through which Lansbury claims to
speak for the working class. He does so without once employing the label
"working class". Class is an inherently divisive concept, and not an appropriate
one to deploy when representing consensus. The "nation" embraces all
classes.
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Before turning to the contents of the Heralcfs reports of the
Jubilee celebrations, attention must be drawn to authorship. Much of the
reporting was the work of one journalist, and it is three of his lengthy reports
which provide the objects of our study. The journalist concerned was Hannen
Swaffer, and there are two aspects of Swaffer which require mention. First, he
was perhaps the most famous popular journalist of his time. His name, and
indeed his face, were well-known nationally by the 1920's and 1930's, and in
the late 1990's my own parents not only recall the man, but also having read
articles by him. It is reasonable to assume that such fame would both lend
authority to his reporting and increase the attraction to read his articles.
Secondly, Swaffer declared himself a socialist, and was described by Francis
Williams as "a congenital socialist and reber. 54 Through several decades
Swaffer gave his support at public meetings to Labour candidates. 55 The first
of Swaffer's reports covered the celebrations in London and featured in the
edition of May 7th. The reporting was impressionistic and unreflective, but the
linguistic character of the reports has ideological significance. The visual
splendour of the official pageantry is lengthily described. In contrast to the
(unmentioned) drabness of the lives of its readers, the newspaper presents a
dense accumulation of lexical items from the field of rich colour:
golden - radiance - glittered - silver - shone - scarlet
Juxtaposed with these are lexical items which evaluate the character of the
proceedings:
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glorious - dignity - imposing - glory
The cumulative effect is to represent the spectator, and the reader, in all his
ordinariness, as witness to the elevated splendour of the proceedings. It is the
splendour and elevation of the official participants which are emphasised. The
spectators also exhibit positive attributes, but of a different type. They are
praised for:
order - patience - gaiety - kindliness
The orderliness of the spectators was not, it was stressed, imposed by
authority. There was "no bossing". Indeed, in spite of the gulf between the
official participants and the ordinary spectators, as indicated in the descriptive
language of the report, for this journalist the event constituted "a revelation to
me of the ever-growing democracy of which we are all a part". 56 One way in
which the text indicates a transformation in relations between governors and
governed is in its constant reference to police-public relations. This is a
celebration of the degree of social consensus, and it is more than coincidental
that the Herald should have carried this emphasis in exactly the same way as
the Times had done in 1887 at the time of Victoria's Golden Jubilee. 57
 The
police are almost unrecognisable in their affability. They appear in a variety of
guises:
1) as entertainers/comics
"They ought to strike a medal for us, after all our long hours of duty,' said
one Bobby to me chaffingly.."
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"Policemen took the 'cake' for cheerful chaff."
"Come on,' pleaded a Bobby, 'Get off that lion's tail [on Nelson's Column]. If
you don't, I'll bring the lion tamer along."
2) as objects of good-humoured fun
"..three policemen went by - one on a horse, one on a motor-cycle and one
on a ordinary bicycle - they got one of the great laughing receptions of the
day."
3) as "ordinary folk"
"A policeman's wife lost her place in the front row - she left it to see what her
husband was playing at. He had a brunette from Manchester in his arms while
his mate was hugged around the neck by a red-head from Ramsgate."
"Policemen from Elephant and Castle district, who slipped away to quench
their thirst..."
4) as kindly and flexible figures
"Let the troops march past first,' he said to the pushing people very kindly.."
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"Steady,' shouted the policemen up against the Palace rails. They wanted
only to lessen the rush in case of accidents. That was all."
"So one of the policemen on duty, after giving them [some small children]
some coppers to buy some ice cream, allowed them to crawl under the locked
gates to the other side."
Here is an ideal world in which the governed are happy to be so, where
authority is maintained with consent and by a kindly word. An over-worked
metaphor was deployed:
"London was one great family party."
If it was a family, there was, however, no suggestion here of the wrong
members being in control. To reinforce the metaphor, a broad range of
participants received mention: not only the grand and powerful, but their
servants; not just the members of prestigious clubs in Pall Mall, but the
inhabitants of "some of the poorest courtyards of London", who held their own
celebrations in Bermondsey and Islington. There were very isolated reminders
that the happy family was not entirely free of domestic problems: some
unemployed men with a concertina singing "Land of Hope and Glory"; a man
begging in the Mall. These were exceptions.
"Nowhere, on any of the stands yesterday, could you possibly have
thought that England was a stricken land."58
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The tone of patriotism and self-congratulation is restrained. Very little
national labelling is used. In a text of approximately four thousand words, such
items amount to: England (1); English (2); British (1). References to Empire
occur only twice, when mentioning Empire Premiers. Where self-
congratulation is expressed, it takes an indirect form. It is done by recording
comments of observing foreigners, or by "wondering what foreigners think
when they see us". The latter is a form of rhetorical questioning; the answer
which the reader supplies is that the foreigner is impressed. Only once in the
text is self-congratulation explicitly voiced.
"...when it comes to it, there is no country that can put up such a show as
the British people."59
A few days later, the attention switched from street pageantry to a
celebratory gathering in Westminster Hall, where the Lords and Commons
offered loyal addresses to the King, who gave a reply. The report of this event
in the Daily Herald is of particular interest because of the account of national
history which it contains. The article's sub-heading is 'Why Labour Could Take
Part". The text is an extended eulogy of the Constitution. It begins with a
review of the crisis of 1910, and dichotomises the participants.
the Tories
	 the King
Court flunkeys	 the People
King's friends
	 Democracy
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Diehard peers
Privilege
House of Lords
In so aligning himself with the people, the King had "saved the Constitution".
This Daily Herald article selects 1910 as a paradigmatic case to illustrate the
benign working of the Constitution. It contains no reference to 1931. As we
shall see later, right-wing accounts offer the latter as a paradigm. By contrast
with the divisions of 1910, the scene in 1935 was, the text insists,
characterised by unity under the Constitution. Marching in a "solid phalanx"
were political adversaries:
Diehards and Labour men
the old-fashioned ones and the Reds
those who believe in privilege and those who. .seek new freedom
What underpinned this unity? It was the Constitution, "which is our safeguard".
Dominating the discourse by its constant repetition is one lexical item:
freedom(s) (9)
free (1)
liberties (1)
"Freedom" is variously qualified: ever-growing (1); new (2); more (1). The
Crown is represented as a crucial element, through its constitutional function,
in the "ever-growing freedom of the British people." 6° The text embodies a
Whig interpretation of history, in which progress is inevitable and freedom ever
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-expanding. This treatment of royal jubilees as markers of social progress had
a history at least as far back as Victoria's Diamond Jubilee, when Liberals
presented it as a " commemoration of the advance of liberty during her
reign". 61
 Labour is a contemporary agent of this change, and its M.P.'s know
that,
"...because of the freedom which their forebears had won for them - yes,
and because of the freedom some of them won for themselves - there is
promise of more freedom. For the fight will go on until the last battle has been
won and men and women are economically free."62
The insistence of the case, achieved by the unusually heavy repetition of the
word "freedom", is explained later in the text. The reader is invited to compare
the political situation in his own country with conditions abroad.
"I thought of the friends I have in many parts of the world, now in prison or
the victims of gross injustice." 63
Most revealingly, the section of text in which "freedom" is repeatedly and
insistently used is followed immediately by a direct address to the reader on
the crux of the Jubilee question.
"You cannot resist this Jubilee, never mind what may have been in your
mind a week or two ago."64
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There are several points to make here. First, the address to the reader is
placed in immediate sequence to the insistent passage on freedom. Although
there is no lexically indicated relationship between the two, their spatial
immediacy leaves the reader to draw only one inference: that the Jubilee is
inherently related to freedom, and that to celebrate the former is to recognise
the Crown's importance for the latter. Secondly, the modality is ambiguous. In
"cannot", the reader may interpret an imperative, which would accord with the
insistence of the preceding passage, or a reference to an inability, due to the
overwhelming quality of the celebration. However, the next sentence reveals a
deeper ambiguity.
"You notice, more and more, how the King must really regard himself
as the head of a great family, that it is not merely a phrase."65
Here the pronoun "you" appears to be a conflation of three ergative agents:
the reader; the writer; people in general. The sentence is semantically curious,
as it posits a mental process (i.e. 'regard') as the grammatical object of a verb
of sensory process (i.e. 'notice). It attempts to substitute factual evidence
detected by the senses for what is, in truth, a belief held by the writer.
Personal belief is thereby transformed into general perception. Modality
introduces a further element into the ergative pattern. The King "must really
regard" is susceptible to varying interpretation. It may simply introduce a note
of certainty to what is in reality pure speculation. Alternatively, it can suggest a
process in which the monarchy is being "captured" by democracy and bending
it to its needs.
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The final Daily Herald text to be considered is an account of the Jubilee
visit to South Wales by the Prince of Wales. The tenor of the piece is
summarised in the sub-heading: "Miners and Millionaires Join in Welcome".
Two juxtapositions are threaded the length of the text. First is the physical
juxtaposition of the representatives of local capitalism and local Labour at a
lunch in Cardiffs City Hall. This proximity is repeatedly introduced:
Labour Mayors. .sat side by side with millionaire coalowners
Only 3 or 4 away from the Marquis of Bute. .sat the Socialist..
Bishops sitting beside mere nobodies..
Lord Tredegar and Lord Davies, both millionaire landowners,
were there. So were the Labour Mayors of Swansea and Llanelli.
Consensus is the theme of the text. Divisions and differences cannot be
denied, but they can be overcome if the occasion demands it and the will
exists.
"They sank all their political differences for the day in welcoming the Prince
of Wales.. .to Cardiff.. .the centre of a whole nation's tribute.. All Wales
celebrated ,,66
The second juxtaposition is between wealth and poverty. The text organises
this in a recurrent pattern:
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wealth - poverty - instance of celebration in poor area
There is no reluctance to name and even to quantify poverty in Wales:
the most distressed townships
Merthyr, which has 98 per cent unemploymemt
have suffered in the great slump
the penury
semi-starvation (2)
a stricken land
Following these indications of severe social problems, the text immediately
places evidence of the "loyalty" of the victims.
even the very poorest have taken part [in celebrations]
most flags were to be found in Labour wards
Even the choir of miners sang "God Save the Prince.."
..and they are still loyal
This loyalty to the monarchy unites the nation, despite the economic disparities
which the text acknowledges. Ultimately unresolvable in the bind established
by these juxtapositions, is why this unity of sentiment cannot be translated into
unity of political purpose. If only everyone worked together, as they cheered
together at the City Hall, problems would be overcome. Unity and consensus
is praised in the article, to the exclusion of the realities of different, and indeed
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conflicting, economic interests. The conclusion of the article indicates the
consequent confusion and frustration.
"I met all parties, yesterday, and all creeds. Why don't they help to build
the new Britain? Why do most of them merely cheer?"67
The use of the rhetorical question, exemplified above, occurs in key positions
in the text. There are three significant questions, which are left unanswered:
1)What chance could Republicanism stand against that sort of
thing? [i.e. the enthusiastic reception of the Prince]
2) Who would have thought South Wales was a stricken land? [after
having seen the pageant of industries]
3) Why don't they help to build the new Britain?
There are two possible reasons for leaving a question unanswered: the
questioner is genuinely unable to answer; or the questioner knows the answer
and is directing the reader towards it. The second type of question may be
termed "catechistic". All of these questions above are of the catechistic type.
Their function is to reinforce the consensus as projected within the text. The
reader "reads in" the answers, and thereby subscribes to a common set of
beliefs, rather than to a set of facts. In this case the set of beliefs involved are:
that republicanism is a hopeless irrelevance; that Wales is economically and
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socially stricken; that this latter condition is remediable, if only all political sides
would work together.
As mentioned earlier, one device for reinforcing the ideology of
consensus is the identification of those social groups which are outside that
consensus. This text features two such groupings: Communists and a
women's group.
"Communists had threatened trouble, but although about fifty formed a
procession with a banner, they did not attempt to go near the show."68
This group is characterised negatively through word-choice. Both the verb and
the verbal object are negative items: 'threaten' has undertones of violence;
'trouble' is vague, but undeniably negative. The actual details of the
Communist protest are omitted, but one imagines they might have related to
the social conditions to which the text refers, but without displaying much
loyalty to the monarchy. As for the women's group:
"A women's march started from the valleys, hoping to get their
grievances to the Prince's ears. But, late on Friday night, they were persuaded
to go home on motor buses."68
Less hostility is apparent in the choice of lexis here, but the transitivity pattern
of the last sentence is noteworthy. The choice of the verb "persuade" entails
the consent of the women. Use of the passive voice enables the agent to be
omitted, so we do not know the identity of the persuaders, or the
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circumstances of the decision to return. These items are replaced by details of
time and transportation. Instead, the reader can infer the role of the police in
these incidents from the succeeding sentence:
"James A. Wilson, the Chief Constable of Cardiff, is in all these difficulties,
a genius.""
No direct connection is made with the protest marches. The police are not
identified in any action, repressive or otherwise. The Heralds reporting of the
women's group may be contrasted with that in Reynolds Illustrated News,
presented in the next section.
Reynolds Illustrated News
This was a Sunday newspaper which had a long and distinguished
radical past. Ownership and policy had recently changed, and it was now
published by the Co-operative Society, and reflected, in its political and
industrial coverage, the values and policies of the Co-operative movement. It
had been bought by the National Co-operative Publishing Society in 1929.
Political and Economic Planning (P.E.P.) estimated its circulation in 1930 to be
420,000, and by 1937 to have risen to half a million. As for the composition of
its readership, P.E.P. observed that,
"Reynolds is read to a large extent by members of the co-operative
societies and may therefore be said to be indirectly owned by its readers." 71
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It did not have the massive sales amongst the working class enjoyed by the
Herald. P.E.P. noted that "easily the most favoured newspapers on Sunday"
among the working class were The People and the News of the World. Mass
Observation found in 1948 that the readership of Reynolds was two-thirds
Labour and one in ten Communist in their political sympathies, but that whilst
nearly every second Labour supporter read the News of the World, only one in
every twelve or thirteen chose Reynolds.72
The declared editorial policy in operation during the 1930's was
contrasted by a post-war commentator with the more commercial
contemporary policy.
"In the earlier days of Co-operative ownership, the Co-operative Press
found that when it produced a newspaper which was not only advanced and
progressive in its politics and on economic matters, but sought to cover all
other aspects of life with equal seriousness, it was not possible to raise the
circulation much beyond half a million."73
Despite the post-war shift towards a less serious approach, "the paper must
continue to emphasise the advantages of public as against private enterprise,
and social as well as individual responsibility". 74 Certainly the news coverage
analysed in the following section bears testimony to the policy described. It
exhibits an economistic concern, a pervading awareness of and hostility
towards the social consequences of capitalism, and an overall tone of
seriousness which makes no concession to the popular appeal of royal
celebrations.
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Analysis.
Reynolds Illustrated News began its Jubilee coverage with a series of
articles concerning types of economic exploitation associated with the
celebrations. These articles were highly critical of "malpractices", but avoided
implicating the monarchy directly in those criticisms. Rather, the Jubilee
celebrations provided a high-profile opportunity for the newspaper to continue
a campaign against the excesses of capitalism. Its interest focused upon
economic and employment issues, with political and constitutional matters all
but ignored.
Two articles recorded the investigation of the practice of charging for
viewing-points along the route of the royal procession from Buckingham
Palace to St Paul's Cathedra1. 75 Those window-owners extracting large
amounts of money are contrasted with offices which reserved places for their
own staff, or owners who were donating the proceeds to charity. It is
essentially a moral case, and includes reference to the King, if only through a
hypothetical aside.
"And supposing that the King himself felt that the private owners of
windows ought to hand over the proceeds to charity, and that, failing a
generous response, he decided to change the route at the last moment?"76
This sentence, with its interrogative mood, can be seen as fulfilling two
purposes. First, by implication it associates the King's name with a proposal
from the writer, adding legitimacy and weight to the criticism. Secondly, it
attributes to the King, in an indirect manner, the same moral position as that
247
occupied by the newspaper, and by extension, its readership. The message
echoes the aforementioned radical belief that the monarch is somehow an ally
of their cause, and opposes the forces of corruption, unfairness and
exploitation.
In reporting the processions to celebrate the Jubilee, Reynolds gave
unusual prominence to several minor episodes featuring dissenting voices. In
an article on provincial celebrations, half of the space was given over to four
incidents. However, each incident was shown to have been "resolved": in two
cases by criminal conviction; in one case by the humorous response of the
King; in the other by a possible reversal of the negative situation. The problem-
resolution pattern is ultimately reassuring, so the effect of including these
incidents is simply to dramatise an otherwise repetitive account of celebration.
Nevertheless, Reynolds was more informative than the Daily Herald on the
Cardiff women's march. It may be recalled that the Herald had indicated that
the incident was concluded when the women "were persuaded to go home".
Reynolds also uses the passive construction, but employs a very different
verb, and identifies the agent.
"..an 'army' of women marchers.... had been intercepted by the police at
Pontypridd."77
The point illustrates how the Herald's account sought to convey an
unblemished consensus. But neither was Reynolds inclined to detail the
women's grievances or to question the circumstances of the "interception".
Like the other incidents featured, the account closes with details of resulting
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criminal charges. Local newspapers, which might have been expected to
provide more detailed coverage of the incident, curiously fail to do so.
Generally Conservative inclined, and exceedingly patriotic on such occasions,
such local examples of dissent were perhaps ignored as shameful and as blots
upon the loyal response. The Western Mail did record the sentencing of two
unemployed men from Rhondda who had planned to demonstrate in Cardiff
against the Jubilee expenditure, but who had been halted in Pontypridd and
then charged with assaulting the police. 78
Daily Express. 
The Daily Express had been owned by Lord Beaverbrook since the
Great War, and at the time of the Jubilee had been under the editorial direction
of Arthur Christiansen for two years. The 1930's were a decade of rapid
circulation growth, as it overtook the Daily Mail and eventually established a
lead over the Herald, with a circulation approaching two and a half million
copies. According to Mass Observation's 1948 survey, its readership was
distributed fairly evenly amongst every income and age group. 78 About half of
its readers were Conservatives, and a quarter Labour. As the 1930's wore on,
its domination of the lower middle-class market grew, with the Mail in relative
and absolute decline. The complexity and diversity concealed by the term
"middle class" as applied to the 1920's and 1930's has been well analysed.8°
Those elements of the middle class to and for whom the Express and Mail
sought to speak were increasingly distinct, and were responding to different
representations of the domestic and foreign worlds.
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"The Mails rivals were better attuned to middle-class experience in the
1930's. The emphasis of the Daily Express on escape, enjoyment and
consumption became far more attractive than the staid approach of the Mail."81
The analysis which follows, of the Daily Express , and then the Daily Mail,
offers evidence which supports this assertion.
The analysis of the Express 's treatment of the Jubilee differs from the
previous analyses in that the texts examined are principally editorial comment
rather than reports. This is because the Express devoted more editorial space
to reflection on the Jubilee and associated topics than the Herald or Reynolds,
and because of the intrinsic value of editorials to a study such as this.
Editorials are where the newspaper's projection of reality or common sense is
made; where the newspaper's ideology is clarified and re-established. One
might anticipate that a national event, engaging the attention and the physical
participation of vast numbers of the population, would be the site of an
ideological struggle to establish meanings which reinforced existing
representations of the world.
Analysis. 
The first text to be examined is an editorial of May 4th, headed simply
"Opinion". If the main heading is uninteresting, the paragraph headings are
not. As they are presented, vertically, these are:
In the Palace
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In the Office
In the Shop
On the Farm
In the Home
The hierarchical organization is no accident, and serves to symbolize a view of
society in which inequality is openly acknowledged, but in which the powerful
and wealthy have responsibilities to those below them. Each paragraph
contains social labels which identify these distinctions:
1) master/employers	 people/typists/clerks
2) capitalists/investors
	
workers
3) master	 man
4) big man	 little man
Each paragraph then proceeds to advocate a restoration of the wage-cuts
imposed during the worst of the Depression. The Jubilee should be the
occasion for raising the living standards of the "little man". These
improvements are to be, or should be, granted willingly by those above, rather
than achieved by struggle from below. The text's imperatives are directed at
the powerful:
Come now, employers, do the big, generous thing.
Restore the cuts.
Fill the cup in the cottage.
Lift up the hearts of the agricultural workers...
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An hierarchical, paternalistic society depends, if consensus and stability are to
survive, upon the dutiful exercise of their responsibilities by those in positions
of power. The Express uses the occasion to make an explicit statement of its
values.
"The Daily Express is the newspaper of the 'little man'.. .The Daily
Express stands for individualism and humanitarianism, for equality of
opportunity coupled with the reward for high attainment, for liberty of action
that does not encroach upon the rights of others, and for faith in the destiny of
the British race."82
The "little man" invoked here is an individual located in a hierarchy, who knows
his place and who respects those above him who fulfil their responsibilities.
The King, of course, is at the summit of that structure. A cartoon by Strube,
two days later, encapsulates this representation of society. Strube's small,
middle-aged clerk has mounted a plinth and is shaking hands with the King, a
much taller, imposing figure in crown and robes. The little clerk raises his
bowler hat as the King bends to shake his hand, smiling paternally. The
caption is, "Congratulations, Sir".
Turning to the editorial published on the day of the main Jubilee
celebration, an intertextual approach suggests another powerful element in the
Express's ideology. The service of thanksgiving in St Paul's Cathedral
provides the newspaper with an opportunity to invoke the religious dimension
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of monarchy. Much of the language of the text resembles that of the King
James version of the Bible:
With panoply of power, he passes...
..the races who dwell under the King's hand
Once Death spread his dark wings over the King's home
Sorrows have come upon us, but in no measure like
that which has fallen upon other peoples of the earth
Put such vain thoughts far away
...with an humble and contrite heart..
The King and his Jubilee are linguistically embedded in a biblical context. It is
an antique vision of monarchy, and one which asserts the spiritual dimension
over the constitutional or social. The text concludes with an explicit reference
to divine order, and a revealing connection between God, King and Empire.
"Today we see the power of a spiritual force in the affairs of men. Behold
a Monarchy, pruned of its ancient prerogatives, yet increasing daily in its
mystic influence, a symbol of the unity and might of a vast Empire.
In the cathedral, on the pavement where you stand, make this high
resolve this day of Grace, that under God we will establish here the reign of
Peace and Justice under this just King."83
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The report of the Jubilee Day service at St Paul's Cathedral represents
the spectacle as a piece of drama, in which the actors are the famous and
powerful. The dramatic present tense is employed throughout the text to
deliver the narrative. It is carefully structured, opening with a empty stage, onto
which come the players, to whom we are introduced in turn:
Here is a famous judge..
Here is a dowager..
There is a debutante...
Here comes an Arabian..
Suddenly we see the King and Queen..
The writer is a member of the congregation, or of that part of the congregation
whose role is, like the chorus in classical drama, to witness the events and
actions of great men.
The wealthy and powerful are distinguished not only by their power to
act, but physically by the splendour of their appearance. The text is dense with
adjectives and nouns which introduce expensive and exotic aspects of
appearance, remote from the life of the "little man":
in full evening dress
in the proud creations of Bond Street
scarlet-coated officer
flowing veils
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beautifully gowned
diamond bracelets and necklaces
orange-tinted plumes
silver, green, red, blue, royal purple, cloth of gold
in mauve and green
red, trimmed with gold
in resplendent robes
The cumulative effect of this form of reporting is to reinforce those distinctions
upon which is based the belief that hierarchy is the natural order of things. The
"we" of the text, that part of the congregation who sit, stand and watch, were,
in reality, composed of extraordinary individuals, for the "little man" was
waiting on the pavement outside. "We" are never identified in the text. One of
the achievements of the text is to incorporate the reader into that collective
"we", by withholding identification which might betray the social remoteness of
the members of the congregation from the reader; and by a narrative
technique in which the reader's perspective emanates from a rear pew.
Another point of interest is the representation of ordinary people and
their relationship to the event. Most newspapers carried reports of celebrations
in the East End of London and in provincial locations, which featured
communal festivities organized locally. Street parties in poor areas were
commonplace. The Express made its visit to south London, but its focus was
upon the experience of individuals, to the neglect of these communal
phenomena. Individual subjects are represented as being in a personal
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relation with the monarchy. Two headlines on the same page indicate this
relationship, pointed up by the singularity of the possessive pronouns:
A Labourer to Meet His King and Queen
And Mr Tricker the Grocer ran to cheer his King
The report from Battersea deals with five local individuals. In each case, that
named individual is described in mundane situations such as drinking tea,
baking a cake, dress-making, when he or she is astonished to find the King is
passing by. For all the vastness of the crowds who witnessed or participated in
the Jubilee events, for the Express the crucial connection is between the
individual subject and the monarch.
but this - for perhaps a hundred thousand Britons - was a moment apart.
Just the King and themselves. Each one of them - each one of us."84
Each subject looked up to his monarch, like the clerk in Strube's cartoon, and
the formal trappings of patriotism were almost superfluous, for the bond
between them went much deeper. When the King entered the City of London,
the people waiting sang "spontaneously".
"The National Anthem did not occur to them. They had no thought even
of 'Rule Britannia'. Their words were the intimate recognition of the King's
achievement. 'He's a jolly good fellow."85
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Daily Mail. 
At the end of the 1920's, the Daily Mail remained the popular
newspaper with the largest circulation, built up under the ownership of
Northcliffe. However, Northcliffe had died in 1922, and was succeeded by his
younger and inferior brother, Rothermere. Before his death, Northcliffe had
foreseen the rise of Beaverbrook's Express. By 1930:
"In the race for circulation the Daily Mail still had the lead but the Daily
Express was hard on its heels, constantly narrowing the gap by superb
popular journalism of a more sophisticated flavour than was to be found in the
Mail and one more suited to the brittle gaieties and fight-hearted
extravagances of an age in which publicity had become the social king. 036
The 1930's were to witness the relentless growth of the Express, and by 1937,
the Mail's circulation figures had declined absolutely and relatively, having
been passed by both the Express and the Daily Herald. In 1937, the Mail was
selling 1,580,000 copies to the Express's 2,329,000. Rothermere was much
less interested in journalism than in money, and his monstrous vanity led him
to use the newspaper to advocate ill-judged and extreme personal political
opinions.
As far as the composition of its readership is concerned, the 1930's saw
a narrowing and marginalising of the Mail's appeal among the middle class.
The newspaper had, at its peak in the 1920's, addressed in particular the
private sector, the clerical lower middle class, advocating the case for a politics
which protected the interests of that class, and for a 'national unity' which
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recognised the threat from organised labour. For the Mail, the nation was the
middle class. However, by the mid-1930's, its appeal and rhetoric had been
overtaken by events and by the Daily Express, which gave a more relevant
and recognisable voice to contemporary middle class concerns. The Mails
lead among the lower middle class was confined to the provinces, and even
among the established middle class to the north and northwest.
"..so far from expressing the political outlook of the lower middle class
as a whole, the Mails continuing claim to leadership was confined to its
success among elderly, provincial, established middle-class women. .The
paper had lost its plausibility, retaining the rhetoric of 1920 in the quite
changed circumstances of 1934...advocating a hard, violent politics just as the
National Government began to set itself up as the guarantor of democracy
threatened by alien fascism." 87
The 1948 Mass Observation survey found that the Mail was favoured more
than the other popular papers by the higher income groups, older people and
older women. Just over half of its readers were Conservatives, and a quarter
Labour. In comparison with the other popular papers (Herald, Express and
Chronicle), its readers were uninterested in reading politics or "serious" news.
Analysis. 
This analysis will focus upon several editorials and an article written by
Rothermere himself. It is of particular interest to compare the approach of the
Mail with that of the Express, for both were mass-circulation vehicles of
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conservative opinion. The similarities and distinctions between the two have
been summarised by Curran in these terms:
"The central core of the conservatism expressed by papers under the
barons' control was a deep and emotional attachment to Britain and her
Empire. This intense patriotism sometimes shaded off into open racism, and,
particularly in the case of the papers controlled by Rothermere, aggressive
anti-semitism." 88
It will be recalled that the patriotism of the Express consisted, at its heart, of a
sentimental personal attachment of the subject (the "little man") to his King,
with little significance attached to race. The prominent article by Rothermere
on Jubilee Day offers a radically different representation.
Rothermere's article is entitled "A Great Nation Salutes its King". That it
is the nation which is in thematic position, and which carries the epithet
"great", is entirely appropriate to the text. A simple word-count of certain key
entities produces an illuminating set of figures:
ENTITY No. OF CITATIONS
King/Sovereign 2
England/English 16
Britain/British 14
English/our race 6
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Clearly, the text is concerned not with monarchy but with nationalism,
underpinned by racial consciousness. Examining the elements placed in
thematic position in the article's paragraphs reveal the overwhelming interest
of the text.
This Britain that rejoices..
At home, Britain may claim to be..
She is above all the land of ordered liberty..
The creation of the greatest Empire..
When our race is denounced..
To the English character..
The pioneering spirit...
This list is not exhaustive. Rothermere's constant switching between the
national labels Britain/British and England/English indicates a problematic
area. At the heart of his dilemma is the need simultaneously to invoke the
historical myths and literary associations inherent in "England", whilst laying
claim to the wider territorial implications of Britain, most notably its overseas
empire. Rothermere acknowledges, but does not resolve, his difficulty.
"..to remind the world of what Britain - or England - for so great a mind
as Thomas Hardy's condemned as 'vague, unhistorical and pinchbeck' the title
of 'Britain'- has accomplished. •,,89
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The term "race" is employed as an inclusive label, with the possessive
pronoun "our" as determiner in the majority of instances. It occurs only once
with a national label, as "the English race". Apart from the national labels, with
their inherent difficulties in expressing uncomplicated nationalism, the text
employs personification of the nation in its dense use of personal and
possessive pronouns:
she	 4
her(s)	 7
herself	 1
Thus, the reader is appealed to as a member of a nation and a race, and the
climax of the article takes the form of an appeal on these grounds.
"..to arouse ourselves and take firm and decisive measures for the
safety of this land and the future of its race and of the Empire."9°
As a final, but interesting aside upon Rothermere's nationalism, the text
becomes lyrical when locating Englishness in a geographical setting. The
description of that setting betrays the essential identity from which Rothermere
extrapolates.
"The English race finds its proper setting in the English
countryside... .when the moan of doves is heard from immemorial elms.. .when
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the woods are flooded with bluebells, when hawthorn blossoms whiten the
lanes and the orchards glow pink against the vivid green."91
Not only is the national identity expressed through a rural idyll, but that rurality
is quintessentially English, and southern English to be even more precise.
The Mail editorial of 7th May reiterated the subordination of all other
aspects of the Jubilee to that of Empire. Entitled "A Day of Empire", the
editorial contains the following lexical balance:
Empire/Dominions 9
Britain 1
Sovereign/King 5
Two-thirds of the editorial are devoted to the role of the King in consolidating
the Empire. The Jubilee celebrations are praised for their "clockwork
efficiency, splendour and public enthusiasm" and are described as
"unsurpassed as a demonstration of personal affection for the Sovereign".
However, the text returns to the theme of "loyalty" with which it began, but
integrating it into the powerful sub-text of Empire. It concludes:
"Ours is an Empire the foundations of which are laid in loyalty and
Justice."92
The possessive pronoun is used to modify three interlocking concepts:
our history - our King - ours is an Empire
262
Of these three, it is the latter which receives the most extensive commentary.
The constitutional role of George V attracts little attention, and this is in
revealing contrast to the Daily Heralds treatment. It will be recalled that the
Herald identified the King with the cause of democratic advance, particularly
focusing upon 1910. The Herald was tactfully silent on the constitutional crisis
of 1931. In the Mail, 1931 was the only incident recalled:
"He has faced situations more dangerous and delicate than any British
Sovereign has confronted in modern times. None can forget the decisive part
which he played in 1931 when, in the strictest accord with constitutional
principles, by his initiative he rescued this country from bankruptcy and
collapse."93
Nowhere in its review of the King's reign does the Mail recall 1910. Although
the Maifs selection of 1931 is in itself revealing, the connection between
monarchy, patriotism and conservatism is quite overtly made in a slightly
earlier editorial. Suggesting that a general election be held in the following
October, the Mail sees the conditions as "favourable".
"The Jubilee celebrations will create an atmosphere favourable to the
Government, because they must strengthen the fires of patriotism which burn
in all British hearts."94
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A recurrent theme in the Mails treatment of the Jubilee celebrations is loyalty
to the Throne. There is far less attention to the individual citizen's relationship
to the monarch than is found in the Express, with its characteristic invocation
of the "little man". It is, instead, a collective spirit that is invoked, and the nouns
which categorise it are recurrent:
immense multitudes gathered to demonstrate their passionate faith
the multitudes..., have assembled to express their loyalty..
the nation's faith in it [the monarchy]...
the nation... .in loyalty of heart..
this Britain that rejoices with such loyalty and devotion..
an Empire the foundations of which are laid in loyalty..
enormous crowds whose fervent loyalty...
The Mail represents the Jubilee celebrations as evidence of a monolithic
loyalty to King, country and Empire which suggests, in an obsessive concern
with the latter, a sub-text of anxiety about its future, with the Indian nationalist
movement ever stronger, and the implications of the 1931 Statute of
Westminster still fresh in the mind.
Town Crier. 
In contrast with the other newspapers analysed in this chapter, the Town
Crier was local and provincial. Furthermore, it was aimed primarily at
members of local Labour organizations, rather than at a mass, non-party
readership. Despite these considerable contextual differences, the same
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fundamental ideological processes are operating, as the events surrounding
the Jubilee are interpreted and represented. The Labour Party in Birmingham,
as elsewhere, contained a variety of attitudes towards the Jubilee, and was
keenly aware of the opinions and beliefs held by its habitual and its potential
supporters. With incontrovertible evidence of widespread popular affection for
the King, and with associated displays of patriotic feeling, the Town Crier
reflected some of the agonising and rationalising which went on in Labour
circles. It provides a useful local insight into Labour's engagement with the
issues raised by popular monarchy.
The Town Crier had started in 1919, founded and edited by W.J. (Will)
Chamberlain, who had previously been a journalist with the Western Times
and then the Daily Citizen. He was a Quaker and a socialist, having joined the
I.L.P. in 1904, and then the Birmingham Labour Party during the Great War. In
his first editorial, Chamberlain stated the aims of the new paper. It would keep
the Birmingham people in touch with Labour and the local party in touch with
itself. According to the newspaper's historian, the intended readership was
limited.
"..essentially it did not aim to appeal to a wider public than the committed
Labour Party member or trade unionist." 95
Circulation was small, estimated in the 1930's at around two thousand copies.
At the time of the Silver Jubilee and the Coronation, Chamberlain was no
longer editor, but continued to write a weekly column under the name
"Watchman". Some of his contributions are analysed below. The editor and
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owner of the newspaper in the mid-1930's was Harold King, an old friend and
colleague of Chamberlain.
Analysis. 
The main day of celebration for the Jubilee was May 6th. Its proximity to
Labour's May Day celebration generated some revealing commentary,
exposing tensions which were never satisfactorily resolved. If these tensions
were to be summarised, their locus would be in the term "popular". In its more
modern meaning, this can refer to the massive evidence of affection for the
King across all social classes, testified to by contemporary reports of
celebrations and street decorations in poor parts of cities, traditional Labour
strongholds. It was a phenomenon which Labour, whatever its reservations,
could not ignore. There is evidence of this difficulty in a Town Crier editorial
which uncomfortably juxtaposes the May Day and Jubilee celebrations.
"Labour's May Day demonstration takes place, very appropriately on the
eve of the 'Jubilee' celebrations, and it is a happy coincidence that the national
celebration should be inaugurated by the workers' own celebration which,
though not associated in any degree with the royal anniversary as such [my
emphasis], marks a period of progress, dating back far earlier than the
accession of King George to the throne, during which the struggle for
emancipation and freedom has been slowly but surely progressing towards
that great Commonwealth of the People which has drawn measurably nearer
in the twenty-five years of the reign of our present monarch."96
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How does the text characterise the relationship bewteen the two celebrations?
The temporal proximity is ostensibly regarded positively, as expressed through
"very appropriately" and "a happy coincidence". However, the nature of the
appropriateness and the source of the happiness are not disclosed. In the light
of what follows, the positive but undefined evaluation appears to be an attempt
to represent a difficult conjunction as being uncomplicated; it is a preface
which seeks to pre-empt the inherent complication. Finally, moves towards
popular government have occurred during the King's reign, suggesting that the
the monarchy can, at least, exist in conjunction with democratic advance, but
the term "Commonwealth" has unmistakeable associations with Cromwell and
the English Republic. The text then proceeds to engage with the term "jubilee",
and to appropriate it for Labour's own celebration and implicitly to question the
genuineness of the other.
"Let us make this year's Labour Day a jubilee in the real sense of the
word - 'a season of great public joy'- joy in the realisation of some of our
dreams, but greater joy in the anticipation of the fuller and more complete
triumph which is ahead."97
The implication is that the employment of the term "jubilee" for the royal
celebration is inaccurate and ignores its "real" meaning. There is a hint of false
consciousness. A Whiggish view of history, the representation of historical
change as the gradual but ineluctable victory of democracy and freedom,
remarked upon earlier in the Herald's treatment of the Jubilee, clearly
underpins this text.
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Dealing with the issues and dilemmas raised by the Jubilee, a regular
contributor posed the question "Who are the True Patriots?" Despite offering a
redefinition of patriotism, there was no question of withholding respect for the
monarch. The writer declares the "highest regard for the King", but condemns
the abuse of patriotic feeling to manipulate public opinion. The text exhibits the
feature termed 'overlexicalisation'. This is a linguistic phenomenon which
involves the application of many terms to one ideational entity, and tends to
indicate an area of intense preoccupation in the experience and values of the
group which generates it. The text in question displays this feature in the form
of negative epithets applied to those deemed to be abusers of patriotism:
crawling
lickspittle
grovelling
mealy-mouthed
obsequious
entozoic
sycophantic
hypocritical
The concern apparent here is taken up again in a later editorial. Definitions of
patriotism comprise the point at issue; and the appropriation of national
symbols, including the monarch, by political opponents, is under attack. In this
matter, reference back to the Daily Mails representation of the Jubilee is
particularly relevant, as is its blatant call for the patriotic sentiments aroused by
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the Jubilee to be exploited by the National Government. The backdrop to this
discussion was the "thousands of our Labour comrades who took an active
part in the Jubilee celebrations all over the country".98 The event itself is
characterised as "a personal tribute to a wise and tactful, if only nominal, head
of the nation", utterly unlike the Daily Mairs attempt to represent it as a
celebration of race, nation and empire. Labour's opponents must be made to
realise that,
"...we of the Socialist Movement were every whit as good patriots as those
who have hitherto claimed that privilege as their own exclusive virtue."99
Nationalism and patriotism should not be confused, as the former embraced
unacceptable situations and practices, employing the national flag as "a
symbol of domination or conquest", a clear reference to colonial policy.
Although the flag is not rejected,
"..it is high time that the old flag had a thorough spring cleaning so that it
could once again become a symbol of the whole British brotherhood instead of
the monopoly of the privileged and self-styled patriotic minority.",loo
The same edition carried an article by Jim Simmons, Birmingham city
councillor and subsequently an M.P., which addressed the same problem.
Acknowledging that royalty had "a hold on our people", and that patriotism was
a powerful sentiment, Simmons' prescription was an eccentric mix:
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'With regard to the flag - if the Tories insist on the Union Jack as their
party ensign there is always the red ensign for us if we really want it. If the
masses respond to the appeal of Patriotism let us give 'em not the tawdry
tinsel trappings of Imperialism, but real patriotism that inspires them to
demand that this should be THEIR country in reality... .in my opinion Britain for
the British would 'get' the people and clear away much of the prejudice against
Socialism.° °1
Before the Jubilee, Simmons had condemned such celebrations as "a drug to
deaden the pain of a cancer", and warned against the Jubilee becoming a
"frenzy of sham patriotism expressed in flag-wagging and beer-swilling".102
The newspaper's former editor, writing under the pseudonym "Watchman" and
as a "theoretical Republican", sought to explain the Jubilee events in terms of
mass psychology. In themselves, mass demonstrations were neither good nor
bad, only inevitable. It was the occasion which produces them that determined
whether they were good or bad. So far as the Jubilee was concerned, it was
harmless. This assertion was justified on several grounds: the loyalty being
expressed was to a "democratic monarchic system"; there was no reason to
believe that a Socialist system and a monarchic system were incompatible;
better the British people cheer King George than a British Hitler or Mussolini.
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The Death of Georqe V. 
Six months after the euphoria of the Silver Jubilee came the death of the
King. Naturally enough, comments upon the deceased tended towards
uncritical tribute and appreciation, marked by a generosity of tone and spirit.
Nonetheless, the public reaction of Labour to the death, and their reflections
on the man and the institution of monarchy, give some indication of how the
monarchy was viewed at this juncture. There was universal praise for the
qualities of George V, as a constitutional monarch and as a man. The Daily
Herald, continuing its customary adulation of sovereign and constitutional
monarchy, paid tribute to the personal qualities: a lack of vanity; an ability to
adapt to and identify with change; industry and devotion to duty. More
importantly, "he realised better than any of his predecessors the true function
of monarchy in a democratic nation and a democratic age". 103 In a lengthy
review of his reign, the Herald included sections on the late King's riding
accident in 1915 and on his stamp collection. The Labour magazine described
him as "a kindly and conscientious man", 104 while Attlee identified his
"selflessness, devotion to duty, kindliness and humanity". 105 His qualities
impressed even those who were not sympathetic to the monarchy itself. The
secretary of the Birmingham Labour Party felt that:
'Whatever our opinions upon the principles of monarchy as such, and
some of us hold very strong views on the subject, we can, at least, pay our
tribute to the man who, having been thrust into a position of great
responsibility, which he did not seek, did all that was humanly possible to carry
ciosout his onerous tasks with honesty and sincerity.'
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The New Statesman called him "an honest gentleman, a wise sovereign and a
devoted servant".1137
Apart from the personal qualities of the late King, what united Labour
commentators was a belief that the monarchy had been strengthened by his
reign, and that it had never been stronger. An editorial in Labour welcomed
this development, claiming that "constitutional kingship and parliamentary
government mutually strengthen each other", and that republics fell all too
easily to the prey of dictatorship. 108 Greece was offered as an example of a
restored monarchy paving the way for the re-establishment of a parliamentary
system. There was no regret about the decline of republicanism in Britain.
"...he [George V] had left the throne not only more firmly established than
when he succeeded his father, but more strongly supported by the people's
will than at any time in our history. Many of us can recall powerful republican
movements in this country. But republicanism died during the late King's reign.
It was killed not by any organised supression, nor by legislation, but simply by
the King's personality and popularity based on his devotion to duty." 109
Pethick-Lawrence attributed to George Vs strictly constitutional conduct and
his punctilious dealings with the Labour Party his conclusion that "there was in
1936 little trace left of support for republicanism as a form a Government, and
still less of any antipathy to the persons of the Royal House". 11 ° Another
Labour journalist felt that George V had "made Britain safe for a Democratic
Monarchy". 111 Underlying the praise both for a constitutional monarch and for
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the Constitution itself, lay an uneasy awareness of how bad things were in
other parts of Europe. Attlee, in his parliamentary tribute to the late King,
mentioned how "great changes effected elsewhere by violence are brought
about peaceably owing to its [the Constitution's] adaptability". 112 Labour
asserted that "constitutional kingship and the institutions of free citizenship
depend one upon the other". 113 Labour's only note of reservation about
George V recalled the events of 1931, when he had strained his constitutional
powers. However, this had been because "he was led astray by advisers who
were unworthy of the trust he reposed in them". 114 Reference to 1931 also
appeared in Reynolds News, which recorded that,
"Some have not scrupled to say that the whole business was a 'palace
revolution' with the King himself as prime mover. It would probably be fairer to
say that Mr. Ramsay MacDonald succeeded in misleading the King, as well as
himself, as to the number of his followers who rated his beaux yeux higher
than the principles on which they had been elected."115
This journal drew the conclusion, which echoed those of other non-
Conservative newspapers, that George had "typified the average upper-class
Englishman at his best, who made the British monarchy a democratic
institution and Republicanism an academic issue". 116 As for the carefully
cultivated image of a genuine family on the throne, and its extension to the
'family' of the nation:
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"Now this seems to me to get very near to the central evil of royalty. It
creates a spurious sense of community. We Socialists are conscious of the
oppression done within this so-called family and especially the crowning
oppression of those who toil by those who own - that the very name of family
seems to us misleading."117
It was a necessary corrective, and a reminder that there was some residual
republicanism within the Labour Party. By the end of the reign of George V, its
voice was very rarely heard.
The Coronation of George VI. 
The cumulative effect of the passing of George V and the Abdication of
Edward VIII was to embolden the Labour leadership's public attitude towards
the monarchy. The old King's popularity towards the end of his reign had
deterred the Party leadership from even the mildest criticism of the character
of the monarchy. Merely to have called for reform of the antiquated and
elaborate court ceremonial would have implied criticism of George V himself,
as his love of, and insistence upon, ceremony was public knowledge. With the
disappearance of George V, and in the aftermath of the Abdication, the Party
leadership clearly felt that calls for reform of the monarchy could be safely
made. However, on the subject of the Coronation of George VI, the clash of
opinion, the ideological tension, within the Labour Party, which had been
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apparent over the Silver Jubilee, resurfaced. The change in the party
leadership's public position will be examined first.
Evidence of a shift in attitude on the part of the leadership can be
found in its bolder approach to questions raised about the Civil List. The Civil
List came up for discussion in Parliament in May 1937, when Labour M.P.'s on
both front and back benches called for a change in the character of the
monarchy. The arguments assembled in support of the case were variations
upon a theme of greater simplicity. Attlee and Greenwood were the principal
front-bench spokesmen. Greenwood argued that Labour's objections to
traditional displays of splendour and pageantry were not made on the grounds
of financial expenditure. Ceremonial and ritual placed barriers between the
King and the people, and this was "of no service to the democratic interests of
our people". 118 He was at pains to distance the Party from any suggestion of
republicanism, which he labelled a middle-class creed. Greenwood's, and the
official Party's, position was to demand a democratic monarchy, shorn of its
aristocratic features and reflecting a society in which social differences had
been partially eroded. Far from weakening the monarchy, greater simplicity,
and an end to the mystery which enveloped it, would help to strengthen the
institution. Attlee provided a slightly different emphasis, in identifying as a
problem for Labour the social character of the Court, with its unhealthy
influence on the monarch. The status quo consisted of a royal establishment
cut off from the masses of the people. This was a threat to the proper exercise
of the Crown's constitutional role. Attlee raised the experience of the second
Labour government.
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"...there was a steady propaganda directed to influence the mind of King
George on the question of the unemployed.. .which suggested that the country
was being ruined by masses of people getting unemployment benefit when
they did not deserve it or did not need it.. .When a Monarchy is maintained with
very great pomp and ceremony there is a tendency for a King to be
surrounded by people who have one particular background."119
Attlee wanted an enquiry into what provision should be made for the King in a
society which, he believed, was moving towards equality and classlessness.
Labour back-benchers focused upon the social distance between the Labour
Party and the monarchy, and the consequent political handicap to the Party.
With Court circles drawn from one social class, the monarch's understanding
of Labour's case, and of the feelings of ordinary people, was inevitably
impaired.
The Labour leadership felt that their views reflected a growing tide of
public opinion. In the wider Labour movement, this feeling was shared. When
the Civil List Select Committee rejected Attlee's call for greater simplicity, even
the Daily Herald, a staunchly monarchist newspaper, declared in favour of
reform.
"If it had been the public instead of the committee which had to vote on the
proposal, it is safe to say it would have been carried by a big majority. For both
in this country and in the Dominions there has been a strong and healthy
growth of feeling that artificial conventions and an elaborate manner of life are
276
not merely unnecessary, but are also hindrances to a 'right understanding'
between King and people." 120
Likewise, the official Labour movement journal observed that there existed a
widespread feeling that the distance between the sovereign and the people
should be diminished, rather than increased by pomp and ritual. 121 The local
Labour newspaper in Birmingham specifically cited Sweden as an example of
a country in which the monarchy had been simplified, and strengthened as a
result.
"The security of the Throne in a constitutional democracy rests not upon
outworn tradition or precedent, or Court ceremonial or Society with a capital S,
but upon the popular respect which simple human qualities, personal dignity
and efficient public usages will always inspire and sustain... It is possible to
preserve such of these ancient usages as may be colourful and wholesome
and do away with all that makes for snobbery and the perpetuation of class
distinctions."122
The case for a simplified monarchy rested upon twin false premises,
identified as such by some contemporary observers. First there was a
confusion between the extension of political democracy and the
disappearance of social class. The former did not mean the latter, nor was the
latter an inevitable consequence of the former. The ruling class may have
been undergoing transformation, with a decline in some of its overtly
aristocratic vestiges, but it was illusory to represent this as another step
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towards classlessness. Secondly, the monarchy may have been a cause of
superstition and irrationality, but it was also a product of these conditions. One
commentator made an incisive observation on the call from some quarters for
a Scandinavian-type monarchy.
"They might as well try to fight poison gas with a sword. Criticism of the
Monarchy can only be part of the general struggle for reason against
unreason, for equality against privilege. The Monarchy in its present form will
last as long as inequality and superstition last and not very much longer."123
The debate about the monarchy which centred around the Civil List
continued into the Coronation celebrations of May 1937. As at the time of the
Silver Jubilee of George V, opinion in the Labour Party varied along a
spectrum which had the Daily Herald at one end and Tribune at the other.
What generated such intense and conflicting interpretations of the Coronation
was the undeniable enthusiasm of the overwhelming majority of working class
people. How was this to be understood? There were broadly two explanations,
although it is perhaps too crude to locate more sophisticated analyses in one
or other of these positions. In one version, it was evidence of the successful
manipulation of the working class, in the interests of the ruling class in general,
and of the National Government in particular. The working class were victims
of cynical Tory exploitation. Thus Beatrice Webb characterised the Coronation
celebrations as a "tremendously powerful dope.. .administered to the people of
England", 124 while Tribune labelled it "a vast and immoral deception". 125 This
perspective identified the phenomenon of working class participation with the
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popular Tory patriotism of the late nineteenth century, a cultural politics which
had "real attraction for many working people, and did so by drawing the radical
teeth from the popular images of patriotism". 126 The Communist Party
condemned the Coronation as a "deliberately planned propaganda campaign
to work up a wave of patriotic feeling", which was aimed at assisting
capitalism, militarism and imperialism. 127 However, the Communists made it
clear that they were not against street parties and enjoyment, and readers of
their Coronation pamphlets were advised to participate in the fun, but not to be
deceived. Behind this concession, there was not just a tacit acknowledgement
of the futility of opposing or denouncing popular street celebrations, but also
the hint of an alternative understanding of what underlay these displays of
"loyalism".
This alternative version of events, which refused to see the working
class as passive dupes, was offered by John Strachey in the Daily Worker.
Reporting that the back streets in the poorest areas of London were thick with
flags, Strachey asked:
'What is the significance of this? A getting-together of workers - together in
brotherhood - a common life."128
What the Conservative Party and the popular press represented as
demonstrations of enthusiasm for the monarchy and as evidence of a
reassuring working-class patriotism, might alternatively be seen as a
spontaneous and autonomous expression of communal solidarity. This
conclusion had been reached, following the Jubilee celebrations, by a South
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London Labour member, who sought to explain the behaviour of the poor
communities amongst which he lived.
"There was, among the poor, a quite spontaneous uprush of communal
rejoicing which was very infectious. I felt the pull myself. What was celebrated
was of less importance than the celebrating itself. Whole streets of families
became neighbours in very truth and were liberated from much of the
conventional shyness and reserve which prevents our pleasure in our
neighbour's company."129
Hannen Swaffer in the Herald remarked on the importance of "street teas" to
working class celebrations, tracing their origin to the time of the Armistice. 130
By the time of the Silver Jubilee they had become "the working man's new
form of gaiety", and owed nothing to outside organisation.
"Boroughs don't organise those. They spring up like daisies."131
Were the celebrations, as Cripps alleged, a "political stunt by the Conservative
Party", 132 or, as the Daily Herald claimed, "the demonstration of a people"? 133
It is not impossible that, in the hands of working-class participants, popular
Coronation celebrations became something other than the intentions of their
propagators. This is an observation which has also been made about late
nineteenth and early twentieth century manifestations of popular patriotism.
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'What is striking is the extent to which working-class people imposed their
own interpretations on patriotic institutions and occasions." 134
The Daily Herald treated the Coronation as it had the Silver Jubilee. Its
coverage did not differ from that of other popular newspapers, with pages of
photographs and trivia. Francis Williams recorded that the surge in the
Herald's circulation during the Coronation made even Elias temporarily happy,
and was dismissive of objections to the nature of its coverage.
"Intellectuals of the left were very indignant when we published long
descriptive stories of the Coronation.. .to satisfy a taste they refused to admit
existed."135
Commenting on the events of Coronation Day, attention was drawn to the
"spontaneity" and "genuineness", and the objections of the left were
contemptuously dismissed. (This is covered in the textual analysis section
later in the chapter.)
"It is this Coronation genuineness which has been missed by that little
minority which seeks to persuade itself, in defiance of all the plain evidence of
eye and ear, that the whole thing is an artificial creation. There is neither sense
nor dignity in this attitude. This Coronation is as real and genuine an
experience of the British people as anything ever was."136
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In an article in the same issue, Hannen Swaffer reiterated the view that "all
except the Communists and a few left-wingers" had come to accept the
monarchy as a crucial element of a form of government which preserved
freedom. The latter point was one heavily stressed by the Daily Herald, which
saw the Coronation as setting the country apart from the totalitarian states,
where celebrations marked the victory of one creed over others.
"The King is neither a dictator nor a Party man. He is a constitutional King
in a parliamentary democracy. And yesterday was the celebration by all
people, irrespective of Party, who mean to honour its rules."137
The same theme was expounded in an article by Ponsonby, Labour's leader in
the House of Lords. He observed that democracy seemed to thrive better
under a constitutional monarchy than in republics, but also acknowledged that
"the time must come, if real progress is to be made towards a genuine social
democracy, when the tradition of monarchy and the practice of Socialism will
be found to be incompatible". 138 However, this was something for the future,
and from past experience, Labour could expect fair treatment from the Crown,
notwithstanding the reactionary opinion prevalent in a Court "manned by an
almost exclusively Tory aristocracy".139
Whilst the Daily Herald and its contributors represented the Coronation
celebrations as evidence of genuine attachment to institutions and a form of
government better than most, others in the Labour Party interpreted the events
differently. Those on the Party's left, heavily engaged in promoting the Unity
Campaign, denounced the events as cynical manipulation of working class
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opinion. It was again Cripps who attracted most attention. In a series of
speeches, he made two basic complaints: that money was being wasted on
the celebrations; and that the events were being exploited by the Tories. At the
end of April, he deplored the turning of the Coronation into "an international
circus, which was being done today by the Conservative Party for its own
benefit". 14° Then just before Coronation Day, Cripps made a spirited
denunciation, the language of which offended monarchists inside and outside
his own party.
"In all this Coronation bunting or bunkum, the Government appears to have
overlooked the essential nature of the struggle which is proceeding in this
country. I have no objection. .to people celebrating if they wish on any proper
occasion... But the present circus which is being carried on and organized and
for which the Government, incidentally, are paying three-quarters of a million
out of national funds - apart from the millions which are being spent
municipally all over the country - is simply being run as a political stunt by the
Conservative Party. They realize, I suppose, that the Monarchy, which is the
chief prop of their political position, had a rather nasty blow last August and
this is the time to rehabilitate it."141
The last point, whilst being the most radical of his criticisms, was not the
primary cause of the fierce reaction which followed, but his use of the term
"bunkum" on this occasion, and "tomfoolery" on another. Amongst those
responsible for organising and financing Coronation events were many
283
Labour-controlled councils. Some working class Labour politicians were quick
to respond ad hominem. The Labour Mayor of Manchester retorted that:
'When Sir Stafford Cripps alluded to the Coronation as bunkum, he was
once again talking without thinking. I suppose there was no bunkum when he
went down on one knee before the father of the present King to receive his
knighthood, and there is not much bunkum about the country which gave Sir
Stafford the riches he possesses."142
Cripps's reply to the criticism was that the issue was not worth fighting over,
and that he regretted his reference to "tomfoolery" because the storm it had
raised had obscured matters he regarded as more significant.
In his comment that the monarchy was the chief prop of the
Conservative Party's political position, Cripps had voiced an opinion which was
more fully developed elsewhere on the Labour left. Clearly there was a
conviction that the Government were engaged, through the Coronation events,
in undermining the Unity Campaign, and that it was a frustratingly successful
ploy. Tribune carried an article by Bevan which listed the purposes of the
Coronation: to give the King an appearance of divinity; to consolidate the
social pyramid; and to spread the illusion of a national "community". 143 In other
issues of the journal, the anger felt on the left was vented.
"..Labour will be - or ought to be - ashamed of the part it played in the
proceeding. It will have the uncomfortable feeling that His Majesty's
Opposition, whose business it is, presumably, to oppose something or
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somebody, only succeeded in supporting a circus run by the enemies of the
working class." 144
Earlier in the chapter, reference was made to Strachey's contention that the
celebrations by the working class could be understood as affirmations of their
class solidarity, and that the connection to the royal event was rather
incidental. Less theoretically, it could be explained as simply a welcome
excuse for a good time. Such arguments cut little ice for Hayter Preston in
Tribune. The Coronation had been an "idolatrous spectacle".
"...millions of British workers turned their backs on all that is meant by
democracy and prostrated themselves before the chief idol of capitialist
imperialism. No doubt many socialists will try to explain this wholesale
liquidation of class faith and hope on the theory of the mass spree. But that
theory is valid only so far as the children's bun-fights are concerned."145
There were two distinct objections to the Coronation celebrations by critics
on the left. The first, less radical, argument, deplored the partisan use made of
the event by the Government. This assumed that the monarchy could and
should be outside the contest for political power. In contrast, the case hinted at
in part of Cripps's speech and elaborated in Tribune was that the monarchy
constituted an integral and crucial element in the capitalist system. Dr Alfred
Salter had long emphasised the monarchy's function in upholding that system,
and repeated his view at the time of the Coronation.
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"The eyes of the common people are to be dazzled, their minds
hypnotised, their imagination bewildered, so that they may readily accept the
present social order as eternal."'"
The other constituents of the United Front shared this belief. The I.L.P.
condemned the Labour leadership's participation in the Coronation, which
served only to hide the realities of capitalism.
"The Coronation is the supreme occasion of Capitalist Society. The head
of the Capitalist State is crowned and all sections of the Capitalist State join to
do him honour. It is the occasion when all the powers at the disposal of the
ruling class are mobilised to create an overwhelming demonstration of national
unity and loyalty."147
Contrast was made between the cost of royalty and the level of state support
for the unemployed. A similar set of arguments was deployed by the
Communist Party (C.P.), which issued a series of three pamphlets on the
Coronation. These were written for an audience beyond the party membership,
and made concessions to popular approval of the festivities. The C.P. was
against the Coronation, but not against street parties. If a worker was offered a
free tea for his children, he should accept it, whilst demanding proper feeding
for the rest of the year. The advice was to take part in the events, but not to
be deceived.'"
This qualified critique by the C.P. was evidence of an awareness on
the left that outright hostility to the Coronation celebrations was liable to be
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counter-productive. The popular enthusiasm displayed on 12th May could be
treated in various ways: by distinguishing between an understandable desire
for a good time and enthusiasm for the monarchy; by rejecting any working
class participation as a sad example of ruling class manipulation of the
workers; or by accepting unconcernedly that working class people were as
loyal to King and country as any others. The predominant attitude in the
Labour Party was summarised thus by Kingsley Martin.
"The Labour Party, and indeed the left as a whole with numerically
unimportant exceptions, says about the monarchy, as it says about the
Empire: 'Of course there's a lot of ballyhoo about all that and we protest
against the use of a national symbol for the purposes of conservative
propaganda. But to go with the relatively few extremists and attack the
monarchy, the Empire and the Coronation, is simply to play into the hands of
our opponents, who will have the vast majority of the people with them
anyway. Far better proclaim our loyalty with the rest and so be in a position to
catch the public ear when we point out that there are still slums in England, still
unemployment, and that the glass coaches and golden crowns don't fill hungry
bellies."149
What evidence exists would appear to justify Martin's assessment of a "vast
majority". It is likewise hard to deny Ziegler's generalisation, based on the
evidence of the Mass Observation Day Survey on 12th May, 1937, that:
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"Of those who ventured an opinion... .there can be no doubt that the vast
majority -90% probably of the several hundred whose views are featured.. in
the Mass Observation Archive - were looking forward to the day with some
eagerness and planning how best to enjoy an occasion which seemed unlikely
to recur for many years."15°
The realpolitik of the Labour Party on this occasion, as expressed in the article
by Kingsley Martin, was perhaps less a cynical attempt to swim with a popular
tide of opinion than the outcome of a tangle of conflicting beliefs and emotions.
Some in the party were unquestioning loyalists: the Labour Party rooms at
Warrington displayed the largest Union Jack in the town. 151 Others publicly
rejected the whole business, and were thrown into fountains for their pains.152
Others in the Party had more mixed feelings, sharing, if not articulating, the
sentiments of a Mass Observation informant of left-wing views.
"I was surprised how much I responded to the atmosphere of the crowd,
the cheering etc. I felt a definite pride and thrill in belonging to the Empire,
which in ordinary life, with my political bias, is just the opposite of my true
feeling. Yet I felt a sense of relief that I could experience this emotion and be
in and of the crowd.. .Therefore you will understand that the carnival spirit of
the actual Coronation Day really was a holiday for me, and I say this without
cynicism. I wonder how many others felt the same....Reviewing it all calmly
afterwards, one sees how very dangerous all this is... because it makes it in
the end harder for us to think and behave as rational beings... It is too
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dangerous a weapon to be in the hands of the people at present in power in
this country."153
Textual Analysis. 
Daily Herald. 
The Herald's coverage of the Coronation may be conveniently divided into
three categories: editorials; feature articles with historical/constitutional
themes; reports of the national and local celebrations. These categories will be
treated separately, notwithstanding some overlap in subject matter.
The first of two editorials on the Coronation, entitled "The King is Crowned",
is a spirited attempt to refute the arguments of left-wing critics and to align the
newspaper with popular opinion, and thereby with its own readership. 154
 The
first two paragraphs seek to characterise the events in terms which deny the
case made by the left. Although the arguments of the critics are not rehearsed,
nor their rhetoric examined, their unspoken presence is reflected in the
evaluative language of the text. The opponents of the celebrations are
identified twice, once indirectly and then directly. In both cases, their
numerical insignificance is emphasised:
"He will be a rare person who is not moved by today's Coronation.."
"..that little minority which seeks to persuade itself..."
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The nouns and adjectives employed to characterise the celebrations can best
be understood as a response to these opponents.
..the spontaneity of this Coronation..
..this Coronation genuineness..
as real and genuine an experience of the British people..
a national demonstration..
the people's free decision that the Monarchy is retained
These terms serve to deny the charges of artificiality, political manipulation
and class bias. The dominant category label in the text is "the people",
appearing eight times. The "people" are identified as the key participants, in
two senses: as participants in the celebrations; and as grammatical
participants in a variety of transitivity patterns. The latter is revealing. Where
the term occurs in transitive structures, the "people" are actors in processes,
and their autonomy of action is repeatedly indicated.
it is the people which has placed him
it is by the people's free decision that the Monarchy is retained
the people of this country governs itself
the people. to make something more of the Coronation
this people forms a nation
a free and enfranchised people
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The "people" are in control of events, in a political system of open democracy;
manipulation and compulsion are implicitly denied.
The second editorial was entitled "United in Freedom". 155 Whilst the
previous editorial had as its sub-text the case against socialist criticism of the
Coronation, the second was a justification of constitutional monarchy in the
light of the unpleasant alternatives on the Continent. At the same time, it
engaged with domestic arguments on the subject of unity, and sought to locate
traditional Labour values in the royal celebrations. The terms of the title
dominate the text, two of a group of terms relating to political values which
recur throughout:
unity/united x7
freedom/free x 7
democracy x 5
community x 3
totalitarian/dictators x 4
The contrast between totalitarianism and a parliamentary democracy with a
constitutional monarch was but part of the argument. Alongside this point, the
text contains some sharp observations about Labour critics of the Coronation.
Having identified unity as a salient phenomenon apparent during the
celebrations, the first half of the text is an exercise in exposition and
qualification of this term. As the text acknowledges, critics of the Coronation
object to it because it represents a "sham unity which does not exist". The
response to this charge is that while there may be differences in political
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programmes or economic ideas, there remains an underlying unity which
results from agreement about the political methods by which such matters are
resolved. To this extent, the Coronation was a celebration of democracy.
Pointedly, the Herald chastised Labour critics who claimed, in contrast, that
the Coronation was a celebration of Conservatism.
"..some of those who call most urgently for the 'defence of democracy' do
not recognise democracy when they see it."156
The Herald strenuously attempts to represent the Coronation celebration as
embodying traditional Labour values. Besides "freedom" and "democracy",
there are other significant lexical cues which invoke such values:
so harmonious a comradeship as was manifest yesterday
a free people together in such solidarity..
if all men and women are to have an equal chance..
This interpretation of the events of May 12th was offered alongside accounts
of those events which emphasise and dwell upon phenomena whose
relationship to modern democracy is less than obvious. It is to the Heralds
reports of the Coronation that we now turn.
The Herald gave as much space to the celebrations as did the
Conservative popular newspapers, and deployed writers of national reputation
to describe them. H.V. Morton covered the events in Westminster Abbey, and
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his Herald readers are immersed in a fantasy world remote from drab lives and
everyday concerns.
"The scene below is absolutely mediaeval. All the primitive colours of the
Middle Ages are alive down there in the tiers of seats where every man is in
uniform or in the mantle of some ancient order of chivalry. The women are
mostly in Court dress with white feathers in their hair; the men are mostly in
scarlet." 157
Complementing Morton's detailed handling of the pomp and circumstance,
Hannen Swaffer was "among the crowds". The focus switched from the
majesty and magnificence of the Abbey to the qualities of a London crowd. It
was the crowd which became the object of celebration in Swaffer's
idiosyncratic approach. He preferred the good-natured, long-suffering,
ordinary Londoners to the procession itself.
"Now frankly, except for the crowds.. .1 would not have walked a hundred
yards to see yesterday's procession."155
The concept of the "crowd" is central to Swaffer's representation of events.
The Herald had a series of articles entitled "Crown and People", the last of
which was a piece by Swaffer on "The Crown and the Crowd". The term
"crowd" is a loose, undefined one, which permits Swaffer license to generalise
about popular opinion concerning the monarchy. By failing to specify who is
reacting in a particular manner, there is greater scope for the incorporation of
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Swaffer's own impressions and beliefs. The "crowd" becomes a flexibly
deployed and powerful agent in historical processes, both as witness and
arbiter of change. In his survey of changing relations, beginning with Victoria,
between monarchs and the "crowd", Swaffer uses the latter initially to
designate the spectators of the Coronation procession of George V. However,
Swaffer continues by invoking the "crowd" and attributing to it a unanimously
held set of sentiments; sentiments which are in reality Swaffer's own
speculations and interpretations.159
"..the crowds felt that she [Victoria] embodied in her stumpy frame the
qualities..."
"The crowd literally paid her [Victoria] reverence."
"The crowd. .admired his [Edward VII's] way with women."
"..in spite of his [Edward VII's] brusqueness of which the crowd knew
nothing.."
"..the crowd in a second would have lost its liking for him [Edward VII]."
'When Edward VIII came, the crowd thought of him as Prince Charming."
"The crowd adored him [Edward VIII]."
It becomes clear that the "crowd" signifies more than simply the massed
onlookers at ceremonial occasions. Elsewhere, the term seems synonymous
with the electorate, which possesses ultimate power within the political system.
By implication, the label subsumes Herald readers.
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"..the Throne.. .accepted by all Parties, except the Communists and a few
Left-Wingers, as the symbol of a form of government under which can be
worked out whatever degree of Liberty the crowd wants.... Monarchs may
come and go but the people remain.. .They reign by their people's will - and for
so long as the people wish."166
If the "crowd" controls events, for Swaffer, as for the Labour Party, further
reform of the monarchy is desirable: a move towards the Scandinavian and
Belgian examples, in which the monarch may "mix freely among the crowd"
and an end to the practice of surrounding the monarch with "people chosen
from one class". There is, however, no doubt about the superiority of the
Constitution over all others. And in that "eternal miracle which is Britain", the
monarch is crucial, for "if the King went, heaven knows what might happen".161
Whilst the "crowd", as presented by Swaffer, is a free, mature, informed body
which knows what it wants and which holds ultimate power, the attention given
to the symbolism of inequality, privilege and mysticism in the Heralds
coverage of the Coronation ceremony and procession produces tension, if not
contradiction, between these two representations.
Reynolds News. 
Earlier in this chapter, it was noted that Reynolds News showed virtually
no interest in the Silver Jubilee celebrations, and the little coverage that was
given was severely economistic, more anti-capitalist than anti-monarchist.
There is a clear shift in editorial policy for treatment of the Coronation. Whilst
the newspaper continued its exploitation theme (this time concerning
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producers of Coronation goods in Birmingham), it also turned its attention to
the ceremony itself, popular celebrations, and included some
historical/analytical features on the monarchy. In all these areas, however,
there was far less space given than in the Herald, whilst the tone was far less
respectful. To point up this contrasting approach, attention will be focused on
three areas of coverage: an account of the ceremony in the Abbey; an article
on the relationship between monarchy and people which mirrors Swaffer's
piece in the Herald; and reports of popular celebrations.
The report of the ceremony in the Abbey was juxtaposed with a report of
the day in Jarrow. The description of the scene in the Abbey is laden with irony
and with suggestions of farce. The ritual of coronation, invested with mystic
significance in the Herald, is stripped down linguistically in the Reynolds
article, in a series of unadorned passive constructions.162
The King is presented
His usurpers are challenged
He is anointed
The King is crowned
The absence of evaluative adverbs and adjectives is striking. The interest
instead lies in the selection of verbs which highlight the absurdity and farce
which deny the event the dignity and majesty it seeks.
The Archbishop fumbles
One aged lord...stumbles
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..my lords and ladies jostle.. .cursing
The unrepresentative nature of the onlookers in the Abbey was emphasised,
rather than the splendour of their appearance. Only the Prime Minister and
Ramsay MacDonald were "representatives of you and me and the fellow next
door", and the writer was pleased to escape from "the gilded crowd".
A consequence of the less austere policy in reporting the Coronation was
the allocation of space devoted to describing street parties. The newspaper
could acknowledge popular enthusiasm for the Coronation without endorsing
the politically and ideologically unacceptable. As Swaffer had treated it in the
Herald, the occasion becomes one for celebrating the qualities of ordinary
people. In Swaffer's column it was the amiability of the London crowd which
earned praise: in Reynolds, it was the capacity for organisation exhibited by
the inhabitants of poorer areas.
"Hard working men and women with little enough time to spare have
revealed a genius for detailed organisation."163
In advance of the celebration, Reynolds was labelling it as the "Tea Party
Coronation". However, an accompanying article offered a different perspective,
dealing with popular manifestations of patriotism. The proliferation of
coronation goods and fashions is described but regretted.
"Everything in London is coloured in keeping with the Coronation
season. The heart of the British Empire is patriotic through and through.. .1
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suppose a true-born Briton ought to be delighted by the amazing aspect of our
greatest city. But I confess my day-long tour of London has given me the
blues."164
All the writer could offer in the face of this unwelcome but incontrovertible
evidence was the limp assertion that "gay as all the patriotic bunting is, it is the
people themselves who are the living decorations". Repeating that the
phenomenon had saddened him, the writer offers no explanation of his
reaction. Readers are expected to understand and to share the ideological
position which generates it. Reynolds adopted a paradoxical position on the
Coronation: by increasing the space given to a royal event, it was tacitly
admitting the interest of its readership; through a critical or disapproving
perspective on the event, Reynolds was simultaneously invoking a radical
scepticism consistent with the newspaper's traditional political sympathies.
Daily Express. 
The Daily Express treatment of the Silver Jubilee had been characterised by
an acknowledgement of a social gulf between the monarch and the "little
man", who represented its ideal reader. Despite this gulf, the relationship was
marked by mutual affection and an uncritical attitude towards the hierarchical
arrangement. The most striking aspect of the Express 's treatment of the
Coronation was an extension and refinement of this approach, which contains
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embryonic echoes of the modern tabloid handling of royalty. If one were to
summarise the ideological basis to the approach, it would be a projected social
unity achieved through the disguising and denial of social distinctions.
The most striking technique for achieving this effect was selection of
register. In an article describing the scenes inside and outside the Abbey, the
newspaper's senior reporter, Trevor Wignall, employed demotic terms to
describe the actions of members of the aristocracy. 165 Thus,
for a quick and furtive pull at a cigarette
he had hardly got the fag going
several others with gaspers in the curves of their palms
The implicature of the employment of such language is to deny underlying
differences between the aristocracy and the reader. The coronets and ermine
do not symbolise real distinctions, but only mask the essential human
ordinariness beneath.
Care was taken not to idealise the events. The readers were not
expected to suspend their disbelief in the perfection and super-normality of
royal events. This is a tacit admission that a highly reverential, adulatory and
humourless representation of royalty was no longer effective. If a projection of
social integration was to be made credible, it could not be achieved by
portraying royalty or aristocracy as embodying different and superior qualities.
"Normal" human reactions to the events were emphasised:
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things were becoming seriously dull
what I heard of it [the radio broadcast] was so desperately dull
things were slow for the first three hours
they [spectators] had been bluffed into getting up before it was light
The talk of enormous crowds. .was sadly overdone
I had strolled to my expensive parking place
..by eight we were tired of watching strong men swinging
their coronets
Whilst the illusion of perfection of organization is carefully deconstructed, the
common humanity of those present is repeatedly alluded to:
Peers steal from the Abbey to smoke
Page boys tease waiting nobles
A photograph shows page boys, not holding ermine trains, but sitting tired on
the Abbey steps, "perhaps thinking of the joys of a big tea and bed".
Occasionally, the theme of common humanity is explicitly raised:
That was the best human touch
I do not want to be told again that our children peers are different from
kids of their age in Manchester
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There is an ironic treatment of those conspicuous symbols of inequality in
evidence around the Abbey:
"I walked... .in a rather moth-eaten black felt hat, a dark overcoat and
with race glasses slung round my neck. I would not have mentioned this if
there had been a crown on my head, or if a peer's cloak had been slung from
my shoulders." 166
Two areas of tension co-exist with this approach. First, despite the ironic
treatment of social difference, the text reserves its irony for the aristocracy:
royalty is treated respectfully and admiringly. Secondly, because of that ironic
treatment, the category terms used to denote higher social ranks acquire an
ambiguous status. The implicature and the reception of these terms by the
readers are unknowable, but, given the surrounding text, they possess a
subversive potential which suggests at least an ambivalent attitude towards
social equality. The terms include:
The souls of the infants of our BETTERS were....
he had hardly got the fag going when others of his RANK
So many of the GREAT OF THE EARTH went by us. .that the
vision grew weary.
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What emerges quite clearly from Wignall's text is a recognition that, for the
Express, and for the type of reader whose views it sought to guide and reflect,
the old social hierarchy was open to question and challenge. Although not for
a moment indicating an impulse towards social levelling, the text exudes
confidence about the qualities and values of the "little man". To continue a
quotation cited above,
"That was the best human touch of the day for me, not only because for
a moment it made us all equal.. ,,167
'Not only because it made them feel equal' entails the proposition that a feeling
of equality is positive, and that is not a sentiment which one instinctively
associates either with a Coronation or with the Beaverbrook press. However, it
accords entirely with the Express's self-representation as the voice of the
ordinary man, whose deferential relationship to his monarch does not preclude
a knowing scepticism about the constituents and workings of the upper
reaches of the social hierarchy. This does not purport to be the voice of
radicalism, but of the "common man", more confident than before of the value
of his language and experience. Loyalty to the King and to the nation are
utterly beyond question, but it is a nation with class structure and relationships
undergoing profound change.
Lest it be thought that Wignall's article is unrepresentative of the
Express's position, the case argued above can be supported by the contents
of futher articles in the same edition of the newspaper. An editorial
emphasised that the essence of the Coronation was a compact between the
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King and his people. The "multitude" shout "God Save the King", the "crowd"
roared their delight and the "public" showed their pleasure. As the final
Express text to be considered, the editorial published on Coronation day
draws together many of the themes characteristic of this newspaper's
approach to popular monarchy. 168 First is a declaration of national greatness
strongly linked to empire and to commonwealth. Then, prominence is given to
"the People's Part". In this section of the editorial, there are very striking
similarities with the Daily Heralds position, analysed above. As did the Herald,
the Express elevates 'the people' to a position of ultimate control. They are
"the source of power and wealth and glory", and they "lift up the King to be the
leader". 169
"..in the ultimate possession, the throne of England is the property of
the people of England."17°
It is noticeable that whilst the Herald had largely avoided national labels, only
rarely referring to the British people, the Express, in two sections of this
editorial, amounting to approximately two hundred words, had included:
the King and Queen of England
the English monarchy
the great Kings of England
the throne of England
the people of England
the most beloved Englishman
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National identity is of far more significance than in the Herald, and it is a
national identity narrowly conceived and defined.
Daily Mail. 
It is instructive to begin to analyse the Daily Mail by contrasting
immediately its projection of national identity, in an edtorial on Coronation day,
with that of the Express, as indicated above. 171 The "English" label is used
only once, in describing Westminster Abbey as "the most hallowed of all
English fanes". The choice of the term "fanes" is a characteristic piece of
archaism, an employment of lexis which distances the text from contemporary,
everyday language. A further example is:
'We have the King's solemn pledge of his life to his office in woe or weal."
It is a mystificatory technique to be found to a lesser extent in the Express and
not at all in the other newspapers under analysis. Returning to the question of
national labelling, the Mail identifies the relevant entities as:
the British nation
the British throne
the Empire x6
the Dominions
the Commonwealth of Nations
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Clearly, the King is not the essence of England, but at the centre of a far-flung
Empire. The text abounds with superlatives and hyperbole. Doubt and
reservation are banished.
the greatest Empire the world has ever known
the most magnificent and majestical [service] known to man
unequalled splendour and beauty
radiant with colour as never before
The following day's editorial similarly abounded with hyperbole, and reveals
nothing about "disappointing" crowds.172
a ceremony more magnificent than any of its forerunners
never in the history of British monarchy...
never has London housed multitudes so immense and eager
the unparalleled vigil of scores of thousands
the perfection of organisation
the vision in the Abbey surpassed in its loveliness anything
that the handiwork of man has contrived in modern times
its almost unearthly beauty
As for the ceremony in the Abbey, the Mail adopted the converse approach
to that of the Express. The Express commentary was constructed around a
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series of revelations: about the imperfections of the arrangements; about the
"ordinariness" of the nobility. The unstated premise was that the ceremony and
its participants were expected to be extraordinary. By failing to meet those
expectations, the ceremony achieved something more significant. The ordinary
was the human, and in key moments identified in the text, a common humanity
moves the monarchy-people relationship onto new ground: the Queen turned
to the King to whisper something; the "shock" felt when both shook hands with
the Duke of Norfolk; the newly light-weight Princess Juliana; Queen Mary's
welcome which "went right to the heart". In contrast to this theme in the
Express, the Daily Mails commentator, the novelist Hugh Walpole, adopted a
initial pose of scepticism, which is then gradually dissolved by the experience
of the Abbey.
"Suppose I found this thing to be in these days the sham sentiment of an
outworn tradition!...ls this not nonsense, seen in the light of these changed and
changing times? If I think so I shall say so."173
Fortunately for Walpole and the Mail, he did not find it to be nonsense. He
posed the question:
"Had this crowning any meaning at all for the men and women of our time?"
In providing an oblique answer to this question, Walpole attends to the spiritual
and mystical dimensions of the Coronation far more than any other
newspaper's treatment. The pageantry and the social character of the event
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are minor elements, but the drama is principally the King standing before his
God. The language of the text makes no concessions to the demotic, and the
intent of the selection of language, and of the attention to the spiritual
dimension, is to raise the event to the sublime. A further article reinforced the
mystical interpretation with an insistence on the transforming power of the
Coronation. 174
the impression of potent and mysterious change
they had been transformed in some mysterious way
the hands were no longer the hands of the woman we know but
hands made to hold the Sceptre
he was no longer a man, but the idea and substance of a King
Whilst the Express had found the essence of the event to be its humanity,
despite the glitter and the pageantry, the Mail made no attempt to prick the
bubble of mystical perfection which surrounded it. The tone and orientation of
the Mails treatment is exemplified in another article which describes the
procession from the Abbey.
"In that most sacred moment of the King's crowning.... before the eyes of
the exalted throng in Westminster Abbey, the mystic seal of his sovereignty
was set no less deeply in the hearts of the multitudes of his people who
awaited him along the royal way to Buckingham Palace."175
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The people are reduced to loyal "multitudes", assembling in unprecedented
numbers to show their loyalty. No hint of criticism or cynicism intrudes, and
"human interest" plays little part in its reports. To use a phrase which occurs
more than once in the Mail, the audience and the reader glimpse scenes "from
the realms of Faery". In contrast, the Express offers a more complex tableau.
Alongside portentous editorials are articles which carry a different and, to
modern eyes, a more familiar tone. The "people" are more intrusive: the
potency of their political influence is emphasised; their assumed value system
and experience are incorporated when depicting the celebrations, constituting
a form of flattery of the reader; the exalted and powerful are pointedly
subjected to a commentary in which those values of the "little man" provide the
framework of reference; in some articles, use of demotic linguistic forms
seeks to encourage identification with the events by a popular audience, and
to flatter that audience into believing that the pawns were now more powerful
than the king and queen.
Conclusion. 
For the Coronation, as for the Silver Jubilee, the obvious feature
of the Labour Party's response was the plurality of views. If the majority
opinion favoured participation in the events, a vocal minority expressed its
downright opposition. More interesting than the split itself were the beliefs
underpinning the respective positions. Amongst those advocating
participation there were varying motivations and degrees of enthusiasm.
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Some were unequivocal royalists, as attached to King and Country as any
Conservative might be. A rather different case was the socialist whose
scepticism, and even hostility, concerning the monarchy had been
diminished by the longevity and perceived quality of George V's kingship.
Then again, there were those who claimed to be celebrating the Constitution.
One of the distinguishing features of Labour press coverage of both
Coronation and Jubilee was its concentration upon the happy constitutional
advantages conferred upon the British people by historical evolution. The
monarchy was represented as an integral, and in some cases, conditional,
part of the growth of political democracy. It was a distinctive argument, which
was not replicated in the right-wing press. As a backdrop, the destruction of
democratic institutions on the continent of Europe made "the King in
Parliament" appear ever more desirable a constitutional arrangement.
Underlying all these positions was a keen appreciation of the popularity of
George V, and the enthusiasm of the mass of Labour supporters to join the
celebrations. For all but the most intransigent anti-monarchists, it made
sense to go along with the popular will.
A discernible change of tone had emerged by the time of
George VI's Coronation. The Abdication had, at least temporarily, made
vulnerable what had appeared an unchallengeable monarchy. It seemed not
only necessary but opportune to raise the question of reform of the
monarchy, and this the Party leadership did. However, it was a brief moment
of opportunity, and there seemed no clearly envisaged alternative form of
monarchy, and certainly no stated route for transformation. The impetus for
change receded as the trauma of the Abdication subsided.
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The contrastive textual analysis reveals different representations
of popular monarchy. If the Daily Herald was pro-monarchy, it was so in a
different way from its right-wing rivals. Each of the newspapers which
celebrated the Jubilee did so in its own terms. Each appropriated the
monarchy to its own value system. Thus the Mail celebrated the King as
head of the Empire, and leader of his "race". The monarchy retained a
strongly spiritual character, and embodied quite mysterious qualities which
defied rational explanation. The Express projected the King at the head of a
social hierarchy, albeit a changing one, and as the personal sovereign of the
lower middle-class citizen. In contrast, the Herald endorsed the Constitution,
and the King's role within it. The King was bound up with the freedom of the
people. If its view of the Constitution might be considered complacent, or its
failure to address the implications of 1931 less than intellectually honest, that
view is made more comprehensible given the alternative scenarios a few
hundred miles away. Finally, it is worth recalling readership figures, and the
perhaps uncomfortable truth that very large numbers of Labour voters, as
well as potential voters, were immersed not only in the popular monarchy of
the Herald, but in those of the Express and the Mail also. The monarchy
was textually located at the heart of several distinct, but not necessarily
exclusive, representations of British society. Whilst its value may have been
diversely perceived, only on the political margins was that value denied.
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Chapter Five - The Abdication of Edward VIII 
Introduction: the political background to the Abdication 
The political events which culminated in the Abdication constituted a brief
episode, but an episode rich in interest for the present study. Within those
days and weeks, the Labour Party was obliged to engage with a genuine
constitutional crisis involving the Crown and monarchy, in contrast to the
hypothetical crises dealt with in books and articles produced on the left during
the early 1930's. Many of the perceptions and anxieties which had
characterised internal Labour debate on the Crown, resurfaced and were
challenged by crucial and urgent realities. Some people were in no doubt
where their loyalties lay, and maintained a clear position throughout the crisis.
Others found their attitudes shifting under the course of events. A few more
admitted, in retrospect, that they had been mistaken and expressed relief that
their cause had been defeated. The divisions of opinion within the Labour
Party over the Abdication cannot be reduced to a simple left-right distinction.
Not only was there the recurrent question of how Labour should regard, and
whether and how it should exploit, the Crown's residual powers, but there was
also a monarch who was manifestly more political than his immediate
predecessors, and whose politics were open to a variety of interpretations. It
must not be forgotten, either, that the Abdication occurred against an
international backdrop of advancing Fascism, and in particular the Spanish
Civil War. For many in the party, the catastrophic events on the Continent
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imbued the Abdication crisis with even greater significance, although for a few
that crisis was regarded as irrelevant to, and a distraction from, what was
unfolding in Spain and Germany. Positions adopted depended partly on the
relative importance attached to particular aspects of the wider political context,
and partly to the ways in which the Constitution and the monarch himself were
perceived.
Broadly speaking, the Labour Party, like the nation at large, had felt
increasingly comfortable with George V as king. There had been moments,
notably in 1911, 1914 and 1931, when the Crown had seemed to be in
sympathy, or even collusion, with reactionary interests, but George V had
played the role of constitutional monarch to the general satisfaction of the
Labour Party. Even those, such as Laski, who were critical of the constitutional
powers of the Crown, and of the social and political effects of a monarchical
system, had a certain admiration and respect for George V as a constitutional
monarch. George V had become a model of such, and this in itself protected
the monarchy against its critics. He was rightly assumed to be conservative in
his social and political views, but these were privately held. It was, therefore, a
radical departure from precedent when Edward, as Prince of Wales, offered his
opinions on sensitive political questions.
Throughout his adult life, Edward had taken more than just an passing
interest in domestic politics. As Prince of Wales he had not shrunk from
expressing views on the most controversial of questions. During the General
Strike, he had gone out with the police, and lent his car and chauffeur to assist
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in distributing the British Gazette. His visits to the depressed areas in the late
1920's and early 1930's were well-publicised, and his concern about
unemployment was frequently expressed.' He summoned David Kirkwood to
hear the Clydesider's ideas about the problem, and Kirkwood was impressed.2
Edward's sense of urgency and concern over unemployment seemed an
implicit criticism of the National Government's inaction. Those who knew
Edward were quite aware that this did not signify left-wing views. Harold
Nicolson described him in the early 1930's as very right-wing, and when
Edward discussed the Blackshirt movement with his equerry, Aird, in 1934, the
latter declared that they "both thought it quite a good movement except for
Mosley". 3 Edward's admiration for the policies of the Nazis, in particular on
unemployment and housing, was not secret. His suggestion, made in June
1935, that a delegation from the British Legion should visit Hitler to offer "the
hand of friendship", was followed two days later by his notorious charge that
members of the L.C.C. were "cranks" for abolishing the Officer Training Corps
(0.T.C.) in schools under its jurisdiction. For many in the Labour Party, here
was evidence not just of political partiality, but of partiality for the most
unacceptable form of politics. One local party journal accused Edward of
breaking the cardinal rule for royalty of avoiding the public expression of views
on controversial subjects.
"Is it possible to suspect that the Prince has joined the National
Government.... By those less kindly disposed toward His Royal Highness, it will
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be averred that there is a very close resemblance between his utterances and
the National Government's policy of alliance with Hitler and contempt for
peace."
As far as the Labour Party was concerned, where one stood on the question of
Edward depended upon what one identified as most significant: the very fact
that the heir to the Throne adopted public positions on controversial issues; his
sympathy with the plight of the disadvantaged in the depressed areas; or his
admiration for the German Nazis.
Beatrice Webb was unable to form a judgement about Edward's politics,
declaring that:
"No-one knows what are Edward's opinions, except that he loathes the
Anglican Church, associates with a bad-mannered lot and cares for the
comfort of the unemployed man. Whether he is.. .communist or fascist is
unknown. He may not know himself. Some say he is intimate with the German
Embassy and is a reactionary."5
Kingsley Martin, in advocating a compromise solution to the crisis over
Edward's proposed marriage, focused upon the positive aspects of his
character and upon his social conscience.
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"Everyone knows that his speeches, both as Prince of Wales and as King,
have commonly expressed his personal feelings; everyone knows that when
he visits a distressed area that he does so.. .because he is genuinely and
deeply troubled about the misery and poverty which successive governments
have failed to relieve."6
Some individual Labour M.P.s demonstrated that their judgement had been
coloured by Edward's interest in social problems. A.G. Walkden, the Labour
M.P. and former General Secretary of the Railway Clerks' Association, spoke
of the good effect which Edward's visit to South Wales had had on the
Government, and declared that "I am all for the King, through and through".7
Louis Fenn, writing in the Birmingham Labour paper, drew positive conclusions
from Edward's visits and speeches and indulged in a little fantasy:
"Perhaps, as his father backed Asquith against the Lords, Edward VIII may
some day back a courageous Socialist Government against military or financial
sabotage."8
In the same newspaper, the regular political commentator reflected on the
qualities of the late George V and the promise of his successor. The article
revolved around an apparently unconscious, but revealing, irony. It
acknowledged that George V had been a Tory, but he had made Britain safe
for a "Democratic Monarchy" because there was "no record of his personal
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political views ever being allowed to interfere with the proper exercise of his
duties". 9 Edward had earned the admiration of A.J. Cook, which augured well,
and the writer was convinced that "the new King wants a better Britain and is
ready to see great, and what may be regarded as revolutionary changes."19
There was clearly a temptation for some on the left to welcome the political
involvement of a monarch believed to hold, however vaguely, left wing views.
There is evidence that others in the Labour Party thought Edward's views
were antithetical to Labour's own. Open expressions of criticism were
uncommon, although that was probably the result of a reluctance to make
hostile public comments about a popular royal figure. Baldwin reported to
Edward himself the words of a Clydeside M.P.
"I see we are going to have a fascist King, are we?"11
A correspondent in a provincial Labour newspaper recalled those of Edward's
views which placed him in opposition to Labour, such as his labelling of
opponents of the O.T.C. as "cranks".
"Furthermore, he has been guilty of praising national capitalist planning
which may be a step towards a Corporate State. The present King is not the
same as the Prince of Wales who, in 1926, was friendly with A.J.
Cook... .[Edward] may take unconstitutional steps when the next capitalist crisis
arrives and we will be amazed to find democracy swept away."12
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It was not just the views themselves which aroused disquiet for some in the
party, but also Edward's practice of declaring them very openly. Morrison found
this a worrying phenomenon.
'While on a visit to South Wales, King Edward VIII made public
declarations about unemployment which could be construed as criticism of the
Government. It was a Conservative Government and the words themselves
were acceptable to the Labour Party. But I did not think well of it, for it was a
case of the Sovereign publicly expressing views on matters which were the
subject of political controversy. However, he would appear also to have
political views adverse to the Labour Party."13
Morrison's comments concern the question of the Crown's impartiality and
detachment from party politics. It was not just a matter of the King's opinions,
but of what he intended to do about them.
Chapter Three of this work examined the debate which was conducted
in the Labour Party during the early 1930s on the role of the Crown and the
use of the royal prerogative. It will be recalled that the principal concern was
about the prerogative being employed to prevent Labour taking office, to
obstruct attempts to overcome the House of Lords' opposition, or even to
suspend normal democratic government. On the other hand, the prerogative
would, hypothetically, become available to a socialist government which might
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require exceptional powers to overcome opposition to its legislation. The
prerogative could be viewed simultaneously both as undemocratic and as the
instrument for ensuring that the democratic will prevailed. At the time of the
Abdication, one Labour point of view sought unscrupulously to derive
advantage from the crisis, even if this meant dragging the Crown to the centre
of political controversy. The Daily Herald attacked those who "have crazily
advised the Labour Party to 'seize its chance' by converting the constitutional
difficulty into a political crisis, forcing the resignation of the Cabinet and forming
a Government". 14 An example of this "crazy" position was that adopted by two
Fellows of All Souls College, Oxford, A.L. Rowse and G.F. Hudson. They
suggested that Labour should come out in support of the King and offer to form
a government if Baldwin resigned. They could then ask for a dissolution and
fight an election not just on the royal marriage, but on the National
Government's record. Labour should thus declare in favour of a morganatic
marriage (in which a person of high rank marries a person of low rank, with
the latter not being elevated to the rank of the former, and any issue not having
entitlement to the higher party's titles etc.), or of allowing the King the freedom
to choose his spouse. In this way, the Tories would be thrown into confusion,
and be uncomfortably obliged to oppose the King. Surprisingly, Hugh Dalton
confessed to having some sympathy for this strategy, albeit only temporarily.
Writing to Hudson after the Abdication:
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"In the early stages of this affair I was inclined to share the views
expressed in your letter. But I soon changed my mind."18
Rowse tried to put pressure on the Labour Party through Attlee and Dalton,
who had come down to All Souls during the crisis. In retrospect, Rowse
admitted that he and Geoffrey Hudson were wrong, but that "it was the very
fact that the unfortunate King was being drummed out by Baldwin, Dawson
and Lang, to the accompaniment of the usual humbug and cant that put us on
his side". 16 For others in the party, it was the urgency of the international
situation which justified Labour taking whatever advantage it could from the
constitutional possibilities. The Town Crier quoted a telegram sent by six
Birmingham socialists to Attlee on 4th December.
"Don't back Baldwin's King ramp; take office and save Spain."17
The Times believed that there were "a few Labour members who feel that the
opportunity could be used to make a certain amount of political capital", but
was sure that this would be strongly discouraged by "responsible" sections of
the party.18
Apart from attitudes towards the King himself and towards the role of
the Crown and of the royal prerogative, other influential factors behind Labour
positions can be identified. Two of the most obvious were the question of the
marriage itself, and of the character of Mrs Simpson. Another factor was the
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feedback which the party leadership received on popular feeling amongst its
own supporters about the marriage. These will be considered within the
account and analysis of the Abdication crisis.
The unfolding crisis and Labour's response. 
It was not until early December that the British people were informed by
the press of the proposed marriage, and of its constitutional ramifications. By
that time, the leadership of the Labour movement had already made clear its
position. Attlee and Citrine had both met Baldwin and, without either having
consulted any colleagues, or having made any official commitment on behalf of
the Party or the T.U.C., offered their unequivocal support to the Prime Minister.
When Citrine was invited to Chequers on November 7th, 1936, Baldwin took
the opportunity to elicit his attitude to the news about Edward and Mrs
Simpson, which Citrine had heard during his recent visit to the United States.
Citrine confidently claimed to know how the British people in general would feel
about the marriage.
"People like him, but what they would stand from him as Prince of Wales
they are not ready to stand now that he is a King."19
Baldwin told Citrine that he had already had a meeting with the Labour Party
leader, at which Attlee had declared that the Labour Party had no objection to
an American becoming Queen, but that Mrs Simpson would be an
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unacceptable choice. Neither would the party approve of a morganatic
marriage.20
 Citrine's diary records his conversation with Baldwin.
"I told him that I thought he was undoubtedly interpreting the mind of
people in the Labour movement. We were republican at heart but we realized
that the limited monarchy as it had operated in Great Britain during the life of
the late King George V, was probably about the safest system in present
circumstances, despite the hereditary drawback, that we could possibly have. I
did not see how the alternative of a President was a possible one without
dragging him into politics as a partisan....I had heard some peculiar stories
about the King when he was Prince of Wales, but fortunately I had one of
those minds which could not carry tittle-tattle and I had forgotten all the
particulars...I went on to say that in the circumstances the P.M. was taking the
right course. Mrs. Simpson had now been divorced twice. How was it possible
in the circumstances for the King to marry such a woman with the respect of
people?"21
At this stage, it must be remembered, Attlee and Citrine were giving personal
opinions about the unsuitablity of the King's choice of spouse. The 'Crown
versus Parliament' issue was for the future. The King seems to have differed
from Citrine in his interpretation of the Baldwin-Attlee meeting. As Beaverbrook
recorded in an unpublished narrative of the events:
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"The King told me further that Mr. Baldwin had consulted Mr. Attlee and that
the P.M. reported that Mr. Attlee was opposed to the morganatic marriage. But
he did not think Mr. Baldwin had sized up Mr. Attlee's attitude correctly. Nor did
he think that Mr. Attlee would be against the morganatic marriage in the long
run. ,122
How widely the rumours about the King and Mrs Simpson had circulated in
the Labour Party before December is impossible to gauge. However, as the
news had reached the left-wing press in both England and Scotland, it can be
assumed that it was common knowledge in at least the higher reaches of the
Party. Kingsley Martin had been aware of the scandal "for months", and by
mid-November was also aware that certain assurances had been obtained
from the Labour Party leadership. In his private diary for 24th November,
Martin recorded:
"I tackled Pritt on 18th November about whether it is true that the Cabinet
threatened to resign if the King insists on marrying Mrs S., and whether it is
true that leaders of the Labour Party (some, I don't know which) have promised
to refrain from exploiting the situation in that case - which would mean forcing
the King to abdicate."23
In mid-November, the I.L.P. newspaper had attempted to include an article
criticising the press silence. The gist was that the King's personal relations
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were his own business, but that when the international press was carrying the
story, it was ridiculous that the British press should be silent. The article never
appeared, as the newspaper's printing company refused to print it. Kingsley
Martin was prepared to publish an article in the New Statesman defending the
King's right to choose the wife he wanted, and by 26th November the article
was in the King's hands, but although Edward was delighted with its contents,
he did not want immediate publication and it did not appear.
By the time the news of the crisis broke in the British press on 3rd
December, it had reached the stage by which it could be represented as the
danger of a challenge by the Crown to the authority of the Cabinet. It was in
this way that the readers of the Daily Herald were introduced to the crisis. An
editorial spoke cryptically of a grave difference between the King and the
Cabinet. There was no mention of Mrs Simpson, but simply a reference to the
difficulty in drawing a line between the public and private affairs of a king.
"For this reason, affairs which would be a private citizen's private affair are
matters upon which a constitutional monarch should, and must, consider the
advice of his elected Ministers."24
The point was reinforced by an article in which Laski discussed "Crown and
Cabinet". Again without mentioning specifically any current events, Laski
examined the constitutional position faced by a monarch who did not find the
advice of his ministers acceptable. He would have to find other ministers who
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could offer alternative advice and who could command a majority in the
Commons. This would necessitate a General Election, which the new
government might not win. But,
"...even his [the King's] victory would be a grave constitutional event, since it
would make him an independent source of power in the State, whose views
would be actively canvassed by parties. This would end the theory of the
Crown's neutrality, which is pivotal to our political system."25
On 4th December the Daily Herald established the line which was to remain
constant throughout the crisis. This was a firm insistence that the crisis was
about the preservation of parliamentary government. Once the King had
received the advice of his Cabinet, the only courses open to him were
abandonment of the proposed marriage, or abdication.
"Either the King is bound to accept his Ministers' advice, or else the British
democratic Constitution ceases to work, and the nation is confronted with
issues which go back to the constitutional struggles between King and
Parliament of 200 years ago."26
On the marriage itself, the Herald remained ambiguous. While expressing
sympathy with the King, marriage to Mrs Simpson would cause too much
discontent at home and in the Dominions. It fell short of expressing moral
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disapproval of the King's choice, and there seemed an awareness that some of
its readership might be hostile to an "Old Guard" campaign against Mrs
Simpson. The newspaper sought to distinguish its own case from the
campaign of those who objected to Mrs Simpson because she was an
American and a commoner. With this position, they had no sympathy. The
language of the editorial also reveals sensitivity to the affection for the King
held by at least a portion of the newspaper's readership.
"The people well know that the 'Old Guard' would fight against the King's
marriage to a commoner. They well know that the King's intimacy with the
people, his nearness to them, his sympathy with their difficulties, his concern
for their troubles, are not altogether pleasing to this 'Old Guard'."27
However, the newspaper urged the Cabinet to make clear their grounds for
objecting to the marriage, to demonstrate that it was not a matter of snobbery.
For itself, the newspaper appeared to accept the Cabinet's judgement, and to
imply that the justifiable objection was to the King marrying a twice-divorced
woman. Implicit in the Herald's coverage of the crisis was an uncomfortable
awareness that for some, if not most, of its readers, Edward was the people's
monarch, the King with a common touch and an interest in the lives of the poor
and deprived. So, immediately after the Abdication, attention switched to the
new King George VI, focusing upon those speeches in which, just as his
brother before him, he showed concern for the working class, through his
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interest in industrial welfare and co-operation, and discreet concern about the
high level of unemployment.
The position which the Herald adopted was consistent, but there is
evidence that before the crisis became public, powerful voices were
expressing opinions very different from its eventual line. J.S. Elias of Odham's
Press, the Heralds publisher, seemed to Beaverbrook to be initially
sympathetic to the King.
"Churchill and I had an interview with Mr Elias of the Daily Herald. He was
personally favourable and gave us reason to hope that he would support the
King. But his Labour Party colleagues, who dictated policy, over-ruled Mr Elias
and supported the Abdication."28
However, Elias later explained that his personal feelings were mixed, with an
innate sense of loyalty to the King in conflict with his strong belief in the
sanctity of marriage. 29 The latter views, he felt sure, were shared by a large
number of others, including, presumably, many Daily Herald readers. Similarly
with Francis Williams:
"My first reactions were to wish the King well in this matter. However, it
soon became clear from the reports that came flooding in from the East End of
London and from industrial areas in the Midlands and North and in South
Wales that the general mass of middle- and working-class readers of the
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Herald were deeply upset by the suggestion that a woman who had been
twice through the divorce courts might become Queen." 30 .
Bevin, whose influence over the newspaper was a powerful one, was tempted
at one point to exploit the possibility to embarrass Baldwin, despite the high
risks involved. Bevin wrote to Attlee on December 7th, some days into the
public crisis:
'We cannot forget that old Baldwin did us over the Trades Union Act, over
Abyssinia, over re-armament and over peace at the last general election.. .The
risk of personal government is great: on the other hand so is the risk of backing
the Government without the facts."31
The fact that the Herald adopted and maintained the position which it did,
seems, however, to have stemmed from Bevin's conviction that it was too
dangerous to ignore the constitutional implications of the crisis. Whatever he
may have written to Attlee, Bevin had already made a clear, public declaration
of his own belief:
"The principle that will guide this great Labour movement in every
Constitutional crisis is that we shall not allow anything to take place which
weakens the supremacy of Parliamentary Government."32
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Certainly, Attlee believed it was Bevin who was responsible for ensuring that
the Herald "kept its head and dealt with the matter in a statesmanlike, not
merely a sensational manner". 33 Francis Williams recalled that Bevin had
previously been critical of the Herald for giving more space to royalty than he
thought it worth, but "was now convinced that royalty was an important popular
institution which ordinary people wanted preserved without a stain on its
character".34
The New Statesman had a distinctly different position from that of the
Herald, a reflection of a difference in readership and of the idiosyncratic views
of its editor, Kingsley Martin. As mentioned earlier, Martin had been
sympathetic to the King's position, and had offered to include an article in the
New Statesman which would provide Edward with support. When the journal
eventually declared its view, however, it was circumspect, if not contradictory.
In a leader entitled "King and Country", the proposed marriage was described
as "a matter for legitimate public concern", and then later as "his own affair".35
Given the unprecedented constitutional dilemma and the "lamentable"
prospect of the King's abdication, a compromise was advocated in the form of
a morganatic marriage. The King's personal qualities were praised. Seven
days later the story was altogether different. Regret at the Abdication was now
severely qualified: in the long run "all democratic institutions, including the
Monarchy itself, may be safer for the change". 36 The writer, quite probably
Martin himself, hinted at "shortcomings in Edward's character" and stated that
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"it is an open secret that much of the society that surrounded King Edward has
been irresponsible and politically, as well as morally, undesirable". 37
 Martin
exhibited here the inconsistency which Bevin found characteristic of Labour's
intellectuals.
What of the position adopted by and within the Parliamentary Labour
Party? Attlee had, of course, given Baldwin his personal support in November,
but without disclosing anything to his party colleagues. Once the newspapers
had broken the news, the P.L.P. could no longer be excluded from involvement
in the events. The P.L.P. Executive Committee met on the evening of
December 3rd, and expressed its "disquiet" at the course of events. According
to Ernest Hunter, political correspondent of the Daily Herald, there was a
discernible change of opinion in the P.L.P. Initially, it was felt that the private
affairs of the King should not be subject to interference. The crucial factor
behind the changed attitude was the information that the King had taken the
initiative, by requesting the Cabinet to introduce special legislation to
accommodate his proposed marriage. Hunter believed that,
"The opinion in the Parliamentary Labour Party is steadily hardening in
support of the view that the authority of Parliament must be upheld against the
personal wishes of the King...At least 90 per cent of Labour M.P.'s when it
comes to a final decision, will be found to support the Cabinet's refusal to bring
forward such a measure."38
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In explaining this shift in the P.L.P. in favour of the Cabinet's position, Hunter
cited, besides the question of the authority of Parliament, awareness of the
strength of feeling in the Dominions; and of the danger of the growth of a mass
movement which opposed parliamentary government and which could lead to
Fascism. Meanwhile, the Labour Party refused to commit itself publicly either
way, and maintained the fiction that Attlee "has not given any undertaking, nor
has he been asked for any". 39 The opposition was merely being informed. At
an N.E.C. meeting on 7th December, Attlee outlined the current situation and
indicated what, in his view, would be the reaction in Parliament and in the
country to various eventualities. Although there was a two-hour discussion, it
was decided that "as no crisis had yet been reached, the N.E.C. was not
required to reach any conclusion". 49 The P.L.P. met again on 8th December,
and was addressed by Attlee on behalf of a united Executive, and, although no
vote was taken, the meeting came out overwhelmingly in support of the view
that in the event of a definite constitutional breach between the King and his
Ministers, the authority of Parliament must be upheld. It was believed that only
a handful of Labour M.P.'s would take the risk of appearing to take the side of
the King against Parliament.
In the House of Commons, there was virtually no discussion of the
issues involved, with Baldwin providing the barest details about the Cabinet's
refusal to introduce enabling legislation to permit a morganatic marriage. The
only hint of dissent from the Labour side was an enquiry from Ernest Thurtle,
Lansbury's son-in-law, about the possibility of a Commons' vote on the
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question of a morganatic marriage. Amongst other things, this indicated how
far Thurtle's view on the monarchy had changed, for it was he who had
seconded the republican resolution at the Labour Party conference of 1923. In
the session which received the message of abdication, only Josiah
Wedgwood, of the Labour backbench M.P.'s present, offered an opinion.
Wedgwood and Thurtle had attended a meeting at the offices of the Imperial
Policy Group on the evening of December 7th. There they met a group of
supporters of the King, comprising about forty Conservatives from both Houses
of Parliament. Wedgwood was motivated in his support for the King mainly by
his dislike of the King's religious opponents. He had been scarred by the
treatment received at the time of his own divorce.
"It was really because I liked him [the King] and hated the Archbishop."'"
The I.L.P.'s republican amendment to the Abdication Bill was supported by
only two Labour M.P.'s, Dr Alfred Salter and G.D. Hardie, brother of Keir
Hardie. In November, Attlee had told Baldwin that the Labour Party would,
when it became aware of the facts, oppose the choice of Mrs Simpson and
object to any plan for morganatic marriage. Subsequently, Attlee claimed to
have been fully vindicated in this view.
"I found that I had correctly gauged the Party attitude. Despite the
sympathy felt for the King and the affection which his visits to the depressed
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areas had created, the Party - with the exception of a few of the intelligentsia
who can be trusted to take the wrong view on any subject - were in agreement
with the views I had expressed."42
Divided opinion on Labour's left. 
It is difficult to recall another event which had produced such divergent
reactions on the left of the Party. Several factors appear to have been in
operation. There was the ambiguous nature of Edward's political sympathies,
with some on the left preferring to recall his comments about the poor and
unemployed, without focusing upon his proposed solutions to social and
economic problems. Others, in contrast, were attentive to the rumours about
his and, particularly, Mrs Simpson's, enthusiasm for Hitler and Mussolini.
Additionally, there was political desperation at Labour's parliamentary
impotence in the face of domestic economic depression and the alarming
advance of fascism on the continent. Some were tempted to exploit the
political opportunity of the crisis to increase Labour's popularity and its chances
of gaining power. Some others shared the Party leadership's concern that the
powers of Parliament, and the principle that the Crown acted on ministerial
advice, should be preserved. Those with republican convictions regarded the
events as a rare opportunity to attack the monarchy while it was weakened.
The following account examines arguments and views across this spectrum. It
is by no means an exhaustive taxonomy, but offers an indication of the breadth
of opinion and, in some cases, of the depth of confusion.
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Turning first to Edward's supporters on the Labour left, their argument was
essentially two-fold. Their enthusiasm was not for the monarchy per se, but for
this most unusual of monarchs: one whose politics seemed to them to be of
the left. Edward's publicly expressed anguish about the social problems of the
distressed areas were the grounds for this belief. Secondly, and in
consequence, Edward was regarded as the victim of a conspiracy by the
political right, led by Baldwin, who feared his popularity and his radical politics.
Labour and the King thus shared a common enemy. The fellow-traveller and
Labour M.P., D.N. Pritt, was active in canvassing support for Edward in the
days before the Abdication, and in close contact with Edward's solicitor, Walter
Monckton. Pritt described the feeling of Edward's friends that Baldwin and his
government were "determined to rid the Empire of this rebel King with red
sympathies". 43 Writing nearly thirty years later in his autobiography, Pritt still
adhered to his belief that Edward had been dismissed by a financial oligarchy.
"His [Edward's] real crime was that he had, on a number of occasions,
publicly expressed sympathy and horror over the conditions - and especially
the houses - in which both workers and unemployed had to live.""
Next were those who held that the whole crisis was simply a distraction from
matters of genuine concern to the Labour Party, and irrelevant to the political
interests of the Party. They refused to engage with the constitutional issues
involved, or to declare an allegiance in what they characterised as a bogus
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contest of strength between King and Parliament. Lansbury publicly expressed
the view that the whole business was an irrelevance and a distraction from the
important matters of poverty and unemployment. For him, the question of
Crown versus Parliament did not arise, because Parliament had not been
required to decide anything, but had merely received information about the
crisis. Moreover,
"...I think the King knows as well as any of us that in a struggle of that kind,
the overwhelming mass of people will see that democratic Parliament remains
supreme."45
He believed that a compromise solution could and would be found. Lansbury's
public statements generally followed this line, but if accounts of his private
views are to be believed, his position appears more ambiguous, if not
confused. Laski recalled that Lansbury had been prevented from starting "a
salute to the democratic King", although what exactly is meant by this is not
clear.46
Also representative of this position was the current chairman of the
Socialist League, William Mellor. During the crisis, Mellor sought to distance
himself from the positions of both Government and King. Describing the choice
put before the King as "hard", he counselled caution about supporting the
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Government. His explanation of the crisis was that the Government saw the
unconventional Edward as a threat to their own long-term interests.
"I charge the Government with having created a crisis. I say quite openly
that their reason for so doing is that they believe that if the King is allowed to
marry Mrs Simpson, he will, by so doing, cut from under the existing Church
and State many of their props and securities."47
Mellor, in an article which echoed Lansbury's approach, complained that the
proposed marriage had "swept Spain, unemployment, the menace of war, the
German-Japanese alliance against the Comintern, into the background of
news". 48 He regarded it as a "small matter". Mellor's Socialist League
colleague and mistress, Barbara Betts (later Castle) was reported as calling on
the Labour Party not to support Baldwin and demanding that the King be told
to obey the Constitution:* This argument seems to underpin a call for Labour
independence by a logical inconsistency.
If Edward's supporters on the left were rather eccentric or marginal figures,
the same could not be said of those who advocated support for the Cabinet.
Laski was the left's most prominent and consistent supporter of Baldwin's
position. He wrote three articles for the Daily Herald over the course of nine
days, the first of which was referred to earlier in this chapter. That article had
not mentioned the current circumstances, but had nevertheless established the
Crown versus Parliament issue as the significant one. In his second article,
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Laski repeated this argument, but made his comments more specific. Neither
the personality of the King, nor the wisdom or otherwise of his choice, really
mattered. Instead, it was crucial that no precedent should emerge from the
crisis which would make the Crown a source of independent political authority.
"..if the right of independent monarchical power is established, it may be
invoked on other occasions for purposes utterly incompatible with democratic
constitutionalism."5°
If there were to be a general election, called on the question of the power of
the Crown, and that election decided in favour of the Crown, the King would
become once more the master of the Constitution. Laski, in an oblique
reference to colleagues on the left who saw in the King a sympathetic spirit,
denied the significance of the King's political inclinations.
"It is irrelevant.. .that there are symptoms, above all in domestic affairs, that
the King sympathises with an attitude nearer to that of the Labour Party than to
that of the Cabinet."51
Laski himself held no such illusions about the King's politics, whether
international or domestic. He wrote to an American friend on December 11th:
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"Don't believe the nonsense you hear that he's a socialist. He is no more a
socialist than J.D. Rockefeller or any other rich man who has occasional
prickings of conscience."52
He also opposed the principle of morganatic marriage on the grounds that it
was symbolic of "that caste system to which the Labour Party is opposed".
(Ellen Wilkinson also expressed opposition to morganatic marriage, but on the
grounds that it offended against sexual equality. 53 ) His third and final Herald
article appeared after the Abdication, and celebrated the reassertion of
Parliament's supremacy. It contained echoes of Laski's old preoccupation that
Conservatives might seek to use the Crown's influence in some future political
crisis. Laski believed that this had "received a mortal blow by the King's
abdication". 54 As for his respected colleagues on the left who had advocated
support for the King's plan, which they foresaw leading to the dismissal of the
Government and the formation of a Labour government, Laski believed them to
have been mistaken and shortsighted. Even had Labour won such an election,
he did not believe it would have carried with it the kind of firm and tenacious
support necessary to see through a socialist programme. Some months after
the crisis, Laski observed that,
"....not a dozen of the British intelligentsia had understood what the struggle
was about. He laughed at those who held that Mrs Simpson might possibly
marry Edward without becoming Queen, declared that 'Cripps was silly
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too'.. .and ended characteristically with the remark that 'it will be difficult,
without revolution, for the new man to interfere in policy. That, after all, is the
main thing."`55
Cripps was at least prepared to engage with the legal and constitutional
questions raised by the King's proposed marriage. His view was rather
idiosyncratic, disagreeing with the opposition to Mrs Simpson as the King's
choice, whilst approving of the Cabinet's refusal to countenance a morganatic
marriage, and of its insistence on the King accepting ministerial advice. He
could see no sufficient reason to force the King's abdication because of the
choice he had made, but believed that social prejudices and snobbery were
behind the objections to Mrs Simpson.
"I cannot help feeling that if the lady in question had been a member of the
English aristocracy, under precisely similar circumstances, quite a different
decision would have been made."56
As for the King's request that legislation be introduced to permit a morganatic
marriage, Cripps declared this unnecessary as the circumstances themselves
were not exceptional. In British law there was no such thing as morganatic
marriage. Finally, there was the question of Parliament's supremacy.
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"The more vexed question that is raised is whether in this matter of his
marriage the King is bound as a constitutional monarch to accept the advice of
his ministers. The answer to that question indubitably is, 'Yes, he is bound."57
Finally, there were the republicans, for whom the constitutional
implications and immediate political considerations were less significant than
the opportunity afforded to air the republican case. Amongst this group,
Aneurin Bevan's views are certainly worthy of consideration, particularly as he
was involved, if in a very minor way, in the consultations which accompanied
the crisis. There is evidence that Beaverbrook believed Bevan might be
sympathetic to the King's predicament, and Beaverbrook's diary records a
dinner appointment with Bevan and Bracken on December 3rd. Although not
the most reliable of sources, Beaverbrook, in a draft account he prepared for
use by Edward in his book (but not ultimately included), gave this summary of
Bevan's attitude.
"It is understood that Mr. Aneurin Bevan was in favour of the morganatic
marriage plan, and it is possible that after a period of confusion a very mixed
government might have been formed out of the wreckage of the existing
parties."58
Bevan certainly took a very different position from the Labour Party leadership
on the constitutional issue of Cabinet advice, maintaining that the real point
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was not whether the King should accept that advice, but whether it had been
the correct advice. When these views became known, Bevan received an
invitation from Beaverbrook to meet the King at Beaverbrook's London home.
The King asked Bevan what he thought might be the reaction of the
Parliamentary Labour Party if he insisted on marrying Mrs Simpson.
"His reply was that his own feelings were entirely neutral, but if the King
wished to understand the feelings of the members of the Party, he could not do
better than ask himself what would be the reaction of a typical middle-class
woman in Surbiton."59
In an article in the first issue of Tribune, Bevan developed his ideas on the
Abdication crisis into a more general analysis of the socio-political role of the
monarchy. Starting from the Mellor/Lansbury depiction of the crisis as a
diversion from the "sombre reality" of poverty and social deprivation, Bevan
offered a critique not just of the monarchy, but of the predominant line of
approach to the crisis adopted by the Labour Party. The role of the monarch
was that of "bulwark-in-chief for the British social system", and the political
representatives of the ruling class were upset because Edward had "violated
their class code, betrayed their class interests and placed their whole carefully
preserved structure in peril of destruction". 69 What should the Labour Party
have done? Bevan acknowledged the difficulty of declaring either for or against
the King's conduct. However, he rejected the mainstream approach, typified by
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the Daily Herald, and Laski's articles therein, that it was a problem of the King
against Parliament. The party should have declared itself against "the mumbo-
jumbo of the whole business", and thereby sought to undermine the institution
of monarchy.
"No charge could have been made against it of dragging in a Republican
issue. Such an issue was implicit in the situation. The Labour Party has too
much reverence."61
Bevan's whole approach to the crisis was virtually identical to that of the I.L.P.
There is also some evidence that this view was shared by some in the Labour
Party in the country. In Birmingham, there was resentment that the Daily
Herald should lump together with Pollitt and Mosley all those who felt the King
should be able to marry whom he liked, and frustration at the approach of the
parliamentary leadership.
'Why are our leaders so anxious to preserve the prestige of the Crown.
Republicanism is not usually a burning issue in this country, and Labour does
well - in most cases - to ignore it. But why should Labour go out of its way to
help the ruling class maintain its whited sepulchres inviolate."62
Although at this time no longer affiliated to the Labour Party, the I.L.P.'s
reaction to the crisis should not be ignored, as it offers a point of contrast to the
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Labour Party's, as well as constituting part of the context of left-wing opinion.
Weeks before the crisis broke in the press, the New Leader had included an
article which the printing company had then refused to print. Originally
intended for publication on November 13th, it eventually appeared on
December 11th. Beginning with a denunciation of the censorship of the British
press on the subject of the proposed marriage, the article offered sympathy on
a personal level to somebody faced with social bigotry.
"If it is true that the King is insisting on his right as a man to marry the wife
of his choice, the sympathies of all broad-minded people will be with him..."63
This did not, however, amount to support for the King, as the article referred to
worrying rumours about Mrs Simpson's fascist sympathies. The editorial in the
December 11th issue shifted the emphasis away from personal sympathy, and
warned against such sentimental reactions infecting the working class
movement. In terms of the King's own politics, the insight was acute. The writer
was unimpressed by Edward's expressions of sympathy for the unemployed;
such a tactic quite accorded with the fascist practice of championing the
underprivileged. The main weight of criticism was reserved for the Labour
Party leadership, and the course advocated in the article was exactly that
which the Daily Herald denounced as mistaken and foolhardy. The Labour
Party, it was suggested, should take office immediately if the King decided to
refuse the Cabinet's advice and sent for Attlee. If Labour declined to do so,
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"This would be throwing away a great opportunity. From a working class
point of view it is much more important to get rid of the National Government
than to secure a monarch who satisfies the old aristocracy and the Archbishop
of Canterbury. tf64
This ignored the obvious objection that such an approach would greatly
strengthen both the political power of the monarchy, which the I.L.P. opposed,
and the personal influence of a monarch whom the I.L.P. believed to have
fascist tendencies.
At the beginning of the crisis, there were rumours that the I.L.P. had
pledged its support for Baldwin, but the position was clarified by a statement
from Brockway, the I.L.P. General Secretary, on 4th December. He declared
that the I.L.P. was uncommitted to either side, and regarded the crisis as
significant only in its capacity to weaken the hereditary system of monarchy.
"[The I.L.P.] is Republican and anti-Monarchical. It sees in the crisis
evidence of the fundamental unsoundness of the Monarchical system, which
brings into sharp conflict the undoubted human right of the King as a man to
marry whom he likes and the political consequences of such action on the
Church and State, of which by accident of birth he is head."65
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This was the principal theme of the I.L.P. contributions in Parliament when the
abdication message was received there. In Maxton's view, the hereditary
principle made such an crisis inevitable at some stage, and the institution of
monarchy was an anachronism which had no place in an advanced country.
Buchanan was more personal in his line of attack, asserting that Edward was
being disposed of because he was "a weak creature". In the debate on the
Abdication Bill on 11th December, the I.L.P. moved a republican amendment,
and Maxton explained to the House of Commons, in a classic statement of
Scottish socialist republicanism, why a socialist was necessarily a republican.
He was:
"For the socialist system of society as a society of equality - economic
equality, social equality - with neither Kings nor Courts, nor nobles, nor peers,
for a no-class society. Here today we are asked to give our consent to the
continuation of the outstanding symbol, the very head and front, of a class
society. 1166
He was prepared to admit that during the previous three reigns the
constitutional monarchy had worked reasonably well, but after the current
events, it would never work as well again. In seconding the motion, Campbell
Stephen recalled the events of 1931, and the feelings of Labour members "that
there had been a departure from procedure and intervention into politics by the
Monarch... ,,67 Taking up Attlee's restatement of the old social-democratic
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contention that it was fundamental economic problems which were important,
and not the "distraction" of republicanism, Stephen countered that the two
were, in reality, inextricably linked, as "the monarchical system has a very
great significance with regard to the maintenance of the present economic
order". 68
 The republican amendment attracted just five votes, with I.L.P.
members joined by two Labour backbenchers, Salter and Hardie, and the
Communist Willie Gallecher. After the Abdication, an article in the New Leader
expressed shock at Labour's support of the monarchy, and explored the
necessity but insufficiency of a republican constitution for a socialist society.
"It is not enough to say that a President is no better than a King. A
President elected by the people is at least a representative of the people and
can be changed by the people. But to say this is not to suggest that
Republicanism is itself the alternative to the Monarchical system. Socialists are
concerned not so much with the head of the State as with the general body of
the State. We want not a Republic but a Workers' Republic.. .A King would be
impossible in a Workers' Republic. A President would be necessary in a
Workers' Republic."69
This clear and reasoned view of the relationship between socialism and
republicanism stood in contrast to the Labour Party leadership's attachment to
a reformed, constitutional monarchy, which would, it believed, help to
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guarantee the parliamentary democracy through which Labour would transform
British society.
As the I.L.P. position offers perspective to Labour's, so does that
of the Communist Party. In several ways, the Communist response to the
abdication crisis resembled the I.L.P.'s, asserting that the party stood for a
"Workers' Republic" and wishing a plague on both houses. As Campbell
Stephen had done, Pollitt recalled 1931 as evidence that the monarchy
remained a political force on the side of capitalism. 70 Just as had the I.L.P.,
the Communists called upon Labour to seize the opportunity to form a
government. However, the attempt to explain the origins of the problem was
reduced to characterising it as a struggle between "the rival gangs of
capitalism", which were the "Baldwin gang" and a "rival gang of big
capitalists". 71 Bosses of capitalism required a puppet to concea) 11-16r dass
rule, but in this instance the puppet had begun to act like a human being,
which put the enterprise at risk. Whereas the I.L.P. had grudgingly accepted
the relative success of the constitutional monarchy in modern times, the
Communists rejected not just the monarchy but the entire Constitution.
"In the U.S.S.R. the Constitution of Socialism triumphant, in Britain
the Constitution of Monopoly Capitalism. In the U.S.S.R .t.he
Constitution.. .which guarantees for evermore social and political liberty for
all. 72
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The monarchy was, according to Strachey, "an integral part of the governing
class machine", and the mere citation of precedents of good constitutional
practice would not prevent the monarchy from being used against the working
class in the future, when real issues of class power arose." The latter point
was one often made on the Labour left in the early 1930's, but mainstream
Labour, and particularly the leadership, saw the Constitution, and within it the
constitutional monarchy, as the guarantor of freedoms denied under foreign
dictatorships, including the U.S.S.R.
Reflections on the Abdication. 
The Labour Party leadership had supported Baldwin unequivocally during
the crisis, but in the immediate aftermath there was an attempt to formulate a
distinctive party position on the monarchy. It was a position different from the
republicanism of the I.L.P. or from those, such as Bevan, on its own left wing. It
also sought to distance Labour from that uncritical adulation of the monarchy
which characterised Conservative opinion. It sought reform rather than
abolition of the monarchy, and reflected an awareness of the impossibility of
reconciling the existing social character of the monarchy with Labour's own
values. Attlee took the opportunity provided by debate on the Abdication Bill to
set out these views. He was careful not to place any blame on the royal family
for the "vulgar adulation" and the "unreal halo" placed upon them.
Responsibility lay with the press and with the "interests which stand for wealth
and class privilege". 74 Attlee called for a change in the character of the
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monarchy, with greater simplicity and less Court ceremonial, and drew
attention to the "narrow and privileged class" character of the courtiers.
"I hope that we shall see a new start made. I believe this is necessary if
constitutional monarchy is to survive in the present age.. .We as a party stand
for the disappearance of class barriers and moving towards equality.. .and in
the interests of this country, we should see the utmost simplicity in the
monarchy..."75
This approach was echoed by Kingsley Martin in the New Statesman, who
hoped that the new King would not be built up into a popular idol, and who
praised the attitude towards the monarchy displayed in Scandinavian
countries. 76 An anonymously written article in the New Statesman, probably
the work of Martin, distinguished between the monarchy's constitutional
function and its exclusive social character. The former did not necessitate the
latter. "Democratisation" of the Court was desirable; by this, the writer meant a
more socially representative Court.
The calls for reform and simplification continued to be made during the
discussions of the Civil List Committee at the time of George VI's accession,
and Attlee believed that this reflected feeling in the country at large about the
character of Court life. The party leadership seemed quite prepared to accept
an hereditary monarchy which retained undefined constitutional powers
through the royal prerogative, if only that monarchy could appear less
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aristocratic and socially exclusive. The public criticism of the monarchy made
in the weeks following the Abdication might have seemed bold by Labour's
normal standards, but a cautious leadership clearly felt that public opinion
would support it, and that was always a key consideration preceding any
publicly declared opinions about the monarchy.
As for the departing Edward, there was general relief amongst the party
leadership that he had gone, to be replaced by a safer bet. Attlee felt that the
monarchy's prestige had been damaged, but "in the event it was fortunate", in
allowing George VI to raise the monarchy "to greater heights than ever
before". 77 Salter considered, too optimistically, that the damage to the
monarchy was not just severe but permanent, and that the Abdication crisis
had threatened the whole social order, a peril of which the ruling classes were
quite conscious.
"The sacrosanctity of Royalty has been destroyed. The halo of Kingship has
been shattered. The veneration for the Crown has been broken... For one
dreadful week the upper classes were in a state of fervid anxiety, amounting to
terror, lest if the monarchy went they too would lose their rank and
privileges."78
The rumours of Edward's political sympathies with the far right were given
substance by his visit to Germany in 1937, which provoked Herbert Morrison
into issuing a public rebuke in Forward.
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"He [Edward] had always failed to realize that in a constitutional monarchy,
neither the heir to the Throne nor the King can publicly manifest opinions on
controversial matters... [These expressions of opinion] were constitutionally
dangerous and not inconsistent with those Fascist tendencies with which (quite
possibly unjustly) he is credited.... He cannot be permitted to re-enter public life
- in this country at any rate."78
Josiah Wedgwood, the P.L.P.'s chief supporter of the King, later admitted that
he had been mistaken, in the light of both contemporary and subsequent
evidence.
"Our fan mail was unbounded for some days, but I noticed the Fascist touch
about many of the letters of my new admirers; and the subsequent career of
the Royal Duke in Austria, Germany and France inclines me to think that
Baldwin was wise..."8°
As Edward departed, the Labour leadership, as much as Baldwin's
Cabinet, welcomed a return to the bourgeois respectability which had
characterised the reign of George V, and breathed a sigh of relief that a
dangerous episode had been concluded. The Party's parliamentary leadership,
the Daily Herald, Bevin, Laski and others, had combined to help ensure that
Baldwin's Cabinet prevailed. They had played a supporting part in what
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Beatrice Webb characterised as "the most superb manifestation of good
manners on the part of the British governing class", 81 and must share the
credit (or blame) with Baldwin, of whom "many whispered that he had saved
the British monarchy".82
Textual Analysis. 
Daily Herald. 
The texts to be examined in this section are, for the most part, editorials,
but as in the previous chapter, some attention will be given to reports from
Hannen Swaffer. Analysis indicates an alteration in tone of address to its
readership, although the Herald's analysis of the crisis and its preferred
outcome remained entirely consistent throughout. In accounting for this
changed tone of address, one factor was surely the perceptions of public
opinion concerning the King's plan to marry. There is some evidence of an
initial tension between the political instincts of both the editorial staff and those
above them, and the commercial concern that the newspaper should not
offend its readership by adopting an unpopular line. Ironically, the resolution of
this tension appears to have resulted from a happy coincidence; that the
constitutional objections which formed the ostensible basis of the Herald's
case required the same outcome as did the moral objections of its readership,
as depicted by informal surveys of opinion.
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The Herald's first editorial dealing with the subject, on the front page of
the paper, is characterised linguistically by two distinctive patterns of
transitivity. 83 The first represents Baldwin as agent, and repeats the modality of
necessity":
Premier must tell all facts
Mr Baldwin must dispel the secrecy
The second pattern represents the people and Parliament as the receivers in
passive structures:
Parliament and the people are surely entitled...
the mind of the country is liable to be diverted..
At this stage, the King does not appear either as ergative agent or as
grammatical subject, but only as an indirect object. At the heart of the editorial
is repeated lexis, which indicates a key concern:
rumours.. .are spreading
the danger of rumours spreading
The rumours in question were clearly of vital concern to the Herald, as they
had potential appeal to at least some of the readership:
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"It is being suggested that the Cabinet's concern is not merely over the
King's personal affairs, but over his political activities - his interest in
unemployment and distressed areas, and foreign affairs."85
The paragraph which contains this sentence is sub-titled "Political Affairs?", but
the question is not answered, nor is the accuracy or inaccuracy of the rumours
assessed.
Unusually, the same edition of the Herald carried a second editorial,
inside the newspaper. The narrative structure of the editorial is revealing. The
first section takes careful account of the sensibilities of its readers, anticipating
both their sympathy towards the personal predicament of the King and the
potential appeal of the "democratic" aspect of marriage to a commoner. This
opening section is dense with adjectives and nouns which indicate a keen
awareness that readers have to be won over from an initial position of
sympathy for Edward.
human (x3)
humanity
acute distress
profound grief
purely personal
private
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suffering
sympathy
This concentration of terms occurs within a paragraph of approximately one
hundred words.
The next section of the text summarises the objections to the marriage,
whilst noticeably withholding any moral judgement of its own on the question of
divorce and re-marriage. The modality in this area contrasts with that
employed in discussion of the constitutional issue:
these views may be wise..
they may be relaxed in the future
On the constitutional question of accepting Cabinet advice:
we cannot see how the Cabinet could have done otherwise
only one reply is possible
Labour must be sensitive to the constitutional
implications...
In seeking to persuade its own public of the correctness of its position, the
Herald cites wider public opinion as sufficient reason to support the Cabinet:
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vast numbers of people here and in the Dominions
millions of our people
The closing section of the editorial attempts to establish the democratic
credentials of its position:
popularly elected Ministers
British democratic Constitution
the Government which the people has freely chosen
democratic satisfaction
The insecurity underlying the Herald's appeal to its readers was even
more apparent in the following day's editoria1. 86 It purported to comment on the
reactions of:
the people (x4)
the country as a whole
the general public
wide sections of the public
The reactions were characterised within one, hundred-word paragraph as:
great bewilderment
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misconception
misunderstanding
not.. .a clear picture
The anxiety manifest through this example of overlexicalisation plainly relates
to its own readership. That readership is not directly identified as sharing in the
"misconception", as that could well be regarded as insulting or patronising.
However, the basis of the "misconception", and the categorisation of some key
participants in the crisis, indicate that too many of the Herald's readers share
the "misunderstanding" of "wide sections of the public". The basis of the
"misconception" is the belief that the objection to the King's choice of wife is
her origin i.e. from outside "the ranks of aristocracy or dynasty". Those (such
as, presumably, readers of the Herald) who have no time for snobbery would
react against such anti-democratic prejudice. The Herald, conscious that it was
attempting to align its readers with a politically uncongenial government and an
equally uncongenial wider political establishment, attributed a different
motivation to the latter. The "people" and "the Old Guard" might find
themselves temporarily on the same side, but for different reasons.
"The people well know that the 'Old Guard' would fight against the
King's marriage to a commoner. They well know that the King's intimacy with
the people, his nearness to them, his sympathy with their difficulties, his
concern for their troubles, are not altogether pleasing to this 'Old Guard'."87
360
This is a discernible change from the previous day's categorisation as 'mere
rumour the suggestion that the Cabinet's opposition to the King's plan
emanated from their dislike of the King's democratic instincts. The concession
that his political beliefs did motivate some of the King's opponents made the
picture more complex.
The final editorial devoted to the crisis is more robust in tone than
previous ones. 88
 The uncertainty, implicit in the constant references to the
King's qualities and the justifiably high level of his popularity, disappeared.
Believing it was faced with a genuinely divided readership, the Herald had,
until December 7, taken pains to express its understanding of those who took
the King's part. Two developments occurred which encouraged the Herald to
adopt a new robustness. The evidence arriving at the Herald's offices that the
"general mass" of its readers were "deeply upset" at the possibility of Mrs
Simpson becoming Queen, emboldened the newspaper's appeal to its public.
Moreover, the pro-King demonstrations over the weekend in London provided
the Herald with an opportunity to characterise supporters of the King's right to
marry as anti-democratic. This strengthened the Herald's case, maintained
from the outset, that the fundamental issue was the constitutional right of
democratically elected ministers to have their advice accepted. The Herald
reduced the categories of participants in the crisis to two. The net effect of this
reduction was to place Labour supporters of the King's position into alliance
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with unsavoury elements. This latter group, the "bedfellows" of Labour people
who took the King's side, was characterised as small and extremist:
the minority demonstration
the small groups behind it
critics of the democratic principle
Sir Oswald Mosley and Mr Harry Pollitt
(not) passionate defenders of the democratic principle
newspapers... publicly advocating Fascism
The Herald sought by its categorisation to deny the possibility of any "third
way" ( i.e. neither aligned with the Cabinet nor with the far-right supporters of
the King), and to stigmatise any naive attempt to exploit the King's popularity
and his perceived political radicalism in order to defeat the Government.
Turning briefly from the strictures of the Heralds editorials to its
reporting of the events as they unfolded; the widely-read and admired Hannen
Swaffer recorded the announcement in Parliament of the King's abdication.89
Far from suggesting that the crisis had damaged the monarchy, even
temporarily, Swaffer's message was "business as usual". His report represents
the events as a demonstration of the strength and durability of Britain's
Constitution, and also of the character of the British, epitomised by Stanley
Baldwin. Herald readers are implicitly asked to celebrate the peculiar,
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admirable British way of resolving a crisis, and to see their own imperturbability
reflected in Baldwin's performance. To take the latter point first:
the unaffected dignity, the simpleness
he (Baldwin) told in plain, unvarnished words
in words so unaffected
a simpleness of speech
his frankness. .the very ingenuousness of it all
This undemonstrative performance found reflection in the behaviour of the
public outside the House of Commons.
People moved along. There was no fuss, no excitement
London passed on its way
Swaffer's romantic, unradical and rather conventional view of monarchy and
Empire, provides the framework for his reporting of events.
An uncritical acceptance, even a celebration, of the imperial Crown, was
complemented by a celebration of the virtues of a constitutional monarchy, in
which the popular will was triumphant.
"...the Commons had survived crisis after crisis and preserved, for our
heirs, a great heritage of liberty. Yesterday, another crisis had passed."9°
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It is well to reflect on the implications of a Labour newspaper offering such an
interpretation of the crisis. It is perfectly fitting that so conservative a story
should have as its hero the figure of Baldwin. Whilst the narrowly constitutional
focus of the Herald's editorial treatment may have been sensible and
necessary, Swaffer's particular, conservative contextualisation of the crisis
more accurately represented the Herald's customary treatment of royalty and
monarchy.
Reynolds News. 
As a weekly newspaper, Reynolds News had restricted opportunity to
report the episode, with one edition on 6th December, and the next one
appearing after the Abdication had taken place. Nevertheless, these two
editions will be analysed, particularly as their editorials differed radically from
other articles devoted to the crisis. If any Reynolds reader had anticipated a
radical analysis of the issues raised by the King's proposed marriage, they
would have been grievously disappointed. The first editorial devoted to the
subject is characterised by an almost exaggeratedly restrained and reverential
tone, and is curiously oblique in its reference to the nub of the problem. 91 An
eighty-word opening paragraph is dense with abstract nouns, and particularly
nouns of sentiment:
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esteem rejoicing sorrow sympathy (x2) regret
controversy sincerity emotions
The deployment of all these abstract nouns within two highly complex
sentences suggest a reluctance to broach the issue in plain terms. The
editorial begins with praise of the King.
"A King whose service to the people promised to make him the most
popular monarch in history.. ,,92
One could observe that this was not so different from the initial commentary in
the Herald. However, Reynolds displays a reticence in dealing with the causes
of the crisis which is difficult to comprehend. There is no mention of public
disapproval of the King's choice of spouse, nor of the actual or potential
influence which this disapproval might have upon the Government. As far as
the readers might discern from the editorial, the crisis stemmed simply from the
Cabinet's refusal to legislate to enable a morganatic marriage. The editorial
then affects not to understand why the King should have made such a request.
'Why the King desires to make the lady his wife but not his Queen we
do not know."93
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This disingenuous statement has the effect of closing down the real area of
conflict; that the King indeed wanted Mrs Simpson to be Queen and that this
was unacceptable to large numbers of the public.
Having failed to set out the true origins of the dispute, the editorial turns
to the "constitutional problem". Here, its conclusions mirror those of the Herald,
with references to:
the people's prerogative
our democratic freedom
the King must accept the advice of his Cabinet
The editorial then relapses into the initial tenor; into vague expressions of
goodwill and hope which offer no indications of how the crisis might be
resolved, of what the alternatives appear to be, or of what the newspaper's
preferred outcome was.
"In that spirit the nation can face its crisis calmly and whatever the
outcome can settle its problem with fairness and equity, with the dignity
becoming a Democracy on whom the eyes of the world are fixed, and without
weakening those ties of loyalty which now link King and People."94
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The blandness and disingenuousness of the editorial suggest how far away
from its radical traditions the newspaper was moving, under commercial
pressure, to broaden its appeal and to increase circulation.
Blandness seasoned with complacency best describes Reynolds other
editorial on the abdication crisis. 95 The outcome is portrayed as a victory for
"the people", "the people's prerogative" and for "Democracy". The depth of the
divisions during the crisis, even within the Labour Party, and the strength of
feeling on both sides, are denied in the misleading assertion that:
"During seven days the nation refused to be divided against itself.."96
However, there is reference to the attempts made by Rothermere,
Beaverbrook and Mosley to create a "King's party"; attempts which the people
treated "with contempt". Self-congratulation is in order, as the outcome
demonstrated the strength of British democracy.
"A problem which could not have been raised anywhere else in the world
without bloodshed, has been resolved here without the firing of a shot or the
cracking of a head."97
The blandness and complacency of the Reynolds editorials are,
however, at odds with the tone and contents of several articles and reports
carried by the same issues of the paper. There would seem to have been
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internal conflict between those contributors adhering to Reynolds old, radical,
anti-monarchical tradition, and a newer, commercially-driven element. The
latter was attempting to broaden the newspaper's appeal, by adopting a
position which resembled the Herald's enthusiasm for Britain's constitutional
monarchy. Opposing this was the former editor of the New Leader, H.N.
Brailsford. His article, entitled "Monarchy or Republic", adopts a hostile, critical
tone, not only towards the monarchy itself but towards the Daily Herald. 98 On
the former, Brailsford employed terms which emphasised the anachronistic
and mystificatory nature of monarchy in the modern world.
outworn relics unreason unreality
obsolete sacerdotal opiate
Unlike the conservative representation of monarchy, in which maintenance of
tradition was heralded as a strength, Brailsford represents it as an affront to
modernity and as a barrier to genuine democracy. On the latter subject,
Brailsford parts company both with the Herald and with his own newspaper's
editorial line, rejecting their uncritical belief in the democratic character of
Britain. The last editorial in Reynolds on the crisis had interwoven particular
key phrases, indicating by its textual organization the inter-dependent nature of
the following :99
368
people's prerogative (x2)
Democracy
constitutional monarchy
the Constitution
Political Democracy (x2)
In contrast, Brailsford characterises Britain as a partial democracy.
'We are allowed to enjoy our democratic rights in this docile island
because we rarely choose to use them."10°
Brailsford employs category labels which are found neither in the Herald nor in
Reynolds editorials.
the governing class	 the capitalist ruling class
the plutocracy	 that ruling class
The monarchy is a functional element in a class society, and has "served
powerfully to preserve things as they are".101
In condemning the Herald's position during the crisis, Brailsford
implicitly criticises his own newspaper. The constitutional arguments which had
been deployed in the editorials of both newspapers and in the several
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contributions by Laski in the Herald are dismissed as "pedantry", and
according to Brailsford, were not the real reasons why many in the party had
accepted the leadership's position.
"If it [the Labour Party] were really thinking on the lines the Daily Herald
laid down, few of us could support it.. .What Labour saw, and rightly, was the
ugly chance that a party of the King's men might be formed to exploit this
crisis." 102
More interestingly for a writer of Brailsford's shrewdness and insight, he posed
a series of questions concerning the conservative opposition to the King.
Although the questions are not answered directly, they emerge from the
"instinct" of "many of us", which suggests that Brailsford, a more than usually
astute observer of the political scene, shared the premise of his questions with
a wider Labour audience.
"Was there not a clash of temperament and outlook between the Old
Guard and this spirited young King? Had not his visit to South Wales
something to do with it, or perhaps even his bolder pilgrimage to the wreckage
of Karl Marx House in Vienna? In short, was the Old Guard deposing, with the
Church's aid, a young man who had courage and popular sympathies?"1°3
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The implicit answers to Brailsford's questions seem to be "yes", which placed
him in disagreement with the Herald. The latter had, it may be recalled,
referred to the rumours of "Old Guard" disapproval of the King's views, only to
dismiss the overall significance of that disapproval. Brailsford's arguments, and
his suggestion that "many of us" held these views, hint at a rather complex set
of Labour attitudes operating behind the public facade, at variance with the
ostensibly straightforward, constitutional point insisted upon by the party
leadership.
Unlike the Herald, Reynolds News carried reports of statements in
support of the King, from Labour politicians, union leaders and a local party. 104
The Herald had reported only Conservative and Fascist expressions of support
for the King, as its editorial policy appears to have been to suppress any direct
evidence of Labour support for Edward. Reynolds was, at least, prepared to
report the Labour prospective parliamentary candidate who supported the
King's right to choose whom he liked as his wife, the union leader who pledged
the loyalty of his membership to the King , and the Northampton Labour
councillors who sent a telegram to Attlee and to the King, urging the former to
take office if invited by the latter. 105 Perhaps as a consequence of a more
liberal editorial policy, or perhaps with a more intrusive and persistent radical
strain undercutting its 'respectable' editorial line, Reynolds offered a confused
and confusing treatment of the abdication crisis, which stands in contrast to the
consistency and discipline of the Herald during the episode.
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Daily Express. 
The editorials which will comprise the main focus of this analysis are
characterised by two points of emphasis: the qualities of the King; and the real
state of public opinion. A further area of interest is the attribution of
responsibility for the crisis, and the representation of the capacities to act of
the respective participants. Taking this latter point first, there is a striking point
of contrast with the version offered by the Herald. Both newspapers published
editorials on December 4th which expressed dismay at the lack of information,
which prevented the public from understanding the problem clearly. The
respective headlines are:
PREMIER MUST TELL ALL FACTS (Herald)
Tell The People! 	 (Express)
However, the Herald's version denies any active agency to the King. It is the
Cabinet, and more particularly the Prime Minister, who are located in this
ergative role. The Express editorial places the King in the role of initiator of
action. However, unlike the Herald, the Express's headline does not indicate
who should do the telling. Also, whilst the Herald, within the headline and
immediately afterwards, specifies the teller, and repeats modality of
compulsion, the Express waits until nearly the end of its editorial before
identifying the King as being the "teller" in question. In calling for the King to
"tell the people", the Express employs an interesting linguistic construction.106
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"Let the King speak then. Let the King give his decision to the people.
And let him give the reasons for it too."
This construction projects the King into the role of informer, offering his version
of events, whilst qualifying his agency. The verb "let" can be interpreted here
as expressing a mere proposal, or as a call for permission to be granted. The
former seems the more likely intended meaning, but it also serves to disguise
and qualify the King's autonomy to act. The Express seems aware that in
calling for the King to put his case to the people, speaking for himself and not
through his ministers, it was in dangerous constitutional waters. The bulk of the
editorial is concerned with the King's qualities. Whilst the Herald had
acknowledged these and the King's popularity, they were then displaced; they
were "not the question". For the Express, those qualities formed the
centrepiece of its case, and the constitutional point about ministerial advice
was not just displaced, but entirely ignored throughout its commentary on the
crisis.
The Government had received no mention in the editorial of
December 4th, but by the following day, after Baldwin's statement to
Parliament, the Express brought the Government into the picture as the
unambiguous agent of the crisis.
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"Mr Baldwin and his Government are making a direct challenge to the
King... It is a man-made crisis.. .This thing can be brought to a close whenever
Mr Baldwin and his Government desire - by withdrawing their opposition to the
King's intention of marrying."1"
In the previous day's editorial, the King was accorded the agency of choice, but
in the second editorial the Government is accorded the agency of resolution of
the crisis.
A final point of contrast with the Herald pertains to the identification of
public support. Although neither newspaper possessed any scientifically-
gathered data about public attitudes, they both associated 'public opinion' with
their own respective positions.
"For Mr Baldwin and the Government do not reflect the true feelings of
the British people if they base their opposition to the marriage - as their press
supporters do - on the grounds that Mrs Simpson has divorced her
husband.° °8
A key aspect of the newspapers' handling of the crisis was a struggle to
establish the coincidence of public opinion with the newspaper's own position,
and to challenge their opponents' attempt to appropriate public opinion. The
Herald had done so through its references to "millions" and "vast numbers" of
people, seeking to influence its own sceptical, pro-King readership by implicitly
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categorising them as part of the unrepresentative minority. In the Herald's
case, the putative "millions" also help to project the Government's stance as
popular, and Baldwin's attitude as representative of public opinion. By
December 7th, the Express was on the defensive in this matter. Unlike the
Herald, which merely asserted "public opinion", the Express was moved to
question it.
II 
...powerful voices are claiming to speak in the name of 'public opinion'.
These voices are against seeking a settlement on the basis of respecting the
King's wish to marry. Just what is that 'public opinion'? It has been assumed
among things that the Empire countries are ranged behind the British
Government on this question. As the days pass and 'public opinion' is
manifested not only in newspapers but in demonstrations of loyalty and the talk
of the street, it becomes plain that the Empire public is as little informed and as
undecided as our own."1"
Two points immediately arise: the Express noticeably does not claim itself to
be speaking in the name of 'public opinion'; in listing its manifestations of
public opinion, the Express demonstrates the frailty of any claim to know
accurately what that opinion was. However, the Express does claim the
recruitment of the popular will to its own cause.
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"In this business, the people have not yet had their say. We imagine
that they will. And we believe they will put a meaning to it when with all their
heart they sing....Long to reign over us, God save the King."11°
There was an almost threatening undertone to this prediction. The Express
failed to specify the mechanism by which the people would have their say; a
general election in which a "King's party" took part, or large street
demonstrations, were the obvious means of expression.
Daily Mail. 
Although Beaverbrook and Rothermere were bracketed together by the
Herald as anti-democratic supporters of the King, the Express and the Mail
were quite different in their treatment of the crisis. Labour supporters who read
either of these two newspapers were exposed to undiluted praise of the
personal qualities of the King, but two significant differences between them will
be examined: the way in which popular opinion is handled; and the crucial
bearing of the Empire and the Dominions on the way the Mail reacts to the
unfolding events. As with the other newspapers, it is editorials which will
provide the textual source.
The Mail began its commentary with a moderate and balanced
summary of the situation, mentioning at once, unlike the Express, that it
concerned the relations between the King and his ministers, and arose from
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the King's marriage plans)" This first editorial praised the record and conduct
of the King and expressed hope for a solution to the crisis. However, the
following day saw a marked shift in tone and attitude. Baldwin had yet to
address Parliament on the subject, but the Mail appeared to be reacting to
increased levels of speculation about abdication, and to criticisms of the King.
Linguistically, there is high-frequency use of modal verbs:
It [abdication] must never happen
The King and his Ministers must find a way out
he must not be hurried
The country should be clearly informed
The nation should be taken into the confidence..
There is an insistence and urgency in the language, and in characterising
reaction in the country, the text avoids nominalization in favour of direct
attribution of feeling to the public:
The people want their King
His subjects know..
They resent most strongly...
His subjects well know...
His country is proud of him
It [the country] is not prepared to part with him
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As with all the newspapers, the Mail operated on assumptions about levels of
popular support for the King. It purported to know the attitudes and mood of an
undifferentiated public:
..the determination of the country grows..
It is their [his subjects] belief that..
His country is... ready and eager to follow..
he has their sympathy and affection.
At least the Mail attempted to provide some evidence of popular support for the
King by referring to a meeting on 3rd December for the "Defence of Freedom
and Peace" in London at which the 7000 people present repeatedly cheered
the King's name.
Whilst Baldwin's statement to Parliament served to ignite the anger of
the Daily Express, its effect on the Mail was quite the reverse. The stridency
and certainty of the previous day's editorial melted away. The key to the
change lay in Baldwin's reference to the replies received from the Dominions,
which had been asked for their response to the proposed marriage and to the
possibility of a morganatic arrangement. The Mail, with its unqualified devotion
to the Empire and the Dominions, was caught in a bind. Only two days before,
the King's imperial role had been cited as one reason why abdication would be
calamitous.
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"Today by the effect of the Statute of Westminster he is the lynch-pin of
Empire and the sole link between the Mother-country and the Dominions.
When such is the position there is every confidence among his wide and varied
peoples that he will answer the Imperial call in the same splendid manner as
so often in the past."112
The reply from the Dominions, as presented by Baldwin, was that neither Mrs
Simpson nor morganatic marriage was acceptable, a point which the Mail
claimed was of "immense importance". With the caveat that "much depends on
the manner in which the situation was put to the Dominion Governments", the
Mail appeared to bow to the inevitable in acknowledging the significance of the
Dominions' attitude in determining the Prime Minister's position.113
"The Prime Minister's statement will seem to many stiff and
uncompromising... But Mr Baldwin's attitude has largely been affected by the
replies of the Dominion Governments."'"
The Mail's resignation to losing the King is further indicated in the next
editorial to appear. 115 There are no modals of compulsion or advisability, but
the text is replete with nominal groups indicating states of mind. These
structures indicate crisis without indicating or invoking courses of action.
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acute and painful anxiety
agitated consultations
affectionate concern
profoundest concern
overwhelming concern
intense concern
deep sympathy
heroic tragedy
deeply lament
The overlexicalisation in evidence here might indicate not just regret at the
overall calamity of the loss of a popular monarch, but regret that, hard as it was
for a loyalist newspaper such as the Mail to admit, the outcome was of the
King's own making. Although embedded in a conditional structure, the
attribution of responsibility to the King is unambiguous.
"If by his Majesty's own act of will the King's subjects are to lose the
benefit of his vast knowledge of the Empire... 016
Mrs Simpson's offer to withdraw appeared to give the Mail some slight hope of
avoiding abdication. Calls for action and indications of necessity reappear,
expressed through modality which had been noticeably absent from the
previous days' editorials.117
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This reflects the Mail's gradual shift of attitude, beginning from the Dominion
governments' rejection of the marriage proposals, towards a tacit demand that
the King must abandon the marriage and remain on the Throne. Unlike the
Express, it does not invoke the King's right to choose his spouse. Given the
feelings of the Dominions, such a choice did not exist. Instead of the right to
choose, the Mail increasingly emphasises the King's duty to serve. If Mrs
Simpson is prepared to sacrifice her wishes, then, the Mail implies, so should
the King.
"If the King shares her sacrifice and now reaches a decision for which
the nation hopes, he will be wondrously repaid... Duty is the lodestone of
Sovereigns... It is the prayer and dearest hope of uncounted multitudes. .that he
will turn to them again with the noble words: 'I servem.118
Despite its desperation that the King should choose to stay and serve, the Mail
was neither bitter nor condemnatory when Edward abdicated. It retained its
affection for him:
a beloved King
a splendid King
Its position was essentially loyalist, described in a piece of self-reference:
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"The Daily Mail stood by Edward VIII, and it will ever stand by George VI.
Whatever other newspapers may fail, the Daily Mail will not, in this primary
duty to the country."119
Apart from its consistently loyalist tenor, the Mail had expressed its approval of
Baldwin's "correctness" of attitude. It had made little of the Crown versus
Parliament issue, and nothing of the morganatic marriage idea. The bombastic
loyalism of the Express was never a possibility for the Mail, once the
opposition of the Dominion governments to the marriage had become clear.
The Express, with its strident populism, was prepared to deny the significance
of the replies from these governments, asserting that they did not reflect the
views of the respective populations. The Mail, more respectful of established
structures of authority, accepted their importance, and the newspaper's
treatment of the crisis derived from this factor an uncharacteristic caution and
moderation.
A point of interest is provided by an open letter to the Mail's editor
from Rothermere, the proprietor. 120 In many ways, Rothermere's letter reflects
the Mails dilemma over the crisis. Effusive personal praise for the King
accompanies recognition of the "good intentions" of Baldwin. However, in two
respects, Rothermere's approach differs from his newspaper's. First, he makes
positive reference to the idea of a morganatic marriage, and claims that this
was always the intention of the King.
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"When it was declared in Parliament that morganatic marriage was
unknown to the law of England, it should have been remembered that also
unknown to the law of England is a constitutional situation similar to the
present and the legislation which abdication would necessitate."121
Moreover, Rothermere fails to mention or to take account of the replies of the
Dominion governments. His newspaper had provided daily reports of reactions
in the Empire, and Baldwin had informed Parliament that the proposed
marriage, including a morganatic one, was unacceptable to those Dominions.
On this occasion, Rothermere's normal imperial considerations were
subordinated to his enthusiasm for the King's cause. Ironically, his newspaper
adopted a position more sensitive to the interests of imperial unity than did the
great Fleet Street imperialist himself.
Conclusion. 
The leadership of the Labour movement, in the persons of Attlee,
Bevin and Citrine, and its leading consitutional expert, Laski, maintained an
unflinching commitment throughout the crisis. It was a commitment to the
principle of the Crown's subservience to Parliament, although the role of
Parliament was far smaller than that of the Cabinet during the abdication crisis.
In this commitment, the leadership demonstrated both its belief in the
Constitution, and a strong disinclination to entertain any move which might
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allow the Crown's influence to be reasserted. Strong leadership was required,
given the temptations offered by the situation to undermine the National
Government, and to break the political impasse in which Labour found itself in
the 1930's. Ranged against this position were those who were prepared to
exploit any opportunity to wrest power. The dangers inherent in appearing to
advocate the course supported also by Churchill, Beaverbrook, Rothermere
and Mosley, were either not apparent, or were considered worth the risk, given
the domestic and international emergencies. The speed with which events took
place, once the matter had been made public, assisted the leadership's cause.
Grass-roots opinion in the Party is difficult to assess, but there was little time
for any momentum to develop behind calls for Labour to support the King,
whether that support might be motivated by misperceptions of the King's
radicalism, or by pure opportunism.
The newspaper analysis throws up several points. The Herald's
firm and uncompromising line may have been more fragile than first appears.
Its presentation of the case reveals an anxiety that the constitutional issue of
Crown versus Parliament was not as appealing or emotionally powerful as the
personal drama of the King's dilemma. Uncertainty about the attitude of its
readership, and of the wider public, underlies the earlier articles during the
crisis. The dangerous atmosphere in which the Herald pursued its case is
illustrated by the approach of the Daily Express. It is worth reiterating that the
Express had a circulation of more than two million, one quarter of whom were
Labour voters. Its behaviour reflected the irresponsibility of its proprietor, and
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helps to set in perspective the statesman-like conduct of the Labour leadership
and the movement's official newspaper. The Daily Mail's refusal to take up the
King's case helps to point up Labour's position. As was seen at the time of the
Silver Jubilee, those moments when national awareness is heightened
generate revealing insights into the ideology of political groupings. For the Mail
in December 1936, its devotion to the idea of Empire subordinated all else,
even at the expense of loyalty to the monarch. For the Express, or for
Beaverbrook in particular, all was subordinate to personal loyalty to the
monarch. Its populism and increasingly demotic tone, remarked upon in
Chapter Four, inclined it to appeal over the heads of governments and
politicians to popular opinion. The whiff of 'Church and King' mobs was in the
air. In contrast, for the Labour leadership (with the Herald as its mouthpiece),
the Constitution was all. Its belief in the sovereignty of Parliament, and its faith
in the constitutional monarchy as it had developed over the previous fifty years,
gave Labour no alternative but to support Baldwin and his Cabinet.
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Chapter Six - The Labour Party and the Honours System. 
One side-issue of the relationship between the Labour Party and the
monarchy is the honours system. The sovereign is the fount of honours, and
may support or resist nominations for them. Politicians may be the recipients
of honours, or, when party leaders, be the source or channel of nomination. In
the period under analysis in this thesis, substantial parts of the system
involved hereditary titles and privileges. All of these points were (and are)
problematic for a Labour Party with democratic, egalitarian or even just
meritocratic pretensions. In describing the period immediately following the
Great War (which saw the introduction of many new honours), Cannadine
indicates the core of the problem.
"Here were hierarchical honours for a hierarchically conceived
society. And it worked, connecting the craving for recognition with the
acceptance and reinforcement of social hierarchy —a connection which has
remained indissoluble in Britain ever since. As witness the enthusiasm with
which trades unionists and Labour politicians came to embrace it. Behind this
lay the British monarchy itself; the fountain of honour and the apex of
traditional society..."1
Of all the pre-democratic vestiges of British public life, the honours system
involved more Labour politicians and trade union leaders in more controversy
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than any other. When the Labour Party held office, attention focused on the
Prime Minister's powers of patronage. At other times, the question was
whether, or in what circumstances, Labour leaders should accept honours. The
disputes arising throw into light two related points of contention: whether or not
the honours system, in a reformed, non-abused form, should have any place in
a modern society; to what extent the Labour Party could or should
accommodate itself to an inherently inegalitarian and undemocratic system.
Honours became a major source of controversy within the Labour Party
for two complementary reasons. During the Great War, Labour politicians and
trade union leaders began to receive honours for services to the nation. These
services were either of a direct kind, such as membership of the wartime
coalition government, or more indirect, such as co-operating with the changes
in employment and industrial practices demanded by wartime production. To
the substantial anti-war minority in the party, such honours added insult to
injury. As Henderson became a Privy Councillor and Ben Turner received an
0.B.E., it appeared to some in the party that Labour's leadership was being
drawn into ever-closer relations with political opponents.
"...the official Labour Party and the majority of leading trade union
officials are becoming more and more suspect owing to their acceptance of
places and honours from the Government - honours and places given with no
damned nonsense about merit."2
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The objection at this time was more to the conferment of honours for "war
service" than to the acceptance of honours per se. So Ben Turner defended
his acceptance of an O.B.E. by citing the letter of announcement from Lloyd
George.
"It mentioned nothing about the war. It was granted for services rendered
to our trade union. That was why I accepted the honour."3
The premise seemed to be that if a recipient was being rewarded for
honourable reasons, there was nothing wrong with acceptance. The system
itself did not present a problem, only specific applications of it. However,
there were more radical Labour objections to the wartime honours, exemplified
in C.H. Norman's explicitly republican I.L.P. pamphlet.
"All members of the Labour Party should be asked to pledge
themselves against taking office until they are in the majority and against
taking any kind of orders, decoration or honours from the King.. .the sweeping
away of the honours system.. .would also be of benefit to the community which
is only likely to occur when the Labour Party governs the country."
The sale of honours, by both Conservative and Liberal
administrations, had a long history. There had been allegations in 1894 and
1906 that honours had been procured after certain individuals had contributed
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to party funds. In 1914 and 1917 the question of the sale of honours had been
raised in the House of Lords. On the latter occasion, examples of abuse had
been cited, and a tariff of prices corresponding to the degree of honour had
been quoted. By 1919, the scandal was so grave that the House of Commons
could no longer ignore it. The Labour Party supported an attempt to end the
secrecy which surrounded sources of party funds, voting for an unsuccessful
motion which demanded that "the bestowal of honours in recognition of
subscriptions to such funds should be discontinued". Officially, the Labour
Party went no further than condemning the abuses of the honours system, but
individual M.P.'s went further. Jack Jones, member for Silvertown, was one of
these.
"So far as some of us are concerned, we protest against nobility in the
sense of giving men handles to their names, and we demand a real nobility
that is a nobility of service with all of us doing our fair share of public service
and taking the reward which that service gives."5
This was categorical opposition to participation in the honours system. This
position demanded a common citizenship, the abolition of artificial social
distinctions and the elevation of service as the primary individual motivation.
This argument found its most eloquent advocate in R.H. Tawney, whose ideas
are considered later.
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As controversy over the abuse of the honours system made reform of it
imperative, Labour was forced to define more clearly its attitude to the issue.
Some aspects were unproblematic: Labour opposed hereditary honours and
those awarded for payment. When, in 1922, Parliament considered the
establishment of a Select Committee to examine the method of submitting
names for honours, J.R. Clynes, then leader of the Party, denounced the
practice of conferring honours for payment or for political service.
"Give them.. .for merit... .A distinction conferred for services ought not to
become a title or a privilege for another purpose. Hereditary titles are totally
inconsistent with our present-day democratic circumstances."6
Clynes appeared to accept the award of honours for "genuine merit", rejecting
only the hereditary and the corrupt features of the system. Of greater ultimate
significance than Clynes's attitude was that of MacDonald. He consistently
stated his opposition to the farce which the honours system had become in
practice, and declined to accept personally any title save the customary "Right
Honourable" which accompanied a Privy Councillorship. However, he did not
share Jack Jones' ideal of a society free of all honours and titles except that of
"citizen". MacDonald believed that,
393
"Democracy is not at all inconsistent with laurels. A people of simple and
chaste tastes may quite properly say to those who have served it well and in
singleness of purpose: 'Well done, good and faithful servant.m7
What MacDonald found abhorrent was the fact that these honours had often
been awarded to the wrong people. As far as he was concerned all honours
had been devalued, for even Privy Councillorships had been bought and sold
between 1906 and 1910. He struck out against the vulgarising of honours, and
demonstrated that his objection was not to the honours themselves but to the
recipients thereof.
'We should feel right in the centre of our souls the disgrace of a titled crowd
of nobodies.. .The ways of a rich plutocracy have for long been corrupting us
and have even found harbourage in Labour cracks. The whole evil is
symbolised in the traffic in 'honours' and the man who is decorated."8
He proposed a thorough investigation by a future Labour government into
abuse of the honours system, with a committee having powers to send for
papers and persons connected with the sale of honours.
"Every peer created within the last twenty years should be asked to send
under oath a statement of his peerage transactions, and if information is
supressed or falsified he should be prosecuted for perjury. No one who has
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bought a peerage should be allowed to vote in the House of Lords.. .All those
who have bought their way into the Privy Council should be dismissed at once
and that body should be purified again."9
Like other Labour leaders, and many politicians of other parties, MacDonald
was scandalised by some of the honours awarded in the 1920's. Sir William
Vestey, a meat contractor who had profiteered during the war and then moved
his business abroad to avoid taxation, received a peerage. When Sir Joseph
Robinson, recently prosecuted in South Africa for corrupt practices, was
recommended for a peerage, the outcry was such that the Government had to
accede to the demand that a Royal Commission investigate the honours
system.
The Commission's critical gaze focused on the issue of political honours.
It recommended that a committee of three Privy Councillors be set up, to which
the names of candidates for honours would be submitted, together with a
reason for recommendation, a statement of service, and a statement from the
party's patronage secretary or manager that no payment or expectation of
payment was associated with the proposed award. In addition, an Act should
be passed which would penalise anyone promising an honour for payment or
trying to secure an honour for payment. Henderson was Labour's
representative on the Commission, and he refused to sign its report. In his
"Note of Dissent", Henderson maintained that the recommendations were
inadequate to prevent venality or to allay public suspicion. Presuming that the
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Privy Councillors on the proposed committee would be from the Prime
Minister's own party, Henderson could not see how party interest and funds
could be entirely disregarded. In calling for an end to political honours,
Henderson, perhaps unwittingly, condemned all honours.
"In a democratic country it is a distinguishing mark of the good citizen that
he interests himself according to his opportunity in the well-being of the
community. It is indisputable that public service of great value has been
rendered by men and women whose thoughts have never dwelt upon titled
reward, and in view of the difficulty of keeping the honours list pure, I do not
believe that the abolition of political honours would in any way diminish either
the volume or quality of the services given to the community by its citizens."10
This conclusion was more than simply Henderson's own opinion. His note of
dissent was produced with the help of the Research Department, jointly
operated by the Labour Party and the T.U.C.
When the Honours (Prevention of Abuses) Bill came before the
Commons, Labour supported it, despite the reservations made by Henderson.
The official party policy was to support this compromise as it would end the
worst abuses, but on the left of the party a more radical approach to the
question of honours was voiced by Scottish I.L.P. members; a complete
abolition of the system. Thus James Maxton:
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"It would be raising the whole dignity of public life in this country if people
retained their own names without prefix or affix of any description."11
George Hardie, like Maxton a republican as well as an opponent of the
honours system, refused to vote for the Bill on the grounds that "the man with
real honour about him is the man who refuses all these things and keeps clean
for life". 12 Like republicanism, this was a position strongly held by a minority of
individuals in the Labour Party, but it was never likely to influence the
pragmatism of the Party leadership.
Some people found it difficult to believe that a Labour government
would act differently from its predecessors over the sale of honours. According
to an I.L.P. pamphlet, just before Labour first took office some I.L.P. officials
were approached by an agent for a wealthy individual seeking a title, who was
prepared to subscribe between twenty-five and thirty thousand pounds to I.L.P.
funds in return.
'When he discovered that there was 'nothing doing', his amazement was
laughable to witness. 'All other parties do it,' he said, 'why not the I.L.P."3
The first Labour Government did not confer honours on anyone for political
services, but MacDonald still found that honours and titles generated some of
the most lively controversy surrounding his Government. A hint of future
trouble had occurred at the Labour Party Conference in 1922, when
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membership of the Privy Council was discussed. With the formation of a
government, Labour was faced with the problem of the award of courtesy and
hereditary titles. Accepting the convention that at least two of the six
Secretaries of State should sit in the House of Lords, MacDonald circumvented
the difficulty as best he could. Haldane, Parmoor and Chelmsford, who were
already peers, were recruited as ministers. Olivier and Thomson, to whom he
gave peerages, were either unmarried or without heirs to their titles. With only
minimal exceptions, the conferment of hereditary titles for constitutional
reasons was generally accepted within the party.
However, when the King's Birthday Honours List was published in June
1924, it proved to be more controversial. Conforming to the recommendations
of the Royal Commission, a small committee examined the nominations for
honours, submitted by ministers, departmental chiefs, ambassadors and all
manner of organisations. The list went from the committee to MacDonald and
thence to George V, who "deleted about half a dozen names and added
some". 14 The list was unusual in its brevity and for the fact that no peerages
were granted. By all criteria but the most puritanical, the list was
unexceptionable.
"Mr MacDonald's first list of honours is satisfactory both for what it omits
and for what it includes... Not a single title.. has been conferred as a reward for
political services to our own Party... (We) find something reassuring in the
barrenness and austerity of this first honours list."15
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One name on the list, a name unknown to most, was to bring upon MacDonald
the public derision and accusations of corrupt practices which he had
condemned two years earlier.
A baronetcy had been awarded to Alexander Grant, the principal partner
in the biscuit concern of McVitie and Price, and an old personal friend of
MacDonald. Grant was a wealthy philanthropist who had, amongst other acts
of generosity, donated one hundred thousand pounds towards the creation of
the Advocates' Library in Scotland. For such good deeds, MacDonald
recommended in April 1924 that Grant receive a baronetcy. In September
1924, the Daily Mail revealed that MacDonald had acquired thirty thousand
one-pound shares in McVitie and Price during the previous March. MacDonald
admitted that he had received the loan of a Daimler car from Grant, and
maintained that the shares were to provide an income to pay for the running of
this car. He vehemently insisted that the honour to Grant had been for public
services. The embarrassment to MacDonald and the Labour Party was
intense, and the matter was "flung in our teeth at every village green
meeting. ,,16 Within the Labour Party, MacDonald's explanation was accepted
and his action defended, particularly as he had not made any secret of the
award.
"Long before Sir Alexander Grant suggested his gift to Mr MacDonald,
the Prime Minister had indicated to a Labour Party meeting in London that
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outside the men whom it was necessary for Government purposes to send to
the House of Lords he had no honours list, with the single exception of an old
personal friend who the previous year had performed a great public service.
That public service of course was the endowment of the Scots National Library
with a gift of one hundred thousand pounds."17
Besides requiring a specific degree of government representation in the
Lords, the constitutional convention was that the government's senior law
officers receive knighthoods. In February 1924, Hastings and Slessor,
respectively Attorney-General and Solicitor-General, were knighted. This
produced mixed reactions in the party, but the leadership's position was that
traditional practices should not be overturned. As in the matter of court dress,
the Labour leadership sought to emphasise the party's fitness to govern by
adhering to established tradition and practice. The Daily Herald gave its
support to the leadership.
"This is in accordance with an old and very firmly founded custom. As
long ago as 1873, the late Sir William Harcourt, on becoming Solicitor General,
made great efforts to be excused from accepting a knighthood; but so strong
was the effect of tradition that he was obliged to give way." 18
If the leadership regarded the pressure of tradition as irresistible, the same
was not true elsewhere in the party. At the first P.L.P. meeting following the
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conferments, Maxton denounced them, in part because there was no
constitutional necessity, but also, in the view of a later I.L.P. commentator,
because he feared it represented a loss of values.
he saw much more in it; he saw that once this creation of false castes
was established in the Labour Party, the old idea of comradeship would be
gone for ever."19
In reply to this criticism, MacDonald's rather weak excuse was that the two
men had acted on their own responsibility, and he did not attempt to argue that
it had been a constitutional necessity. This particular practice was to continue
in Labour governments until 1974.
Labour's second period of office saw a change in MacDonald's policy on
honours and titles. In 1929 he was concerned to strengthen Labour's
representation in the Lords, but appeared initially to be adhering to his practice
of not giving hereditary titles to men with heirs. He persuaded the childless
Sidney Webb to go to the Lords, despite Webb's reluctance and his wife's even
greater reluctance. Then he abandoned his plan to send Adamson to the Lords
as nominal Secretary of State for Scotland when a delighted Adamson told
MacDonald he must at once break the good news to his son." In November
1930 MacDonald asked Citrine and Bevin if they would help to strengthen
Labour in the Lords. Bevin considered the request, but declined. Citrine also
declined, partly because he had two sons, a fact which MacDonald knew. In
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fact, MacDonald no longer applied the criterion of having no heirs to his
selection of candidates for the peerage. He now seemed to regard the social
status of the candidate and any potential heirs to be of greater significance.
Thus when a trade union official approached him for a peerage,
"I could see it was impossible,' MacDonald said, 'because when this man
died his son would succeed to the peerage, and the position of an agricultural
labourer as a peer would be impossible."21
In defence of MacDonald's apparent snobbery, it could have been that he was
concerned about the financial difficulties for such an individual in taking his
seat. Those peers who were politically active received no salary, except when
holding a government post, and the annual cost of full-time work in the Lords
might be two hundred to three hundred pounds. However, there was no
obligation for anyone to take their seat in the Lords, so MacDonald's worry
would seem to have been about social "suitability". Giving peerages to men
with heirs seemed less of a problem when those men did not have humble
origins. In January 1930, Arthur Ponsonby received a peerage. He had a son,
but, more significantly, he had had a father who was private secretary to
Queen Victoria. In June 1930, Noel Buxton, the Minister of Agriculture, was
also made a peer. He had three sons, but this difficulty may have been
tempered by the fact that Buxton had been to Harrow and Trinity College,
Cambridge.
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By 1930, MacDonald's earlier distaste for conferring honours would seem
to have vanished. In January of that year, he created eight new peers, only two
of whom were needed as ministerial spokesmen in the Lords. One of the eight
peerages went to Sir William Noble, chairman of the Cairne Line of
steamships, and an ex-president of the Chamber of Shipping. Noble was no
friend of the Labour movement, and the award brought a letter of protest from
the Transport and General Workers' Union. 22 If he was prepared to reward
individuals who were unsympathetic to Labour, it must also be said that
MacDonald was increasingly generous in his treatment of Labour people. In
January 1931, three current Labour M.P.'s 23 received knighthoods, and two
Government whips received C.B.E. 5. 24 Numerous local Labour people
received minor honours. All of these honours were "for public and political
services", and whilst no-one suggested anything financially corrupt was
happening, it was clear that the previous resistance to political honours had
crumbled.
Indisputably, it was MacDonald who brought about this change in policy.
He complained bitterly about the letters he received which begged for honours,
but yet felt impelled to offer them to people in the Labour movement. Having
offered an honour to Middleton, the party's Assistant Secretary, in 1930, he
then wrote to congratulate him when he refused it. The letter expressed
MacDonald's revulsion at the clamour to receive honours.
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"It is disgusting and makes me even more of a cynic. I am glad that I
refused everything offered to me whilst in opposition, that the solitary thing I
have I could not avoid and yet take office, and that what is now said to me is
that they would give me this or that, but that I know I would not accept it." 25
However true he remained to his determination not to accept honours himself,
MacDonald increasingly behaved just as his predecessors, in giving honours
for political service. The practice grew most spectacularly after 1931, when
MacDonald rewarded almost every parliamentarian who adopted the label
"National Labour". MacDonald refused a peerage three times, declined to
become a Knight of the Thistle and may well have declined a Privy
Councillorship in 1923. In this regard, he was far more self-denying than any of
his successors as a Labour Prime Minister. However, through the increasing
use of his power of patronage MacDonald indulged the worst instincts of some
Labour figures, and encouraged a tendency already recognised and deplored
by Beatrice Webb.
"There is far too much snobbishness - far too much regard for rank and
social status in the British Labour Movement. It is a good thing to set the
example of not considering a title as honourable to the person legally entitled
to use it."26
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The accusation of snobbishness, levelled at recipients of honours from a
Labour Prime Minister, was compounded by graver charges when the source
of the honours was the National Government. The concerns of critics focused
on several distinct aspects of the honours system. For Laski, honours
constituted one aspect of an unhealthy accretion of powers to the Prime
Minister, which also included the appointment and dismissal of ministers, the
exclusive right to express the Cabinet's viewpoint to the monarch and to obtain
a dissolution. Although he personally disapproved of the honours system,
Laski foresaw its continuation under a future Labour government and
suggested that the approval of candidates for honours be undertaken by the
whole Cabinet rather than just the Prime Minister.° A more radical critique was
offered by R.H. Tawney, who was less concerned with constitutional questions
of patronage than with the moral effects of the system. Tawney rejected
honours outright, except as a way of indicating stages in an official career. Like
Beatrice Webb, he had detected a creeping enervation, a loss of will and
direction, caused in part at least by Labour accepting their opponents' "livery".
"For Labour, knighthoods and the rest of it.. .there is no excuse. Cruel
boys tie tin cans to the tails of dogs; but even a mad dog does not tie a tin can
to its own tail. Why on earth should a Labour member? He has already all the
honour a man wants in the respect of his own people."28
405
It was, as Tawney acknowledged, a puritanical argument, but not irrelevant to
a political movement ostensibly committed to the ideal of social equality. In the
early 1930's, debate on the matter of honours tended to reflect upon the
experience of the second Labour Government, or else to consist of abstract
discussions of the values they represented and alternative notions of honour.
This debate was sharpened later in the decade by some particular cases
involving Labour people.
Prominent Labour figures had been absent from honours lists after 1931,
except for those who had defected with MacDonald. However, in June 1935,
the King's Birthday Honours List contained several Labour names, as the
Government attempted to give it a "national" character at the time of George
V's Jubilee. As well as a Privy Councillorship for Attlee, there were knighthoods
for Citrine, for Labour's Chief Whip, Charles Edwards, and for Arthur Pugh,
General Secretary of the Iron and Steel Trades Confederation. For some less
prominent people, there were C.B.E.'s. 29 The knighthoods provoked some
highly critical observations, as doubts were expressed about exactly what
service, and to whom, was being rewarded. Dalton recorded his own horrified
reaction at the "shocking news".
"To take these bloody titles at all (except the P.C.) is bad enough. But to
take them from MacDonald !,  What the hell will decent people in the
movement think? Citrine is by far the worst case." 30
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Citrine was sensitive to the criticism, and very resentful.
"It did not pass without comment that Pugh had been chairman and I had
been acting secretary of the T.U.C. at the time of the national strike nine years
earlier... In the Labour Party were to be found earls, barons, Privy Councillors,
knights, C.B.E.'s and other bearers of distinction in not inconsiderable
numbers. There had been no commotion about any of them, but I knew that I
would be a target no matter how others had fared."31
There were various strands to the argument against acceptance of
honours, and several of these were rehearsed in a commentary by a
Birmingham Labour officia1. 32 First, the origin of the honours was unacceptable,
i.e. a Government which had emerged from the events of 1931. Next, the
honours themselves were historically connected with practices which the
Labour movement held in contempt. Then, there was the fact that titles were
the symbols and expressions of social values and class distinctions which
Labour repudiated. Acceptance of them helped to perpetuate the status quo.
Finally, the association of so many of the honours with the Empire should be
unacceptable to a party which should not defend imperialism in even the
slightest degree.
There were others in the party who not only had no objection to honours
being conferred for service to the Labour movement, but who positively
enthused about the business. Those who objected were characterised not as
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principled upholders of the creed of social egalitarianism, but were to be
bracketed, according to Ivor Thomas, with "vegetarians, nudists, free-lovers,
theosophists". 33 To those such as Thomas, the honours system was no symbol
of class division or symptom of snobbery, but a harmless and even pleasurable
aspect of pageantry. This attitude was voiced by the leader writer of the New
Statesman, commenting on the aforementioned Birthday Honours List.
"This list was so long and so varied that one must be content with
congratulating all the recipients... It is good Jubilee stuff, typical of our British
democracy, and inexplicable to anyone but a Briton."34
This view struggled against the tide of indignation in the Labour Party and the
trade union movement.
In 1935, for the first time, and in response to the Birthday Honours
rumpus, the Party was asked to define its attitude towards the conferment of
honours upon its representatives. The debate at that year's annual conference
was on a motion which deprecated the acceptance of honours except where
necessary to ensure the passage of legislation. An amendment was then
passed which called for a clearer definition of Labour's attitude towards "the
ceremonial functions and so-called honours by which the decaying capitalist
system seeks to maintain its prestige and influence over immature minds" and
instructed the N.E.C. to "consider and report upon the conditions and
restrictions under which it shall be permissible for members of the Labour
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Party to accept 'honours' from capitalist governments." 35 A further point was
raised in asserting that "Socialist participation in such functions and honours
can be justified only in exceptional circumstances for the express purpose of
frustrating the propaganda of the capitalist parties". 35 The N.E.C. attempted to
sidestep the whole question by claiming that this was a matter for individual
consciences. The Conference would have none of this. Of interest and
relevance here was the connection made by the speaker opening the debate
between the honours system, the monarchy, and, more specifically, Edward,
Prince of Wales.
'We think that the question is not simply whether one or two of our own
members are going to carry titles, but whether this Party.. .shall identify itself
with those institutions and celebrations which are used by our opponents for
propaganda against us. Are we to identify ourselves with ceremonial functions
relating to a young man who will not hesitate to describe us as 'cranks' when
we try to deal with the stamping out of militarisation in the schools?"37
Following the conference debate and its specific instruction to the
N.E.C. to report on the subject, the party's constitutional sub-committee met to
deliberate. Citrine was a co-opted member of this committee, and submitted a
five-page memorandum dealing both with honours and attendance at
ceremonial functions. 35
 He was responding to a draft preliminary memorandum
from the committee. The committee had sought to draw a distinction between
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those honours which could, on practical grounds, be justified. By so doing, the
memorandum condemned as being without justification the acceptance of
honours such as Citrine's knighthood. Citrine defence was to challenge the
distinction between an acceptable and an unacceptable honour. The draft dealt
first with the hypothetical necessity of creating sufficient peers to abolish the
House of Lords. Citrine dismissed this as a most unlikely prospect. Secondly,
the committee observed that members of a Labour Cabinet automatically
became Privy Councillors. Citrine responded that it was unnecessary for a
Labour Cabinet minister to retain his membership of the Privy Council on
leaving office, and that appointment to it had increasingly become a reward for
public service. The committee had acknowledged that members of the party
who were in senior positions in the Civil Service might receive honours from a
capitalist government. Citrine found this a "fine distinction", particularly as
some honours conferred upon members of the party were as a result of service
on government committees or commissions. Turning to honorary degrees,
freedom of the city or orders of merit, the committee saw these as reward for
service and merit, conferred on persons of distinction. Citrine objected that it
could not be wrong to receive honours from the government and right to
receive them from a municipality. Generally, Citrine was able, with ease, to
expose the weakness inherent in the committee's memorandum. To attempt to
draw a distinction between types of honour, or between different recipients or
donors, was fraught with difficulties. If the principal criticism of the movers of
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the resolution at the 1935 conference had been that the honours system
helped to maintain "the decaying capitalist system", then Citrine had a point:
"If the honours system is wrong, it remains wrong whether the honours
are conferred by a Labour Government or a government of any other political
colour. If it is right for members of the Labour Party to be prohibited from
accepting honours from a capitalist government, it can scarcely be consistent
for a Labour Government to confer honours on members of the capitalist
classes."39
It would hardly be acceptable for the party to continue to use the existing
honours system, but only when in government, and to reward only its own
supporters. One could more easily take issue with Citrine's preference for
keeping the status quo and respecting the rights of individuals to accept
honours or not, and with his assertion that:
"The Movement is no more likely to be corrupted and deflected from
its purpose because certain of its members participate in ceremonial
functions...than is the government of the U.S.S.R. to lose its revolutionary
characteristics because its representatives participate in ceremonials with their
capitalist opponents, or because it has instituted an honours system and has
conferred distinctions upon prominent capitalists".49
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When, at the following annual conference (1936), the N.E.C.
produced its report, it proved to be a predictably anaemic document. The
diversity of ceremonial functions was cited as a reason for not attempting to
apply general rules of conduct. In the case of those associated with local
government, the decisions about accepting honours should rest with
individuals or with local parties. The Parliamentary Party could not be expected
to avoid all ceremonial functions, whether as the governing party or as the
official Opposition. Finally, the N.E.C. felt that pageantry should be encouraged
on the "right lines", and adapted to the purposes of the Labour movement. On
the more immediate and sensitive question of the acceptance of honours, the
report was equally evasive. By citing those instances where honours were
needed to fulfil constitutional requirements, such as peerages or Privy
Councillorships, or other cases such as honorary university degrees and the
freedom of cities, the N.E.C. made the issue appear so impossibly complex as
to defy attempts to apply rules of conduct.
"It would be impossible for the Labour Movement to lay down a binding
rule which would bar individuals fron accepting Honours. A ruling of this kind
could only be enforced by expulsion from the Party, and if any Honours are to
be recognised at all, the Movement would be called upon to differentiate
between the Honours which could and which could not be accepted - a task
which would not be without serious difficulties."'"
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The implication was that it was a task not worth performing. Not surprisingly,
the report provoked animosity amongst some delegates and divided the
conference almost equally for and against. Describing the report as "another
exhibition of tight-rope walking", a delegate moved the reference back of the
relevant section of the report. This was carried by 185 votes to 174, and was
the clearest indication yet of continuing disquiet in the party over honours.
At the same time, the trade union movement was examining the problem.
At the Trades Union Congress in 1935, a motion was debated regretting "that
active leaders of the Trade Union Movement should accept honours at the
hands of a Government which is not established in the interests of the
workers". 42 The mover of this resolution anticipated the objections of her
opponents by admitting that others had, in past years, received honours
without controversy or criticism, but claimed that it was not until the present
time that "the significance had been realised". It was the impact such conduct
had upon the rank and file of trade unionists which was the concern.
'We are wasting the goodwill, the faith and the trust of the workers of
the movement if we continue to accept honours on those lines."43
Clearly, the principal targets for attack were Citrine and Pugh. It was
unfortunate for supporters of the motion that it should be Citrine who replied to
it. His characteristically reasoned argument referred to the fact that the T.U.C.
had never declared its position on the question; many others had accepted
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honours over the years, with no ensuing rancour; it would be unfair to criticise
individuals implicitly by passing the resolution; if it was wrong to accept
honours, then it was wrong for Labour governments to distribute them. Citrine's
finale was unusually emotional in tone, and a raw appeal to the delegates'
sympathy.
"It is desperately hard to speak. I cannot think cogently because my
feelings run deep. I have tried to serve the Congress, and I hope you will
permit me to go on serving it."44
Following this powerful reply, the question was shelved and never resurrected
at the Congress. 45 Having already plunged so deep into the mire of the
honours system, it was easier and less divisive to continue on the same lines
than for the movement to extricate itself.
The arguments about the acceptance of honours drew in even the Co-
operative Party. Several prominent co-operators had received honours, the
most notable being Fred Hayward, who, as a former chairman of the Central
and United Boards of the Co-operative Union and the current chairman of the
Parliamentary Committee of the Co-operative Congress, received a knighthood
in January 1931. As this was conferred under a Labour government, it did not
generate much ill-feeling, but later an award made under the National
Government certainly did. The president of the Co-operative Wholesale
Society, William Bradshaw, was knighted in the Coronation honours list of May
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1937. At the 1938 Co-operative Party conference, the Birmingham and District
Party moved a resolution arguing that the acceptance of honours by co-
operators was not in the best interests of the movement and should be
deplored. It was a Labour M.P., A.V. Alexander, who replied to this resolution,
offering the weak and irrelevant argument that such a resolution might lead to
the Labour Party being unable to send people to the House of Lords to fight
the Government. The Co-operative Party was even more disinclined to grapple
with this question than Labour or the T.U.C. It passed overwhelmingly a motion
that no action be taken.
Despite the general failure of moves to prevent Labour's representatives
from accepting honours, there is evidence that some potential recipients were
deterred by the volume of criticism earlier awards had produced. At the time of
George VI's Coronation, there was a very modest Labour representation in the
honours list. Only Christopher Addison received a peerage and there were
Privy Councillorships for Snell and Pethick-Lawrence. Two trade union general
secretaries received minor honours, as did other trade unionists." The modest
proportions of Labour representation was viewed with a certain cynicism by
commentators on the left.
"If there are not many Labour names on the list, we may be sure that this
is not due to any lack of desire to make the list 'democratic'. It is a sign of
recent controversy and the widespread feeling throughout the Labour
movement over this question of honours."47
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One side-issue raised by the Coronation list was the relative merits of different
honours. Normally, within Labour circles the debate had been either whether or
not to accept, or for what reasons they should be awarded or accepted.
However, the Birmingham Town Crier gave its unconditional approval to the
award of 0.B.E.'s to local trade unionists, as this honour was "based more
upon merit and service than any other of the Ancient and Noble Orders which
have long since lost any significance as symbols of chivalry or dignity". 48 The
fact that this honour had been given to many "simple folk" for service to their
fellows made it compatible with the spirit of the Labour movement.
Conclusion. 
The attitude towards the honours system which prevailed in the Labour
Party by the late 1930's paralleled the leadership's declarations concerning the
monarchy. As described in Chapter Five, calls were made for reforms to the
monarchy which would modernise and simplify its character. Similarly, it was
claimed that a reformed honours system would be acceptable to Labour. Like
the monarchy, it should be "democratised". There were claims that such
change had already taken place.
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"A comparison of yesterday's Honours List with those of a generation ago
reveals the advance of democratic ideas and standards into what was once a
closed preserve of a small class."49
The fact that the kind of scandalous abuse which had flourished earlier no
longer seemed to occur, and that a proportion, albeit a tiny one, of the honours
went to recipients outside the traditional ruling elite, induced Labour into
acceptance of the system. A system inherently undemocratic and anti-
egalitarian continued to flourish, reinforcing the social divisions and differences
which Labour ostensibly sought to abolish. Its acceptance and continuation
under successive Labour governments indicated the deep conservatism of the
Party, not to mention the vanity of many of its leading figures. Of course,
Labour always contained within its ranks those who perceived the moral
malaise that participation in the Honours System both caused and reflected.
Tawney argued this case most powerfully in the 1930's, condemning political
honours in particular.
"The truth is that the whole business of political honours stinks - stinks of
snobbery, of the money for which.. .a good many of them are sold, of the
servile respect for wealth and social position which remains even today the
characteristic and contemptible vice of large numbers of our fellow
countrymen. It is precisely these things which are among the principal
obstacles in the path of the Labour Party. Why on earth does it go out of its
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way to strengthen their pernicious influence by allowing, without a murmur, its
members to do obeisance to them?"5°
To answer Tawney's question would mean exposing the contradictions at the
heart of the Labour Party. Whilst espousing the case for social change, for
greater equality, for democracy, for a new and better society, it gradually and
simultaneously became incorporated into the old ways. MacDonald almost
personified that contradiction. Refusing to participate as a recipient, lie
nevertheless dispensed honours with increasing generosity. Coming to terms
with the Honours System, as with the increasingly warm regard far titre
monarchy, signified Labour's readiness to accept, and even to celebrate ttre
conservative-national traditions.
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Conclusion to Thesis. 
The themes analysed in this work constitute some crucial
elements of Labour Party ideology. The latter was a complex which
emerged from two interacting forces. The first was the set of political
beliefs and attitudes which it derived from the nineteenth century. Labour
did not begin its existence with an ideological tabula rasa, but drew upon
an existing stock of radical, Liberal and social democratic ideas, amongst
which were a variety of attitudes towards the monarchy and the
Constitution. Neither the early I.L.P. nor the nascent Labour Party had
official, programmatic positions on either issue, apart from the abolition
of the House of Lords. However, there were elements and individuals
who brought a range of radical ideas about both issues into these new
parties.
From radical constitutionalism came a powerful faith in the
capacities of the British Constitution (excluding the House of Lords) to
facilitate Labour's reformation of society. Labour's rhetoric emphasised
the uniqueness and openness of the Constitution, and constantly
celebrated the progressive changes in British society which had occurred
through its mechanisms. This Whiggish conviction that, under the
Constitution, Britain had become a political democracy and would, in
time, become a social democracy, made it unnecessary to break cleanly
with the past. Worrying neither about its unwritten nature nor about its
undemocratic features (other than the Upper House), Labour discourse
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concerning the Constitution celebrated the protection of liberty and the
facilitating of parliamentary democracy. Given this ideological framework,
even an ancient, hereditary institution such as the monarchy could retain
a place. This was a powerful enough factor to counterbalance any
theoretical difficulties about a social-democratic government co-existing
with a monarchy.
From the tradition of anti-monarchism came a republican
rhetoric which never entirely disappeared from Labour's discourse. It was
particularly evident in Scottish socialist circles, reinforced by a
consciousness that the monarch was the King or Queen of England.
Anti-monarchism never permitted Labour to forget some uncomfortable
truths about the monarchy: that it was stupendously rich, whilst Labour
purported to speak for the poor; that it drew its friends from the
aristocracy and the plutocracy, and that such groups were no friends of
Labour; that it exhibited more than its fair share of decadent or immoral
behaviour; that Labour's political opponents found a sympathetic ear at
Court, and that the prevailing ethos there was Conservative; that the
hereditary principle was at odds with all Labour's democratic values; that
the very concept of royalty implied the existence of a social hierarchy,
which offended against Labour's egalitarian principles. It was a outlook
which prevented Labour from establishing an entirely comfortable co-
existence with an institution whose constitutional role unarguably became
progressively less problematic. However, this anti-monarchist element
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never sought to impose upon Labour a coherent programme of
constitutional change to a republican system. Indeed, it never brought
forth such a programme, which suggests that the prospect of change
was never taken seriously. There was a tacit acceptance among anti-
monarchists that the monarchy's strength and popularity all but ruled out
such a change in the foreseeable future, although in the fever of 1917 a
few republican hallucinations occurred.
From Labour's social-democratic convictions came a tendency
to relegate purely political change below the economic. This had a long
history in socialist politics, and played a part in Labour's self-conscious
distancing of its own politics from the Liberalism and radicalism of the
nineteenth century, regarded as being middle-class phenomena whose
day was done. Throughout the period covered by this work, leading
figures in the Party declared their belief that to attempt to replace the
monarchy would make no difference to Labour's main objectives, and
would, rather, provide a unnecessary distraction. Whilst this belief may
have been genuinely held, it also provided a convenient pretext for
avoiding confrontation on an electorally unpopular subject.
Interacting with this set of attitudes were a set of changing
circumstances. Principal amongst these was the relentless growth of the
monarchy's popularity. From its remote, exclusive and troubled image in
the earlier part of the nineteenth century, the monarchy, partly by design
and partly by force of circumstances, changed in fact and in perception.
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The gradual (even if this was sometimes exaggerated) withdrawal from
politics, enhanced its image as neutral arbiter and removed it from
political controversy. When this process suffered occasional lapses, as in
1910, 1914 and 1931, Labour's reaction demonstrated that suspicions
remained about the Crown's neutrality. The response to 1931 was
considerably more restrained than on the other occasions, but that may,
in part, have been due to a failure to appreciate the full extent of the
King's involvement.
The transformation of royal celebrations into national, and
even nationwide, events was a marked feature of the period. It perhaps
reached its culmination in the 1935 Silver Jubilee. The degree of local
participation was unprecedented, and even the most uncompromising
anti-monarchists could not deny the tide of enthusiasm. A more visible,
mobile monarchy brought it into contact with a wider public. The
deliberate cultivation of the image of the domestic ordinariness of the
royal family, and the projection of the national "family" metaphor,
appealed to a wide audience. Labour could simply not, even if it had
wished, have swum against this tide and hoped to increase its popularity.
A further change in circumstances that cannot be
discounted was the development of personal relationships between
Labour politicians and the monarch and other members of the royal
family. There is no doubt that many hitherto sceptics on the subject of
monarchy were influenced by the treatment received, as individuals and
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as a government, at the hands of the monarch. There was a sense of
flattery at being "accepted" at the highest social level. Without the steel of
principled objection to the monarchical system, there was a tendency to
succumb to the decency and humanity of the monarch himself, and to
conflate the man with the system.
What were the consequences for the Labour Party of the
attitudes taken and the positions adopted? It might be argued that in
constitutional terms, Labour's confidence in the Crown was justified in the
long run. The degree of political intervention continued to diminish, and
the reforming programme of 1945 proceeded without the need to assume
the Jacobin tactics envisaged by some in the mid-1930's. Until very
recently, the popularity of the monarchy has remained consistently high,
and there were relatively few high-profile provocations to the anti-
monarchists. Labour politicians enjoyed good relationships with
monarchs, and Labour prime ministers especially so. It may appear that
Labour had done well out of its acceptance of the monarchy. However,
there was a price. By turning its back so quickly and completely on
republicanism, Labour sacrificed a political framework within which many
of its social principles might flourish: its egalitarianism; its rejection of
inherited privilege; its preference for citizenship rather than subjection; its
dislike of snobbery and undue deference; its commitment to democracy
and to rational politics. All of these were potentially or actually
compromised by Labour's willingness to live with the old ways.
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APPENDIX.
A Note on Readership Figures for the Popular Press in the 1930's.
A study made in the early 1930's of newspaper readership, including
three of those popular papers analysed in this thesis, divided households
into three categories: Category A were families occupying eight rooms or
more and whose main breadwinner earned six hundred pounds per
annum or more; Category B occupied villas of six or seven rooms and
were earning five to twelve pounds a week; Class C lived in five or fewer
rooms and were "working class" in character. 1 Putting together results for
three regions, Greater London, the West Midlands and the North West,
the total penetration of four popular newspapers was as follows, in
rounded percentages:
A B C Total
Daily Mail 37 28 9 14
Daily Express 20 19 10 13
Daily Herald 5 14 28 24
News Chronicle 10 15 14 14
The Political and Economic Planning (P.E.P.) report on newspaper
circulation contained data collected in 1935 by the Incorporated Society of
British Advertisers. 2 Dividing the population into five categories on the
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basis of the annual income of the family's chief earner, the investigation
offered the following relevant information:
Group	 Income	 % of pop.	 Most common papers
3 250-300 pounds 14.3 Mail & Express
4 125-250 pounds 57.4 Express & Herald
5 under 125 pounds 24.0 overwhelmingly Herald
The Herald's dominance of the working-class market should not lead us
to ignore its share of the lower middle-class market. This was a point
revealed by readership surveys conducted on behalf of advertisers, which
led the latter to:
"...reassess stereotyped images of left publications as being
'down at heel'. For instance the 1934 official readership survey showed
that the Daily Herald was read by more middle-class people than The
Times, (even though the Herald's readership was predominantly working-
class. )3
As for the urban/rural divide, a study by P.E.P. discovered that in a South
Wales mining town in 1937, the distribution of national dailies was:
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Newspaper cyo
Herald 52
Express 32
Chronicle 12
Mail 3.5
The sample from a rural area straddling the Oxfordshire/Gloucestershire
border revealed a virtually equal distribution between the Herald, Express
and Mail. Two points which emerge from both the P.E.P. survey and a
wartime (1942) Mass Observation are: that the readership of the Daily
Herald was poorer than any other daily; and that its readership had a
higher proportion of men than any other popular daily. A post-war (1948)
Mass Observation survey revealed that the Herald's readership was
unusually long-standing, with 32% having taken the newspaper for
between six and ten years, and 40% having taken it for more than ten
years. This fact enables us to regard other findings of the 1942 and 1948
Mass Observation surveys as having some evidential value even for the
1930's. Two tables are particularly relevant. The first is the 1942 analysis
of the class composition of the readerships of four popular dailies. The
social categories are crude, but provide a rough picture:
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B — upper and middle class
C - artisan and skilled working class
D — unskilled working class
Table showing % of each class reading popular papers
B C D
Herald 5 9 13
Express 19 18 16
Mail 15 19 8
Chronicle 13 14 11
The second table indicates the political affiliations of readers, and is taken
from the 1948 survey.
Table showing % of readers who say they support these parties
Herald Express/Mail All
None 10 17 18
Labour 80 32 42
Conservative 7 41 29
Liberal 2 7 6
One point worth bearing in mind is the fact that only one quarter of all
Labour supporters in 1948 read the Herald. Even more significantly, in the
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1942 survey, over half of the Herald readers questioned claimed to have
no political attachment. Finally, the 1948 survey found that 92% of Herald
readers had been educated only to elementary school level, compared to
an all-dailies level of 72%. When Mass Observation generalised on the
basis of its 1948 survey about the readerships of the national press, the
Herald was set apart from the other popular dailies:
"It seems clear enough that the Daily Herald is most
outstandingly read for its politics, and readers of this paper are most of all
influenced by their class and political outlook, particularly the former, in
making their choice of paper. In so far as the other dailies are concerned
politics operate less directly as a determining factor, and are probably
influential only within the wider set-up of general background of interest."
Far more problematic to assess is the effect which a
newspaper has upon its readers. The surveys cited above reveal a little,
but they caution about the dangers involved in the self-reporting on which
they depend for their findings. Two points made on this topic have bearing
on the current work. The first deals with readers' perceptions of bias. Mass
Observation found that 37% of all readers surveyed objected to their
newspaper's political bias or unreliability, whilst only 25% commended
their paper for truthfulness or agreed with the bias. A notably high level of
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scepticism was recorded in the cases of two newspapers analysed in this
thesis. There were,
"...a good many cases of people who like their paper
because it is interesting and easy to read, though they disagree with its
policy — the Herald and the Express both provoke this reaction."5
The extent to which readers looked at the "opinion-forming" features of
their newspaper, i.e. leading articles, interested the P.E.P. investigators.
They found that only one third of readers of national morning newspapers
claimed to read completely the leading article. The figure was more than
twice as high for men as for women, and decreased with the income of the
reader. The 1948 Mass Observation study investigated how many
readers liked and read the editorial. For the three dailies analysed in this
thesis, the results were:
NEWSPAPER %LIKED EDITORIAL %READ EDITORIAL
Daily Mail 12 24
Daily Express 11 24
Daily Herald 4 15
1 H.G. LyaII, 1934, An Analysis of Press Circulation, London
2 Political and Economic Planning, 1938, Report on the British Press, London
3 J. Curran, Power Without Responsibility, London, p65
4 Mass Observation, 1949, The Press and its Readers, London, p100
s Mass Observation File Report, December 1938
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